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Abstract 
Statement of Purpose: 
Ethos, o� the character of the speaker, is a subject of interest 
to students of rhetoric. This study traces the concepts of ethos from 
classical to modern times, and identifies philosophical value systems 
on which these concepts are based. 
Hypothesis:. 
The study explores the hypothesis that similarities and differences 
exist between classical and modern concepts of ethos and that the concepts 
can generally be identified with philosophical value systems. 
Criteria and Procedure: 
The study is focussed by the following seven questions: 
(1) What philosophical value systems provided the bases for the concepts 
of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians? 
(2) What concepts of ethos are set forth by classical rhetoricians? 
(3) What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos 
set forth by classical rhetoricians? 
(4) What value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set 
forth by modern rhetoricians? 
(5) What concepts of ethos'·a.re set forth by modern rhetoricians? 
(6) What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos 
set forth by modern rhetoricians? 
( 7 ) What similarities and differences exist between concepts of ethos 
set forth by classical and modern rhetoricians? 
Materials: 
Both primary and secondary sources were used in this study. Basic 
sources included classical and modern rhetorics plus philosophical essays. 
Articles providing critical analyses were also consulted. 
Conclusions: 
The conclusions reached in this paper are as follows: 
(1) Classical value systems that could serve as bases for concepts of ethos 
were idealistic, naturalistic, and pragmatic. 
(2) Ethics in classical periods largely saw education as productive of 
righteous life styles and rhetoric as advisory. 
(3) Similarities in classical concepts of ethos are found in agreement 
on the importance of audience analysis, speak.er wisdom, and speak.er 
honesty or sagacity. Differences are seen in emphasis given to audience 
adaptation and speech content. 
(4) Modern value systems that have related to the concepts of ethos in 
rhetoric have been predominately naturalistic and pragmatic. 
(5) Education and rhetoric are more generally considered amoral, unrelated 
to value structures, by modern theorists. 
(6) Modern theories of ethos emphasize the importance of the speaker's 
--....._�_ 
reputation and language usage. They differ on the importance of content, 
purpose, and forms of proof needed to gain credibility. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND ORIGIN OF STUDY 
Aris to t le defined rhe toric as a " facul ty o f  dis cove ring all the 
pos s ib le me ans o f  p er s uas ion in any s ubje c t . 11 1 The mos t  e f fective o f  the 
art is t i c  p roofs used in pe rs uas ion is des i gnated as the true and p erceived 
charac ter o f  the speaker • • . "we may practi cally lay i t  down as a general 
2 
rule that the re is  no p roo f so e f fe c t ive as that o f  characte r . "  
The inte rp re tat ions men have given to e thos are s ome o f  the mos t  
controvers ial t o  b e  fo und in the field o f  rhe to ri c . Wi lliam Sat tler gives 
us a commonly accep ted interp re tation of e thos . He p oints out that the 
tt � 
Greek word €.6 os ( e tho s )  is  derive d  from "1'/8o5 whi ch means a cus tom o r  
hab i t . 3 This hab i t  be comes a .s t andard o f  morally app rove d  conduct dis-
cernib le in social gro up s . Sat tle r  s tates , " The traits  o r  q ual i t ie s  whi ch 
make up e thos are app roved and resp e c te d  by the so cie ty in q ues t ion ,  but 
do no t neces sarily have the s t at us o f  ' we l fare p rincip les . ' Ethos  i s  
there fore a more comp rehensive term ,  me aning ' tot ality o f  charac teris t i c  
4 
t rai t s . ' " S at tler applies this e thos to rhe t ori c by poin t ing to the 
imp ress ion of the speake r gaine d by members o f  the audience through their 
1 J .  E .  C .  We lldon , t rans . ,  The Rhe toric o f  Ari s t o t le (London and 
New York : MAcmi llan and Comp any , 1 886 )  �p--:-10�--------
2 
We ll don , pp . 1 0- 1 2 .  
3 
Wi lliam Mar t in S at t ler , "Concep tion o f  E thos in Rhe toric , "  
Unpub lished Ph . D . disserta t ion , Northwes tern Unive rs i ty , Evans t on , 
Ill inois ,  1 94 1 ,  p .  8 .  
4 Sattle r , p .  5 .  
view o f  his habits  and cus toms in relat ion to the i r  own . I f  the image 
2 
created by the s peake r agreed wi th that he l d  mos t  des irab le by the audi-
ence , the speaker had es tablishe d  his "e thos . "  
Craig Baird , in Rhe toric : A Philos oph i cal Inqui ry, points t o  the 
re lationship between the character of the speaker and the e thos that will 
persuade the audien ce . 
To Aris totle , the e thical p roo f is thus connected 
with the speech i t s e l f--one o f  the three e lemen t s  
o f  " p roof" . Ethi cal cha rac ter produces belief  in 
the realm of op inion--as p ro duced in the speech 
i ts e lf .  This ethos o f  the speaker is  not an ante­
cedent imp res sion held toward the sp eaker by the 
audien ce , but cons i s t s  o f  materials and persuas ive 
de tails o f  the communicat ion i ts e l f . 5 
Arthur B .  Miller , in a Spee ch Monograph art i c le in November, 1 9 74 , 
takes excep tion wi th both these interp retat ions and a number o f  o the rs as 
we l l .  He mos t  parti cularly no tes the mi s t akes that have been made due to 
the fai lure o f  s cholars in the field to app ly the concep t of both hab i t  
and character i n  ethos , as found i n  the Nichomachean E thi cs , to the clas s i-
cal meaning o f  e thos . 
Co rts 6 negle cts  to dis cus s Ari s totle ' s s t atements in 
the Nichomachean E thics abo ut the relat ionship be tween 
ethos and eethos and neglects also the ac comp anying 
footnote . Mos t  impo rtant , however , Cor t s  mis s e s  the 
s i gnificance o f  the relationship b e tween e thos and 
ee thos to the Rhetori c  and he wrong ly argues that 
" e thos is mo rally neutra l , "  and " that it  is  not 
vital to ancient rhe tori c . 11 7 
· 
5c rai g Bai rd , Rhetori c : A Phi lo s ophi cal Inquiry (New York : The 
Ronald Press Company , 1965 ) ,  pp . 10 1- 102 . 
6 Thomas E .  Co rts , " The Derivation o f  E thos , "  Spee ch Monographs , 35 
(1968 ) ,  pp . 2 0 1- 2 02 .  
7 
Athur B .  Miller , "Ari s t o t le on Habit and Cha racte r; Impli cat ions 
for Rhetoric , " Spee ch Monographs , 4 1  (November , 1 9 7 4 ) , foo tno te , pp . 30 9-
3 1 0. 
3 
Mil le r  ci tes theNichoma�be�n Ethi cs when he explains the Aris to-
telian concept  o f  the meaning o f  e thos . Howeve r ,  s ince the concept  o f  
intended meaning is derived from the meanings and relat ionship s taken 
from the Greek language , it  would be logical to as sume that  the me aning 
Miller found was c losely allied to the t rue meaning in the minds o f  
clas s ical theo ris ts • 
• . • mo ral and ethical virtue is the p roduc t  o f  hab i t  
( ethos ) ,  and has , indeed, derived its  name , wi th a 
s l igh t  variat ion o f  fo rm, from that word . 8 
Mille r  notes that the t rans lato r ,  Rackham, p oints out in a foo t-
note to the above p as s age that it is probab le that (e thos ) "hab i t "  and 
(ee tho s ) " charac ter" are kindre d  words in the original Greek . He p ro-
ceeds to carry the interp re tation even furthe r .  
Even more spec i f i c al ly , regarding the Greek term 
accomp anying the citation above , the wo rd for "moral 
or  e th i cal vi rtue" is  (ee thikee ) - - f rom the s ame s t em 
as  (ee thos ) ot  " character , "  and ( e thos ) not only i s  
t rans lated "habi t" , b u t  is also the key wo rd re fe rred 
to in the f inal phrase,  " from that word . " The point 
of Ari s totle ' s s tatement is that (ee th ikee ) ( and thus 
ee thos ) is  de rived from (e thos ) .  The re for e , the s ense 
in whi ch ee thikee means "mo ral o r  ethical virtue" and 
" ee thos" means " character" is ijnders tood wi thin the 
context of " e thos"  or "h abi t . "  
The s i gni f icance fo r this s t udy is  that th is analys is  shows the 
o riginal meaning of " ethos " was more comp rehens ive than the o f ten cited 
" cus tom" o r  0hab i t . "  By de fini tion the re i s  no room for the theory that 
the class i cal concep t of e thos was amoral . Moral or e thi cal virtue ,  hab i t  
and character are a l l  part o f  the s ame word s tem and t heir close relat ion-
---- ·- ·------
8Aris totle,  Ni chomachean Ethics , Rackham t rans . ( Camb ridge,  Mas s . :  
Harvard Univers i ty P ress ,  1 96 2 ) ,  Book I I . , pp . i,  1 .  
9Mille r, "Aris to t le on Habi t, " p .  30 9 . 
4 
ship was re cognized and pointed to by Aris to t le himself  dur ing his dis-
co urse on e thics . Ethos wi l l  be def ined f rom thi s  viewp oint for thi s 
s tudy . 
Whe n the ethos is in troduced into the rhe torical s i t uation both 
the true character o f  the speaker and the e thos as perceived by the aud i-
ence are present . S ince i t  i s  the e thos of the audience tha t  shapes their 
pe rcep tion of the sp eaker , in rhe toric audience analy s i s  has to be p art o f  
the picture . S ince men are not always rat iona l in the i r  obs ervations , 
of ten the rhe tori cian become s involved in p roblems o f  man ' s  relation to 
so cie ty and his environment in general in his e f forts  to de termine what 
react ions might be expected  i ri  any rhe tori cal s i t uation . 
Purpose o f  the S tudy 
The purpose of this s tudy is  to s urvey concep ts of e thos set forth 
by s e le c te d  cla s s ical and modern rhe to ri ci ans . To give accurate interp re-
tat ions o f  ethos as seen in the eye s  of resp ect ive rhe toricians , their 
philosophical app ro aches will fir s t  be i dent i fied , giving parti cular atten-
tion to the ir value systems . The pap er  wi l l  center around these ques tions:  
1 .  What philosophical value sys tems p rovi de d the bases  for  the 
concep t s  of e thos s e t  forth by clas s i cal rhetori c i ans ? 
2 .  What concep ts o f  ethos are s e t  fo r th by class i ca l  rhe to ricians? 
3 .  Wha t s imilari ties and di f fe rences exi s t  b e tween the concep ts 
o f  ethos s e t  forth by clas s ical rhe toricians?  
4 .  What value sys tems p rovide d the bas es for the concept s  of  
e thos s e t  fo rth by modern rhe tori cians ? 
5 .  What concep ts of  e thos are s e t  forth by mode rn rhetoricians ? 
6 .  Wha t  s imi lari ties and d i f fe rences exi s t  between the concep ts 
o f  e thos set  forth by mo de rn rhe to ricians? 
7 .  What s imi lari ties and di f ferences exi s t  between concep ts o f  
ethos s e t  forth b y  clas s i cal and mode rn rhe torician s ?  
5 
Hypo thes is 
Simi lari t ies and d i f fe rences exi s t  be tween c l as s i cal and mode rn 
concep ts o f  e thos and the concep ts can generally be ident i f ied wi th 
philosophical value sys tems. 
Review o f  the Literature 
Wherever possib le the mos t comp rehens ive and divergent views o f  
the works o f  selected rhe toricians we re consulted . This was done to give 
as broad a view of the area as mi ght be p os s ible in a p aper of this s cope . 
A review of  the l i terature revealed two di ssertations dealing wi th com-
parat ive views o f  e thos in rhe to ri c . The f irs t was comp leted by Dr . 
Wilhe lm Suss in 1 9 1 0. 10 Here the concep t s  of  e.t hos ar.e examined as taught 
by Corax , Tisias , Ant iphon , Gorgias and f rom the viewp oin t o f  the Rhe torica 
Alexandrum and the Rhe toric o f  Aris to t le . Dr.  William Sattler , author o f  
1 1 
the second s tudy , refers to  the S uss disser tat ion as having been o f  much 
bene fit  to his own p reparation . The S a t t ler dis sertation begins wi th 
Tis ias and Corax and ends wi th Ri chard Whately . 
Crit i cal evaluat ions o f  the writings o f  s elected rhetoricians were 
reviewed for this s tudy . C .  S .  Ba ldwin , Anc ient Rhe toric and P oe t i c ; 
Geo rge Kennedy , The Art o f  Persuas ion_in Gr�ece ; Craig Barid , Rhetoric : 
A Philosophical Inqui ry;  Daniel Fogarty , Roo ��_!s>_!:._a_l!ew Rheto ric ; S i r  
Alexander Grant , The Philosophy o f  P lato  and Aris t o t le ; as we l l  as a s tudy 
10wilhelm Suss , Ethos : S t udien zur alteren grie chi s chen Rhetorik , 
pub lished Ph . D . dissertation , Universi ty o f  Gie s sen , 1 9 10 (Berlin :  B .  G .  
Teubner , 1 910). 
1 1  
Wi lliam Martin Sat t ler , " Concep t ions o f  Ethos in Rhe toric , "  
unpublished Ph . D . diss ertation , Northwes tern Unive rs i ty ,  Evans ton , Illinois , 
1 941 . 
6 
by J .  Donald But ler , Fo ur Phi losophies_and Their  P ractice in Education 
and Re ligion , were among those .that provided analyses  o f  the concep ts 
set forth in this s tudy . 
An thologies o f  art i c les wri t ten by vario us rhe torical cri t i c s  and 
edited by Le s ter Thons sen , 12 Ri ch ard L .  Johannesen , 1 3 Mauri ce Natanson and 
1 4  1 5 Henry W .  Johns tone , Jr . , and Joseph S chwartz and John Rycenga , greatly 
facili tated the p rocess of gathering divers i fied views f rom the field . 
A tho rough search o f  the speech j o urnals added the op inions o f  such 
authori t ies as Evere t t  Lee Hunt , 1 6 Bromley Smi th , 1 7 Clarence Edney , 1 8 and 
many o thers to the views al ready in hand . Others not lis ted here will be 
referred to in the course of this s tudy . 
1 2Les ter Thonssen , e d . , Selected Re adings in Rhetoric and Pub l i c  
Speaking (New Yo rk : The H .  W .  Wi lson Company , 1 9 42 ) .  
1 3 
Richard L .  Johannesen , ed . , Selec ted Readings in Rhetoric and 
Pub lic Speaking (New York : Wis on Company , 194 2 ) . 
------�-----
, e d . , E thics and Persuas ion (New York : 
Random Hous e , 1 967) . 
1 4  Mauri ce Natanson and Henry W .  Johns tone , Jr . , eds . , Philosophy ,  
Rheto ri c ,  and Argumenta tion (Univers i ty Park , Penn . : Pennsylvania S tate 
Univers i ty P re s s , 1 965 ). 
15 
J .  S chwartz  and J .  Rycenga , The Province o f  Rhetoric (New Yo rk : 
Ronald P ress Company , 1 965 ). 
1 6 Everett Lee Hun t , "Plato on Rhe toric and Rhe toricians , "  Quarterly 
Journal o f  S pee ch , Vo l .  VI , Apr i l , 1 9 2 0 .  
1 7  
Bromley Smi th , "The Father o f  Debate : Pro tago ras o f  Abderra , "  
_,Q._ u_a_ r _t_e _r_ l,,_y_J_o _u_ r_n _a _l_o _f S..._p_e_ e..,.,c,__ h , Vo 1. VI , Ap ri 1 , 1 9 2  0 .  
_____ , " Co rax and P ro babili ty , "  Q uarterly Journal o f  Spee ch , 
Vol . 7 ,  February , 1 92 1 , 1 3-42 . 
----- - ' "Gorgias , A S t udy o f  Oratorical S ty le , "  Qu�_rterly Journal of  Speech , Vol .  VI I ,  November , 1 92 1 , 335- 35 9 .  
1 8c1arence Edney , " George Campbe ll ' s  Theory of Logical Truth , "  Speech 
Monographs , Vo l .  XV, No . 1 , 1 94 8 , 1 9- 32 . 
--------' " Richard Whately on Dispos i t ion , " Speech Mono­
graphs , Vol .  XXI , Augus t ,  1 954 , 2 2 7- 2 34 . 
--------' " Hugh Blai r ' s Theory o f  Dispos i t ion , "  Spee ch Mono­
graphs , Vol. XXIII, March , 1 9 56 , 38-45 . 
7 
S ignif icance of t he S tud y 
This s tudy has rhetorical , philosophical and personal s ignif icance . 
The study is s ignif icant to t he field of speech-communicat ion in t he areas 
of theo r y  a nd prac t ice .  Nowher e can educators o r  prac t ic ing rhetoric ians 
find in one source t he collec t ed and analyz ed views of lead ing rhetori­
cians on et hos in c lassical and mod ern theory. This s tudy will be useful 
as a sourc e for exist ing t heory and a s  a ref erence to use in t he f ormu la­
t ion o f  new t heory.  
The philospher may gain insight into t he rhetorical b ehavior of 
speakers . The examination o f  prevailing t heo ry t hat molded the rhetori­
cal prec ep ts of  t he sp eakers along wit h the s peech content may g ive a 
different final picture of the event . 
The writing of this paper gives me , as a s tudent o f  rhetoric , t he 
o pportunit y  to make d is coveries , exerc ise r esearch methods , int egrat e 
kno wledge , and form some opinions about the theory and practic e  o f  rheto­
ric . As a t eacher of speech I feel it is part icularly important to have a 
thorough under standing o f  t he  ethica l  princ ip les of my f ield . Thi s  s t udy 
should provide t hat .  
Finally, t his stud y should indicate whether fur ther inves tiga t ions 
of t his sort into s imilarit ies o f  conc ep t s  o f  ethos during diff erent per­
iods of  rhetorical history are l ikely to  prove fruit ful .  This work could 
serve as the basis for future studies . 
Organizat ion and Mat erials 
The first c hap t er o f  t his s tudy is devo ted t o  an intro duct ion to 
and description of t he  invest igat ion entailed in this analy sis of e t ho s  
in rhetoric . The li terat ure i s  reviewed and the hyp o thesis  on whi ch the 
work is to be based  is  formed . 
The se cond chap ter deals wi th Egyp tian and Greek concep ts of  
ethos . The third chap te r deals with Roman con cep t s  of e thos . 
Bri t i sh concep ts o f  e thos , be ginning wi th a d i scus s ion o f  the 
philosoph ies developed by Thomas Rei d , John Locke , and Davi d  Hume wil l  
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be the fo cus o f  the fourth chap ter . This is followed wit h·· an· analysis c 
of Hugh Blai r , George Campbell and Ri chard Whately . The i r  views of  rhet­
oric in general and ethos in particular will b e  examined . 
The f i f th chap ter deals  with later modern concep ts o f  e thos p re­
sented by I .  A. Richards , Kenneth Burke , and Ri chard Weave r . 
Fina lly , charts answer all ques t ions includin g : What s imi larit ies 
and dif ferences exi s t  between clas s i cal and mo dern concep ts o f  ethos ? 
Suggest ions for further s tudy in this area will be made . 
The materials used in develop ing this s tudy included t rans lat ions 
a�d the o riginal p rimary so urces . Mo re specifi cal ly , Plato ' s Euthydemu s ,  
Gorgias , and Phaedrus ; Ari s t o t le ' s  De Rhe torica and N i chomachean E thics ; 
Isocrates' Works o f  I socrates ,  Vols. I ,  I I , III ; C i ce ro's De Oratore ; Ad 
He rrenium ; Quin t i lian ' s Ins t itutio Or��oria ; Hugh Blair's Le ct ures on 
Rhe to ric and Be lles Le t t  res ; George Campbe ll ' s  _The Philosophy o f  Rhe toric ; 
Ri chard Whately ' s  E lements o f  Rhetori c ;  I .  A .  Ri chards'  The Philo sophy o f  
Rhe tori c ;  Kenneth Burke ' s  A Grannnar o f  Mo tives ; Richard Weaver's Language 
is Sermonic . 
Other materials include d , for the clas s i cal p e riod , Alexande r 
Grant ' s  Philosophies o f  P lato and Aris t ot le , Craig Baird ' s  Rhetori c :  A 
Philosophical Inquiry, and J .  Donald But ler ' s  Four Phi losophie s and their 
Practice in Education and Religion . For the modern period , James L .  
Golden and Edward Corbett's The Rhetoric of Blair, Campbell and Whately , 
and Daniel Fog�rty ' s  Roots  for a New Rhetoric provided helpful source 
material . 
Method and Procedure 
The his torical method will be used in this study . First the 
original source will be  read and the ideas pertaining to etho s  will be 
recorded . Next , the secondary sources pertaining to the concepts of 
ethos of  that rhetorician will be  read . The axiology o f  the rhetori-
cian ' s  concep t  o f  ethos will be identified and s imilarities and d iffer-
ences between the concepts  will be noted . The methodo.logy allows this 
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study to fall into the category of  research known as a "history o f  ideas , "  
as identified by Auer . i9 
Aft er a brief sketch of his torical background found in Egyptian 
records of Kagemni and Ptah Ho tep , the study will deal with Corax and 
Tisias and the beginnings of  Greek rhetorical concep t s . Since philo-
sophical views of " f irst truths" as  oppo s ed to "perceived probabilities" 
are basic to ethics in rhetoric and , therefore , to concept s  of  etho s  in 
rhetoric , this s tudy will , whenever possible , ident ify the stand of  the 
rhetorician on these basic views . Pro tagoras o f  Abderra and Gorgias of  
Leont ini will be viewed from this standpoint and the influence their 
philosophies had on the ethics of the rhetorician of that period will b& 
explored . Socrates and Plato will represent those who held philosophies 
opposed to Protagoras and Gorgia s . Aristotle and Isocrates will be  
1 9Aue r , Je f frey , An Introduc tion __ to Res�arc_!t_in Spe_ech (New York: 
Harpe r , 1 95 9 ) , p .  1 2 0 .  
be studied from the standpo ints of their philo sophical or ientation , 
their ethical views of rhetoric , and , finally , their concepts of  ethos  
in rhetoric . 
The next section , the third chap ter , will explain the philo­
sophical stands of  the Stoics and the Skeptics in early Rome . When 
looking at the works of Cicero and Quintilian and at the Ad Herrenium , 
the influence of these concepts will b e seen in their views of  ethics 
and ethos in rhetoric . 
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The fourth chapter will again b e  or iented in the leading philo� 
sophical arguments oi the day . Thomas Reid , John Locke and David Hume 
will be explained in reference to the potent ial relationship o f  their 
philosophies to the f ield of the ethics  of rhetoric . Hugh Blair , George 
Campbell and Richard Whately will be  r eviewed and their orientations in 
ethics and concep ts of  etho s  duly noted as well as any alliance they 
might show with the dominant philo sophical thought of their day . 
The f ifth chapter will be devoted to three current rhetorical 
concepts of  ethics in �hetoric and the role the speaker is  to play in 
his relationship to his audience . ' The concept s  used in this paper 
are those of I .  A. Richards , Kenneth Burke and Richard Weaver . 
The last chapter will sununariz e the findings on a series o f  charts  
designed to show the theories held by each of the rhetoric ians in thi s  
study . The chart will give page references f o r  the concepts  credited to 
each rhetoric ian . This chapter will trace the development of  some of  the 
more persistent and dom inant theories . Again page references will be 
given f o r  each assertion . 
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Limitations of  the S tudy 
The study will be limited to rhetor ic ians in each period recog­
nized as most  significant for their era by teachers , texts  and cour se 
outlines dealing with ancient and modern rhetoric . Secondly , it will be  
limited to rhetoricians who include statement s pertaining to  the concepts 
of ethos . The sources will be limited to classical and modern period s 
because the inclusion of those from medieval and rennaissance eras would 
make the s tudy too extensive.  
CHAPTER I I  
THE GREEKS 
This chap ter will trace the beginnings of rhetorical concepts  
of  ethos . The written records of  Kagemni and Ptah Ho tep , ancient 
Egyptians , date from 2900 B . C .  and clearly show the interaction of  
audience and speaker in a rhetorical'situat ion . 
The Greek period begins with Tisias and Corax , the traditional 
founders of rhetoric , and proceeds with an analysis of the popular philo-
sophies of the " sophist ic "  teachers of Athens . Two of the most  outstand-
ing , Pro tagoras of Abderra and Gorgias of Leont:ini , will be explored in 
depth . Critical evaluations of  their views on the ethics of  rhetoric 
will be cited and some tentat ive conclusions made about their contribu-
tions . 
Next , the chapter will deal with the efforts  of Socrates and Plato 
to establ ish the ethical foo t ing for rhetoric . Plato carried ethics into 
his dis cussion o f  the character , or ethos , of  the speaker . Richard Weaver ' s 
explanation of  this  appl ication of  ethics to  rhetoric wil l  be  cited . 1 
Aristotle and Isocrates were two o f  the first t eachers o f  rhetoric 
to use ethics in teaching of speech and in making ext ensive applications 
of the theories to establish the concept s  of ethos taught in their s chools . 
Aristotle wrote extensively in the areas of  both philosophy in general and 
ethics in particular . These writ ings will be applied to his concept s  of 
1 Richard Weaver , The Ethics of  Rhetoric ( Chicago: Heney Regenery 
Co . ,  1 970) . 
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the ehtos o f  the speaker so as to make consider ations o f  ethos found in 
De Rhetorica consistent with what el se we now know about Aristotle ' s views 
on man ' s  relation to man and society , or ethics. 
The Early Egyptians 
A little more than one hundred years ago , an ancient scroll , 
supposedly the "oldest manuscript in existence , 1 1 2 was d iscovered by the 
French Egyptologist , N .  Prisse d ' Avennes . The eighteen pages of hier-
atic charact ers were designed for training young men in ways of living . 
A few of the sanctions are relat ed to the communication ar t s  and demon-
strate an awareness o f  the importance o f  ethos  in speech . 
Kagemni 
Kagemni and his later pro to-type , Ptah-Hotep , evidently wrote the 
scrolls as lessons for student s in the courts of Pharoah . The former , 
the earlier of the two teachers , relates in one section : 
The cautious man flourisheth , the exac t one is 
praised ; the innermost  chamber openeth unto the 
man of s ilenc e . Wide is the seat of the man 
g entle of speech; but knives are prepared against 
one that forceth a path , that he advance no t save 
in due season . 3 
Though certainly aware of the effectiveness of  a speaker who has 
gained the good will of his audience; Kagemni also realiz ed different audi-
ence types do not react in the same manner . More particularly , there are 
those who cannot be reached by any means . 
2Giles Wilerson Gray, "The Precepts of Kagemni and Ptah-Ho tep , "  
Quarterly Journal o f  Speech , 3 2, p .  446 . 
3cray, p. 447 . 
Ptah-Hotep 
If a man be lacking in good fellowship , no 
speech hath any influence over him . He is 
sour of  face toward the glad hearted that 
are kindly to him ; he is a grief unto his 
mother and his friend s ; and all men ( cry) : 
Let thy name be  known ; thou art s ilent in 
thy mouth when thou art addressed . 1 14 
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As vizier of  King Ises i  about 2 6 7 5 , B . B . , two hundred years after 
Kagemni , Ptah-Hot ep was des cribed by James Baikie in A History of Egyp t , 
as a wise old man who advised honesty as the bes t  policy . Baikie , accord-
ing to Gray , ventured the opinion that he had probably tried the o ther 
course and found it wanting . Honesty for the speaker and conduct "without 
defect " were cited as good at tributes for the would-be effect ive speaker . 
Gray , in his QJS article , doubted tha t  this was an indication of  any 
philosophy o ther than , "This is the way to be if you want to succeed . "  
Such a j udgement o f  philosophy underlying t eaching precepts is diff icult 
to make . It must be remembered that what we have are a numb er of  guide-
lines written for young people to follow . When teaching a child , reward-
punishment is the mos t  used system .  Only in rare cases would philosophical 
rationale for the rules be incorporated into the lesson . That Ptah-Ho tep 
recognized the value of  education in lead ing one into a noble concept of  
living is shown by the following : 
A well taught heart hearkenth readily ; one hath 
remorse for even a little covetousness when his 
belly cooleth; Repeat not extravagant speech , 
neither listen thereto , for i t  is the ut terance 
of a body heated by wrath ; Let that which thou· 
speakest implant true things and j us t  in the 
life of thy children . 5 
4Gray, p .  44 7 .  
5Gray , p. 4 54 . 
The thir ty-sixth paragraph and the f if th dealt with honesty and 
good conduct . "If  you follow these ins truct ions , your conduct will be 
above reproach for ' the quality of  truth is among their excell ences . ' " 
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The fifth paragraph caut ions " that thine own conduct be without defect . "  
Evidences of the need to adapt one ' s speaking to the memb ers of  
an addressed audience are seen in admonitions to  keep silent when meeting 
a more capable debater and when unsure of your position in the presence 
of superiors . 
If you meet a debater mo re capable than yourself , 
s ilence will be your best defense . 
In council with your superiors ,  if you would be 
wise , avoid speaking of that which you know 
nothing. S ilence is more pro fitable than 
abundance of  speech . 6 
The speaker is caut ioned against undue manifes tations o f  intel-
lectual pride-when speaking to people without educat ional advantages . He 
also advises one to guard against flaunting any superior talent or know� 
ledge when debating someone of  obviously inferior ab ilities . 
6 
Be no t proud because thou art learned ; but 
discourse with the ignorant man as with the 
sage , for no man ever reaches perfection . 
Fair speech is more rare than the emerald that 
is found by slave maidens on the pebbles . 
Refute the false arguments of your equal in 
debate ; you will thus appear wiser than he . 
But if your opponent is weaker than you , do 
not scorn him ; let him alone ; then he con­
found himself • • •  it is shameful to confuse a 
mean mind . If  you are tempted to rid icule , 
overcome it as a thing rej ected of princes . 7 
Gray , p. 450 . 
7Gray , p .  450 . 
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Obvious greed or covetousness was another trait t o  be avoided by 
the ef fective speaker . Specifically , Ptah-Ho tep stated that , " • . .  he that 
is  covetous lacks persuasiveness in speech . "  No te he re there is  no men­
tion o f  appearances . The s tate of  "being covetous ":is en ough . 
In conclusion , while reading these guidelines we must  keep in 
mind the purpose for which they were designed-- teaching the young . To 
arrive at a positive declaration of the philosophy behind them is no t a 
practical possibili ty . There are indic ations that education is known to 
result in a more j udicious and vir tuous mode of behavior . Anything beyond 
this is more conj ecture without adequate proof . 
The Sophists  
Condit ions in Sicily during the days of Co rax and Tisias were 
responsible for the development of a sys tem of  rhetoric designed to aid 
dispossessed landowners recover their property . Under a new government 
the citizen was given the right to appear in cour t to establish his claim 
to land a former tyrant had seiz ed . The claimant was often at a great 
disadvantage without knowledge or ability to win his case . Corax and his 
pupil , Tisias , were the first to offer their services as teachers for those 
who needed their knowledge and could afford to pay their fees . Since their 
writings are e:x:t;,an.t., :thexe is reall;y noth·ing to learn of their ethics o.tber 
than this : they sought to teach their clients how to win a decis ion in 
court . 
There are two areas to be covered in a dis cussion of the views of  
Corax and Tisias on  ethos in  rhetoric . The first of  these is their doc­
trine or probablity . The second concerns the parts or divisions of  speech . 
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Doct rine of  Probab ility 
D . A. G. Hinks explains the doctrine of probability as developed 
by Corax . He refers to two classes of argument • 
• • •  the form of reasoning is strict and only the 
doub tful truth of the premises makes the conclu­
sion uncertain ; and the arguments in which the form 
of reasoning i tself is no more  than probable ,  even 
if the premises are true . It  is the importance to 
the orator of the argument s of  the latter class that 
'Corax recognized . 8 
The line of argument is based on the reasoning that , "What will happen or 
has happened in a particular case is inferred from what usually happens . 119 
In pursuing this l ine of  argument , the speaker has accepted the fact that 
people generally are more easily convinced by what they have observed to 
be a truth than by pure logical reasoning . The speaker establishes his 
ethos in this type of argument through use of  audience beliefs or experi-
ences he cites as being identical to  his own . The audience agrees with 
his premise , this he has established ahead of time , and therefore sees 
the speaker as a truthful , dependable type p erson • 
• • •  and far more people are impressed by admitted 
truth in the premises than by logical cogency in 
the reasoning . The orator who can adduce general 
probab ility but no particular evidence on his s ide 
appeals to a r eal sentiment in his aud ience when he 
urges them , however fallaciously , to prefer prob-1 0 ab ility to testimony because  it is incorrup t ible . 
The writings of Plato , Aristotle and 1socra tes left no doub t  about 
their disapproval of  the ethics of this approach . 11 In accepting their 
8n. A .  G .  Hinks , "Tisias and Corax and the Invent ion of Rhetoric , n  
The Classified quarterly , XXXIV , p .  63 . 
9Hinks , p .  63 . 
1 0 63 . Hinks , p. 
1 1 Hinks , pp . 6 1-69 . 
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evaluations we must remember Corax was b eing classified with what was 
being labelled "undesirable" in the teaching of rhetoric . Jus t how accu-
rate they were in their appraisal we canno t be too certain . They d id all 
agree , and here there seems little reason to doub t the conclus ion , that 
the line of reasoning they developed was designed for the court s  and 
really no t suited for any other use . 
Parts or Divisions of Speech 
Co rax has connnonly been given credit for observing and defining 
the parts of speech . Bromley Smith attributes the five-part d ivision to 
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Corax . These are :  the proem (introduction) , the diegesis (narration) , 
the agon (proof or argument ) ,  the parekbasis ( digression o f  subsidiary 
remarks) ,  and the epilogos (peroration or conclusion) . Hinks cites a four-
part system as being generally attributed to Corax . Hinks , however ,  seri­
ously doubts that there is enough evidence to make this claim . 1 3 
Our concern is not for the validity o f  these  claims , but rather 
the fact that there seems to be general agreement that Corax recognized 
the opening of the speech , the proem , to b e  the place to win the favor of  
the audience . 
All that we know of  this "Ar t "  is tha t i t  laid down 
a regular form and regular divisions for the ora tion; 
above all , it was to b egin with a distinct proem , cal­
culated to put the hearers in a favorable train ; and 
to conciliate their good will at the very opening o f  
the speech . 1 4  
1 2Bromley Smith , "Corax and Probability , "  Qua rterly Journal o f  
Speech , 7 ,  pp . 1 3-4 2 . 
1 3 
Hinks , pp . 66-68 . 
14K .  o. Muller and John w. Donaldson , A History of the Litera ture 
of Ancient Greece (London : Longmans , Green and company , 188 1) II , 98-99 . 
In conclusion , then , we find the development of  a system of 
rhetoric designed for use in pleading legal cases . Though s trongly 
criticized by later writers , the doctrine of probabil ity as developed 
by Corax and his pupil Tisias , was wid ely used in the cour t s . The 
proem was recogniz ed as the place to gain the sympathy of the audience . 
"Sophist Philosophy" 
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In the term "sophist "  we have a word that has been so overworked 
and misunderstood as to render it almo s t  useless as a label for any group 
or movement . For our purpose the term is used in ref erence to those who 
taught rhetoric for pay during the Fifth Century , B . C . , in Greece or 
Sicily . No one philosophy could be  called "sophis t ic . "  The teachers 
who allowed themselves to be called "Sophists"  varied as widely in their 
ethics as in all el se they said or did . No t all of  them were primarily 
rhetoricians , but since this was a f ield of learning certain to at tr ac t  
clients of means , most  of them included i t  in their course  o f  study . Two 
of the mos t  out st andiag "Sophistic "  teachers of  rhetoric were , first , 
philosophers , and , second , teachers of  speech . Al though the claim is 
made tha t  they attempted to keep their philosophies separated from the 
teaching of rhetoric , 1 5  in actual practice this was not pos sible . The 
philosophical orientations of Pro tagoras of Abdera and Gorgias of Leon-
tini colored much of the rhetorical teachings and prac tice in early Athens . 
These philosophical orientations will be  cons id ered in turn followed by a 
discussion o f  the impression they made on contemporary theories of ethics 
in rhetoric . 
15sir Alexander Grant, The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (New 
York : Arno Press , 1 9 73 ) ,  p .  1 35 . 
Philosophical Principles of Protagoras of Abdera 
Protagoras was known as one of  the earlies t  and greatest of the 
Sophists . He was rooted in a philosophy that starts with the spirit of 
Heraclitus that "all is becoming . "  Plato treats with this doctrine in 
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the "Theotus "  where he  has Pro tagoras analyze this becoming into two sides, 
the act ive and the passive , or the obj ective and the subj ective . 
No thing exis t s  absolutely , things attain an 
existence by coming in contact with and acting 
on an o rgan of  sensat ion , that is , a subj ect . 
Thus , all existence is merely r elat ive , and 
depends in each case  on the individual per­
cipient , and , therefore , man is the measure 
of all things , of  the existent that they exist , 
and of  6hings non-existent that they do not 
exist . 1 
Grant goes on to po int out that this is at once the germ or start-= 
ing po int o f  all philosophy is to lift men out of  their absolute b elief 
in the existence of external obj ects . It  asserts that all knowled ge , and 
therefore all existence , as far as we can conceive it , consists in the 
relation between an obj ect and a subj ect , that every obj ect implies a 
subj ect and every subj ect an obj ect . From the standpoint of the philo-
sopher , according to Grant , where Protagoras goes too f ar is in stating 
that obj ects exist only in relation to an ind ividual ' s  perception of  them . 
This allows for an obj ect being two things at the same time as obs erved by 
two dif ferent people . Any s tatement about an obj ect or subject is mean-
ingless for it will have to do only with the obj ect as seen by the person 
making the s tatement--no t with the way o thers see it . In o ther word s , 
the same obj ect may possess contradictory element s at the same t ime as 
as seen by different ind:iyiduala. This. ethical precept affects rhetoric 
1 6 Grant, p. 135. 
and the entire role of  the speaker pro foundly .  Grant claims Protago ras 
acknowledges this : 
What appears true to a person is true to him . 
I canno t call it false ,  I can only endeavor to 
make his percep t ions , not t rue , but better , i . e . , 
such as are mo re expedient for him to entertain 
• • .  Pro tagoras despairs of  a theology and pro­
claims his despair , and falls back upon practical 
suc cess . 1 7  · 
Hunt is skeptical o f  this extreme to the po int of absurd in ter-
pretation of Protagoras • 
• . • scholars are f ar apar t in their int erpretation 
of the meaning of Pro tagoras ; but they are gener­
ally agreed that the Pl atonic interpretat ion of it 
in the Theatus is quite unfair . Few interpreters 
now cons ider it to involve the degree of  relat ivity 
and subj ec tivism with which Pro tagoras and the 
Sophists generally have been burdened . 1 8 
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One authil>rity with an ent irely dif ferent po int of  view expressed 
his conviction that in Protagoras we have the roo t s  of the only philo sophy 
with any true meaning . 
Our only hope of understanding knowledge , our only 
chance of keeping philosophy al ive by nourishing 
it with the real ities of l ife , l ie in go ing b ack 
f rom Plato to Pro tagoras , and ceas ing to misunder­
stand the great t eacher who dis covered the measure 
of  man's universe . 1 9 
Suggestions for proj ection of ethical orientat ion are lacking in 
our knowledge of Protagoras . It has been conj ectured the man who is 
credited with being the originator of "sophist ic philo sophy , "  if indeed 
such a philosophy c an be identif ied, would be pleased with the educat ional 
aims attributed to him by Plato: 
1 7Grant , pp. 1 35-1 36 .  
1 8 Hunt , "Plato and Aristo tle on Rhetoric , " p .  1 2 .  
1 9F .  C .  S .  S chiller, S tudies in Humanism (London , 1 907 ) , p .  xiv . 
If a young man come to me he will learn pru­
dence in affairs private as well  as public , 
he will learn to order his own . house in the 
best manner , and he will be best ab0e to 
speak and act in affairs  of state . 2 
The Philosophy o f  Gorgias of Leont ini 
Another of the philosophers among the sophists was Gorgias of 
Leont ini . Although his book , On Nature , the Non-Existent , is no longer 
2 2  
extant , a sketch of  the work remains in the Peripatetic treat ise called , 
"Aristotle ' s ,  De Xenophone , Zenone et Gorgias , "  and also in "Sextus 
2 1  Empiricus . "  Grant , in his work , cal l s  this one o f  the mos t  s tartl ing 
utterances in ant iquity . There are three premises : ( 1 )  No thing exis t s . 
( 2 )  If it does exis t it  cannot be  known . ( 3 ) If  it can be known it 
cannot be connnunicated . The diff icult ies facing a rhetorc ian who has 
devoted himself to this philo sophy are obvious . Isocrates made this 
point in the opening of  his Helen : 
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He is speaking of  the inveterate hab it o f  
def ending paradoxes which had f o r  s o  long 
prevailed , and , he asks , "who is so behind­
hand as no t to know that Protagoras and the 
Sophis ts  of  that t ime left  us compo sitions 
of  the kind I have named , and even more 
vexatious?  fo r how could anyone surpass 
the audacity o f  Gorgias . • •  El sewhere (De 
Perma tat , page 268) , he ment ions as the 
" theories of the old Sophists , "  that , " the 
number of existences was , according to 
Empedocles , four ; accord ing to Ion , three ; 
according to Alcmaeon , two ; acco rding to 
Parmenides and Melissus , one ; according to 
Go rgias , ab solutely none . 1 1 22 
Plato , Protagoras , p .  3 1 8 . 
Grant , pp . 1 35- 1 36 . 
Grant , pp . 1 36- 1 37 . 
2 3  
Grant goes o n  t o  compare the last two theses of  Gorgias with the 
philosophies of Kant . Saying that we canno t know something even if it 
does exist , and , supposing we . know something we are unable to conununicate 
it , places an impassable gul f  be tween the material world and the human 
mind . 
Plato ' s treatment o f  rhetoric in the Go rgias d ialogue is one of  
the most  popularly used as sessment s of  Sophistic style rhetoric and has 
been taken by many as a fac tual account o f  the teachings and practice of  
Gorgias . The unfortunate resul t has been the b el ief on the part of many 
that Gorgias ' chief contribut ions to rhetoric were stylis t ic devices and 
that he was nothing more than a glib nihilist who advanced no positive 
23  theories and was unconcerned with ethics . R.  L.  Eno s makes the state-
ment that Gorgias himself denied that he had ut t ered any of the lines in 
the Gorgias--in fact , he dismissed the work as a humorous satire . 24 
Everett Lee Hunt and B romley Smith made scholars aware of  the 
fact that Gorgias was , in f act , a participant in the philosophical argu-
ments of his d ay and opened the door for fur ther invest igation of his 
ideologies . 2 5  These studies and o thers have led to the wo rk done by Eno s 
that indicates Gorgias was influenced by both Empedocles and Z eno , the 
respective inventors of  rhetoric and d ialectic , and that he developed a 
23George Kennedy , The Art of  Persuas ion in Greece ( Princeton , N .  J . : 
Princeton University Pres s , 1 963) ,  p .  1 8 2 . 
24Richard Leo Enos , "The Epistemplogy o f  Gorgias ' Rhetoric : A 
Re-Examination , "  The Southern Speech Conmunicat ion Journal , XI.II , 1 ,  3 5 . 
25Hunt , "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoric ians , 11  in 
S tudies in Rhetoric artd Public Speaking in Honor of James Albert Winans , 
ed .  A . M . Drummond (New York , 1 925) ,  p .  1 4 .  Bromley Smith , "Gorgias : 
A Study in Oratorical S tyle , " �' Nov . 1 9 2 1 ,  pp . 33 5-359 . 
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pre-So cratic dialectic and rhetoric that were at odds with the later 
school . To understand the development of that conflict it is necessary 
to look at some of the precepts  o f  Empedocles . In these will b e  seen 
the roo ts for a fundamental las t ing disagreement on the nature of ethic s 
and , growing from this , on the nature of ethos in rhetorical practice . 
There is found in the extant writings of  Empedocles a profus ion 
of contradictory bel iefs . These have drawn criticism from scholars . 
Enos po ints out that these seeming contradic t ions are actually the "j uxta-
pos ition of  ant ithetical concept s , "  and were more a matter of  "correlative 
. . 26 balanc ing of thesis and antithesis than of intellectual inconsistency . "  
This ant ithetic al process was "anticipated by the philosophical inquiry 
of the Pythagoreans and by the dichotomic method of Zeno . "  This not ion 
of contraries was the foundation for philosophical inquiry for Empedocles . 
Empedocles res ted his verif ication on the human s ense mechanism . 
He placed trust not with the gods but with human sense percep t ion . 
Man ' s abil ity to acquire knowledge , and for that 
matter to perceive exis tence itself , was dependent 
upon the degree of his sense-perception . S ince 
man ' s capacity for understanding reality was 
finite , complete communication was impos s ible , 
and required a system of  probab il ity which was 
l imited by sensory exper ience . Empedo cles ' view 
of  knowledge led him to dismiss the pos s ibility 
o f  perceiving the gods and o f  communicating with 
them , for they were beyond the positivistic 
reality of the senses . 27  
These concepts were  adopted b y  Gorgias while a pupil of  Empedo cl es . 
Later they were developed by him into a sophisticated system of  rhetor ic . 
2 6  Eno s , p .  40 . 
2 7  Eno s , p .  4 1 . 
25 
Ano ther maj or influence for Gorgias was Parmenides . A good sum-
mary s tatement of his point of view follows : 
Unlike Plato , Parmenides believed that the l imited 
capacity of  the human mind , and the inherent decep­
tion in co11D11unication , precluded man ' s acquiring 
certain knowledge of the existence of real truths 
and compelled an epistemology that secured con­
victions on probable opinions and no t on certain 
knowledge . 28 
What developed was a dialectic that argued from contrary posi-
tions , proceeding from premises that have not b een agreed on with con-
clusions resulting in a cho ice of probable po sitions . Thus , "contrary 
to the d ialectic of  Plato , conclusions expose contrad ictory positions 
29 in relative degrees of  strength . "  
When the initial concept of  Gorgias ' philosophy states that 
"nothing exis ts , "  he is not speaking of the material world , for this 
would be a contradict ion of the fundamental b elief s of his teachers and 
of his own empirical observations of sense perceptions . Enos points out 
that Gorgias is using the verb "to be" in an intransitive manner to indi-
cate existence itself and no t in the mater ial or phys ical sense . The con-
cepts of the mind are the ones without real existence and Platonic no tions 
of "ontological ' essences ' such as the ideal rhetoric were ab surd ities to 
Gorgias . 1 130 The world is ever ..... changing and man functions in this world 
with his manufactured ideas losing their exis tence the instant they pass 
from the mind of the thinker . 
28Eno s , p .  42 . 
29 43 . Eno s , p .  
30Eno s , p .  4 7 . 
Accordingly , ideals attain "existence" only 
through the extrapolations of the mind , and 
are dependent upon the referential per cep­
tions of their creator .  As such , they cannot 
therefore even at tain this existence without 
a manufac tured antithesis or anti-model , and 
by their very nature they can form no ideal 
at all s ince each individual predicated his 
own ideals upon personal experience . In this 
respect , each thinker ' s transient notion o f  
the ideal rhetoric i s  an amorphous grouping 
of relative not ions . 3 1  
The second precept o f  Go rg ias , "That if anything actually did 
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exist , it would be incomprehensible to man , "  refers to Gorgias ' concept 
that an ab stract idea has no referrent for sense percept ion--man ' s  only 
avenue for perception--and therefore , even if it did exist , man would 
have no knowledge of its existence . 
The final precept , that even if he had the knowledge of such an 
idea he would be unable to communicate it , refers to Gorgias ' observat ion 
again of the lack of a sensory ref errent for the abs tract idea--there is 
no experience that can be communicated--only references to  experiences 
which cannot b e  the same as those-· w.hich the senses perceive and which 
actually exist . When rhetoric , song or poetry are used to arouse the 
emotions , this to Gorgias is deception--for the reaction is to word s , 
not to experiences and the words are not the experiences and therefore 
emotions kindled by them are deceptive . However , to Gorgias , this decep-
tion was not necessarily morally wrong . 
The poss ib il ity for deception is apparent when 
word s , which have no uni-vocal meaning , are 
us ed within their context to guide the soul 
by interpreting and recreating an experience . 
Hence a persuasive speaker could use the power 
3 1 Enos , p. 47 .  
of  words to deceive listeners into becoming as 
f rightened in the verbal recreating of  a battle 
as they would be if they actually were in the 
encounter . 3 2  
Gorgias was deeply aware o f  the power of  persuas ion t o  ''mold soul s "  as 
2 7  
it desired . As such i t  could b e  used for good o r  evil . H e  saw no thing 
in rhetoric indicative of a built-in moral code . Rhetoric itself was 
neutral . The motives for good or evil were to be  found in the person 
us ing it . And so , the sophist who is known to have made no claims o f -
his ab il ity to "teach vir tue" was fully aware of the potential fo r good 
or evil lying in the province of rhetoric . 
Gorgias belonged to a s trong philosophical tradit ion that stressed 
probablity , ant ithesis , relativism and sense-perception . 
Athenian Rhetorical Pract ices 
Another bit of "philosophy" popularly discussed in Athens at the 
time was a traditional piece of d ialectic "older .than Protagoras , "  that 
argued that it was impo ssible to speak falsely . If one were to speak 
falsely it would mean he was uttering the non-exis tent . The non-existent 
has no existence whatsoever . To conceive or utter it is impos s ible . 33 
32 
Plato maintains against this argument and against 
the doctrines of the Eleatic s , that in some sense 
"no t being" was an existence . We see then that to 
set the relative meaning o f  a word agains t its abso­
lute s ignif ication , to play off the accidental 
against the essential , formed a main view of the 
Eris tic art . 34 
Enos , p . 4 9 .  
33Plato , Euthydemus , tran . Ro samund Kent Sprague ( New York : 
Bobbs-Merrill Co . ,  Inc . , 1 9 65) ,  Scene III , 2 84A-286E , pp . 23-30 . 
34 Grant , pp . 133-1 34 . 
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Certainly these early theor ies of  referrent , symbol izat ion , per-
ception and encod ing-decoding mess ages are interest ing to any modern 
student of interpersonal theory . The foundations for such s chools  o f  
thought were laid gener ations earlier than the So crat ic-Platoni.c sys t ems 
to be discussed in the next part of  this chapter . 
These doctrines were popular in the Sophistic schools of  Athens 
and the inquisitive minds of the early Greeks eagerly explored the var ious 
channels  of reasoning now opening to them . When charges are brought 
against the early sophis ts for corrupt ion o f  the youth , it was not an 
accusation that revolut ionary thought was being taught . The accusations 
rather concerned the negat ion of the accepted social-moral values of  
Athenian society . Efforts o f  the teachers of rhetoric were of ten directed 
toward clothing old ideas in fresh words to make the trivial worthy of  
discussion . Often ,  through the use of an antithetical dialect ic , called 
perverted by Plato , the bas ic values of society were attacked and des-
troyed . The s tudents of the day were left without the steadyi.ng influence 
of traditional value systems to guid e  them and their teachers were neglect-
ing to replace old concepts with ones o f  equal or super ior worth . 
The Platonic dialogue , EutJtydel_llus , is written to show the effects 
on a young person "attacked " by such a sys tem of dialectic as this . The 
young person depicted was without enough maturity or j udgement to evaluate 
the worth of the argument s being advanced against him . Grant explores 
this facet of  Sophis tic teaching and gives this evaluation of the actual 
practices of  the art of  rhetoric during this period . 
Prominent association connected with it ( Sophism) 
is--fallacious reasoning . Plato and Aristotle 
both d irectly accuse the Greek Sophist s  or pro­
fessional teachers of  the practice of  con s cious ly 
using fallacious argument s  to suit the ir own 
purposes . These accusations seem to come in 
the later dialogogues of  Plato . Euthydemus , 
Sophistes , Theoetetus , are the three later 
works that show the Sophis t ic practicing a 
perverse d ialectic . They are put ting ques­
tions to people and trapping them through 
contradictions and verbal quibbles . The 
las t  of the trio talks of an Eristic  with 
no regard for the truth but only for a 
victory as oppos ition for an honest  dia­
lectic who�e obj ect is the discovery of 
the Truth . 5 
Certainly from the discuss ion o f  antithetical d ialectic as 
developed by Gorgias and his pred ecessors we can see that this was an 
honest appraisal o f  the actual practice of the dialectic of the day . 
The purpo se was not to arrive at any truth--fo r man could not perceive 
truth in the realm o f  ideas even if such truth were to exis t .  The pur-
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pose of the dialec tic being used was to arrive at opposing premises with 
varying degrees of prbab ility assigned to them . 
Isocrates also wrote about the .lnfluence of this "Eristic"  art on 
the prac tice and reputat ion o f  rhetoric . Norl in explains in his transla-
tion of  The Works of  Isocrates that he was criticizing the same sort of 
dialectic dea l t  with i.n the Euthydemus o f  Plato . ( It is interest ing to 
note that to the best of our knowledge , Isocrates was a pupil o f Gorgias . )  
35  
36  
Indeed , who can fail to  abhor , yes  to condemn , 
those teachers , in the firs t place , who devo te 
themselves to disputation , s ince they pretend 
to search for truth , but s traightway at the 
beginning of their professions attempt to 
deceive us with lies?  ( Isocrates is ref er­
ring to captious argument in the f ield of 
ethics . ) 3 6  
Grant , p .  1 3 1 .  
Isocrates , "Against the Sophis ts , "  Isocrates , Vol . II , tran . 
George Norlin ( Cambridge , Mass . : Harvard University Press , 1 962) , p .  1 63 .  
Parenthetical material is a footnote by Norlin , p .  1 62 . 
These complaints with the practice o f  dialectic in the s chools 
of the Sophis ts appear in Plato ' s  later writings and o ther complaints 
against them are found in the · earlier dialogues . Gorgias , Protagoras , 
and Republic are primarily critical o f  the Sophists ' worldliness , habit  
of declaiming and making long speeches , ignorance of  the art o f  argu-
mentation , and inability to discuss a subj ect by means of  short ques-
3 7 tions and answers .  Grant makes the suggestion that there may have 
been a change in the practice of rhetor ic that led to this change in 
30 
the focus o f  c riticism .  Although Isocrates was not known f b t  his over-
whelming agreement with Plato on many subj ects , here we do f ind common 
ground between the two . 
If all who were engaged in the profes s ion of  
education were willing to s tate the facts 
instead o f  making greater promises than they 
can po ssibly ful f ill , they would not be in such 
bad repute with the lay publ ic . As it is , 
however , the teachers who do not scruple to 
vaunt their powers with utter d isregard for  
the truth have created the impression that 
those who choose a life of careless indo-
lence are better advised than those who 
devo te themselves to serious s tudy . 38 
Although no t in agreement on the remedy for the plight of educa-
tion , both critics are stating that the conditions as they saw them were 
in need o f  some corrective measures .  It remains for o ther sect ions o f  
this work t o  different iate between the courses chosen b y  each t o  follow . 
There is a passage in Grant ' s work that is comprehensive in it s 
analysis of  many o f  the problems besett ing the practice of  rhetoric in 
37 Grant , p .  1 32 .  
38  Isocrates , "Agains t the Sophists , "  p .  1 63 . 
ancient Greece . He po ints  out that Plato ' s  complaint is no t that the 
Sophis ts are teaching lax mo rality to their disc iples , but rather tha l 
they trifle with it . 
The procedure of the Sophists  was two-fold , 
either it  was rhetorical or dialect ical . They 
would ( 1 ) t rick out the praises of j us t ice and 
virtue with citat ions from the old poets , with 
ornaments of l anguage , and with allegories and 
personif icat ions • • •  Such ( l ike) compositions of 
the Sophis t s  form a sort of  parallel to the 
popular preaching of the present day .  Or else 
( 2) they gave an idea of  their power and sub­
tlety , by skirmishes of language , by opening 
up new points of view with regard to common 
everyday duties , and making the old not ions 
appear strangely inverted . 39  
In his analys is o f  the Sophis t ic teachings Hunt po inted to the 
3 1  
fact  that these varied with the ind ividual . In general , however , sophi-
stic educat ion aimed at enabl ing the pup ils to become leaders of men in 
a democracy . The Sophists exerted much more influence on their society 
than d id Socrates or Plato . The public generally might have distrusted 
the Soph is ts for their skill in speaking on either s ide of a question--
j ust as we may tend to distrust modern lawyer s for the same reasons . 
However , in matters of public concern , the Sophis t s  were the conserva-
t ives--the upholders of the status quo . 
The Sophists  as public orator s illustratc•d and 
reenforced the received dogmas of  Athenian 
society • • • Rhetoric , as we know , as the art of  
persuasion , must always appeal t o  the peopl e  
upon the basis o f  whatever bel ief s they have 
• • •  It was not likely then that it was the 
rhetoric o f  the Sophist s  that led to the 
charge that they broke down rel igion and 
corrupted the youth . 40 
3 9Grant , pp . 1 4 6-148 . 
40  Hunt , p .  1 7 . 
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It was rather a problem of  the Sophists devo t ing themselves enough 
to philosophy to incur something of the distrus t with which specul at ive 
thought has always been viewed . It  was this philo sophical s ide that 
excited the general distrust of the Athenians toward al l S ophists as 
well as Socrates and Plato . The quarrel between philosophers was unre-
lated to this out s ide d is trus t f rom the general public . 
How would we look at that quarrel today ?  What would Plato hAve 
to say about our modern society? Hunt specul ates : 
The pervers ions o f  such education--half knowl edge 
propaganda , demagogery , phil istinism , wo rship o f  
the appearance o f  suc cess--are probably even more 
prevalent now than then . Whether they are worse 
than the perver s ions of  Platonism is too large a 
question to b e  argued here . But whether for good 
or ill , the conceptions of  the aims and purpo ses 
of the Amer ican liberal college as set forth by 
the mo s t  dis tinguished modern educators , is much 
closer to Isocrates and Pro tagoras than to Pl �to . 
The Reformers , Socrat�s and P�ato , Aristotle and Isocr� 
The dissatisfaction with the moral tone o f  t>e teachings of the 
Sophis ts resulted in the emerging ethical theories o f  So crates and his 
famous pupil , Plato . This portion of the chapter will d escribe the philo-
sophical orientat ion of Socrates . This will be followed with the account 
of Plato ' s use of Socrates ' approach in the formation of his own code of  
ethics . The section will conclude with the adapt ion of  these theories 
to rhetoric and some connnents on the pract icality of these theories . 
4 1 Hunt , p .  2 2 . 
Socrates 
One of the firs t to make a departure f rom the phil o spphical 
orientation described in the preced ing discuss ion of the Sophist s  was 
Socrates . In the writings of Aris totle we f ind many references to 
Socrates and S ir Alexander Grant points to the d i.f ference between the 
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his torical Socrates and the literary So cranes . Aris totle , as a pupil o f  
Plato , i s  deeply roo ted in the So crates of literature . The So crates of 
the Platonic Dialo gues is mouthi"g the thoughts of Plato . As So crates ' 
pupil Plato has taken the teachings o f  the mas ter and applied them to 
his own philosophy . The historic al Socrates is quite distinguishable 
from this use of  him and it will be our endeavor to discover these dis-
tinctions . S ince So crates taught by lecture and discourse rather than 
putt ing his views in writing , we mus t  turn to secondary sources for our 
references .  In Aris totle ' s  Metaphysics I .  vi2 , XII . iv . 3 -5 , Grant 
po ints to pas sages that dis tinguish between the views of Plato and 
Socrates . 
4 2  
Aristotle i s  relating the his tory o f  the "do ctrine 
of ideas . "  He tells us how it sprang f rom a belief 
in the Heraclitean principle o f  the flux of  sens ibl e  
things , and the necessity of  some o ther and permanent 
exis tences , if thought and knowledge were to be con­
s idered po ssible . He proceeds , that Socrates now 
entered on the discus s ion of the e thic al virtues , 
and was the firs t to at tempt a univers al def inition 
of them--def inition , exc ept in the immature essays 
of Democritus and the Pythagoreans , having had no 
existence previously . "Socrates was quite r ight in 
seeking a definite , determinat e  conception of these 
virtues , for his obj ect was to obtain a demonstra­
tive reasoning , and such reasoning mus t  connnen.ce 
with a determinant concept ion . There are two 
things that we may f airly attribute to Socrates , 
his induct ive d is courses and his universal def ini­
t ions . But the Platonist s  made them trans cendental , 
and then called such existence "Idea s . · ·4 2  
Grant , p .  159 .  
34 
Socrates ' Concept of the Ethical Virtues 
This pass age descr ibes Socrates ' subj ects of inquiry--the ethical 
virtues . It also relates that his universal definition of  these vir tues 
would be established by means of  induc t ive discourses us ing experience 
and analogy . This was ,a great deal more than anyone had attempted before 
--and , indeed , those adhering to the t eachings of Go rgias , proclaimed 
this stance ridiculous . I t  was a syllogis t i c  or one-s ided concept . 
His concept ions were definitely f ixed so as to 
exclude one ano ther . He knew nothing of that 
higher dialec t ic , which , sett ing aside the f ir s t  
limited and f ixed concept ion of  a thing , from 
which the contrary of  that  thing is wholly 
excluded , asks , "Is there no t the same sc ience 
o f  things cont rary to each o ther? Is not a 
thing inseparable from , and , in a way identi­
cal with its  contrary ? Is no t the one also 
many , and the many one ? 
Xenophon agrees with Aris totle in saying that Socrates always 
conf ined himself to ethical inquiries • 
• • •  he never ceased discus sing human aff airs , 
asking , What is piety? what is impiety? what 
is the noble?  what is the bane ?  what is the 
j us t ?  what is the unj u s t ?  what is temperance ? 
what is madnes s ?  what is a S tate?  what con­
stitutes the charac t er of a cit izen? what is 
rule over man? what makes one abl e  to rule?  
(memor . I .  i .  1 6) . 44 
Because of this concentration in the areas of human behavior and the 
evaluation o f  what cons t itutes b ehavior of a certain kind , Socrates has 
been called the f irst moral philosopher . To say that he d ivided philo-
sophy into logic , ethics and physic s  would not be  correct . He had no 
concept of ethics as such and if asked the category of topics he was 
considering would have said "Pol itics " before anything els e . In Plato 
43crant , pp . 1 5 9-1 60 . 
44 Grant , p .  1 6 1 .  
there is no log i c --·1 1n l v  a dial e.ctic that is really metaphys ics . In 
Aris totle , logic s t ill has no name and ethics is only becoming a s tudy 
in itself . The subj ec ts of  ethics were So crates ' favorites . 4 5  
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The thought of  "Virtue as a s cience" was very far from the 
abstract . It  was clo sely assoc iat ed with life and reality and connec ted 
to educat ion through the claims of the sophis ts that they taught virtue . 
(Gorgias was the no table except ion . )  Socrates agreed with the sophists  
that it could be taught but  he gave a new dimens ion to such instruct ion . 
He wished to make act ion into a kind of  art and to make self-knowled ge 
and wisdom predominate over every part o f  l if e .  I t  was later that Plato 
said , "No , virtue canno t be taught , "  and that aspec t will be discussed 
in the next sec t ion . 
The second thing to no te about "Vir tue is a science" is that it 
was related to Socrates ' use of  inductive reasoning or general ization . 
He b rought the various virtues that had been enumerated by Gorgias under 
one heading--wisdom . These virtues were j us t ice , temperance , courage and 
wisdom . The signif icance o f  the other three being reduced to the universal 
class if icat ion of "wisdom" should no t be overlooked . In Socratic philo­
sophical thought wisdom is co-equivalent with the o ther three virtues . 
Wisdom becomes the p urpose o f  education arid later the quali ficat ion 
for an orator . 
The third aspect to cons ider is that the doctrine had two s ides . 
The one s id e  could be said to involve "hab it s . "  This means such state­
ments as , "Courage cons ists in being accus tomed to danger . "  The other 
45 Grant , p .  1 62 . 
3 6 
side of the doct rine had more to do with self-knowl edge and cons ciousness 
of the law . Courage mus t  have knowledge of good and evil and the presence 
of mind to keep hold o f  right principl es even in the p resence o f  danger . 4 6  
Next , there i s  the fact  that Socrates felt that all pol itics was 
no t learned through sys tematic s tudy as were other crafts . ( Politics is 
derived from "polis" and refers to soc iety , the relat ionship o f  man to his 
organiz ed society . )  So crates ' view was that all human life must have its 
proper funct ion within the polis or society and in this way virtue became 
the Science o f  Living . This can take a self ish turn and one offshoot of 
Socratean Philosophy did so . If Virtue is called the Science of Living 
it could be and was equated with pleasure . The Philosophy o f  Pleasure 
as an end for human existence has been the substance of several philo-
sophies s ince the t ime of  Socrates . 
The fifth aspect of "Virtue is a Science: ' '  o f fered an appeal to a 
society beset by mat erialistic relat ivism . A found ation has been laid 
for a conscious moral ity in the preced ing steps . The grounds for right 
and wrong are placed in individual reason and exis t  in and for the mind 
of the individual . The Sophis t ic say ing that "j ust ice is a convent ion , "  
now gives way to "j ustice is a science . "  Just ic e  no longer depends on 
society and external authority but exis ts as a cons tant value within the 
individual . This is a b ig step out o f  the morass that  can characterize 
a completely relativist ic o r  nihil istic society such as threatened Athens . 
4 6Grant , p .  1 6 7  •. This do ctrine is given in Aristo tle , Ethics 
III . viii 6 and in Xenophon , Memorab III ix 2 .  The second doctrine is 
found in Laches and Plato ' s Republic . 
Later , the Peripatetics would point out that this conception 
ignored all distinct ion between the reason and the will . Early ethic s 
contained little psychology . Socrates d id no t perceive the diff erence 
between "what is good" and "what is right . "  He argued that everyone 
would do what is the "good" without realizing that there are two ways 
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of looking a t  the "good . "  There is the "good" which i s  the end result . 
Certainly anyone looking at this would agree that this is what he wanted 
and would no t knowingly do anything agains t the achievement of that good . 
The trouble begins when we consider the good that is the means of gett ing 
the other good . Here it might be more difficult to correlate the means 
with the end and there is no assurance that everyone will go along wi th 
the same proposition of means to the end . Later it will become evident 
that this is a b as ic difference in the ethical orientat ions of some of 
the leading rhetoricians . 
Socrates on Education 
The charges that were brought agains t Socrates stating that he 
had corrupted the youth could be traced to some of his educat ional poli­
cies . In the Xenophontean "Apology " Socrates is charged with inducing 
his pupils to disobey their parent s .  Parents traditionally have the last 
word in the educat ion of their children . S o crates was in fundamental dis­
agreement with this . He pointed out that when one was sick he consulted 
a medical doctor . When the country is at war it trus t s  the advice of  
generals in the f ight ing o f  battles . In affairs  o f  s tate the s tatesman 
determines the course of action . When the ques tion of educat ion arises 
the educator should be the guide as to what is best for the .youth . The 
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professional educator is trained in his pursuit--no t the parent . The 
charge against him was that he cons tituted youths to j udge of their own 
education and this they were unfit to do . Socrates was condemned . 
On the surface certainly Socrates appeared to be a Sophis t and he 
mus t have presented a purely sophist ical image to many of his cont empor-
aries . However ,  when his teachings are closely examined the differences 
become evident . 
But from ano ther po int of  view , looking at the 
internal character and mot ive o f  the man , his 
purity and nob ility of mind , his love of truth , 
his enthusiasm , his obed ience to some mysterious 
and irrational impulse , and his genius akin to 
madness , --we mus t  call him the born antagonis t 
and utter ant ipodas of  all sophis try . 4 7 
S ince Grant agrees that Sophists  were no t in any sense to be considered a 
homogeneous grouping , s ince we know they had no universal philosophy and 
that there were differences in their t eachings , we mus t  assume that 
"sophistry" here is ref erring to fallacious reasoning--the appl icat ion 
of a perverted d ialectic to everyday affairs . The kind o f  " sophis try" 
referred to in the Euthydemus of  Plato would have b een s trongly opposed 
by Socrates . 
Tnterpreting Socrates 
Generally people have had trouble interpreting a paradox that 
develops in the s tudy of  So crates . He s tates that inj ust ice done volun-
tarily is better than inj ustice done involuntarily . Aristotle as sumed 
the opposite stance and Plato defended it : d ialectically . The key is in 
the wording of the statement that insert s  the phrase ,  "If it were pos s ibl e . "  
4 7  Grant , p .  1 65 . 
By hypothesis it has already been established that it is impossible for 
any man to knowingly do wrong . In this sys tem wrong is equated with 
ignorance . The wise man can only do what is seemingly wrong since to 
himself his act ions have been j ustified as right . The effects of  . .  this 
39 
proposition is to forcibly drive home the fact that wisdom and knowledge 
come firs t , action l ater . 
Conclus ions 
Throughout this discussion it can be seen that S o crates had many 
things in common with the Sophis ts in addit ion to being called one of them . 
His dialectic disturbed the popular conceptions on moral subj ects . He was 
convicted of corrupting the youth . Howev�r , there are three ways in which 
the dialectic of Socrates left the methods of the other Sophis ts and moved 
on to a newer concep t . 
( 1 )  that there was a higher and truer conception 
to be discovered by thought and research ; ( 2) it 
seiz ed upon some permanent and universal ideas 
amid s t  the mas s  of what was fluctuating and 
relat ive ; ( 3) it left the impression that the 4 8  
mos t  moral view mus t  after all b e  the true one . 
Accord ing to Grant , Plato saw in the method of Socrates ' discourses 
indications of  a philosophy that could rise above empirical generalizations . 
The inquiring spir it , the effort to connect a variety o f  c ir cums tances into 
a general law and the efforts to test the law through applicat ion to new 
circumstances , were all pot entially the beginnings o f  a philosophy that 
could be carried to a higher plane than Socrates himself had envisioned . 
lJ8Grant p 1 7 1  ' . . 
Plato 
• • • the conception formed by Socrates differed 
from the Ideas of Plato--that they had no absolute 
existence , they had no world of  their own apart 
from the world of  t ime and space . The his toric 
Socrates was quite excluded from that sphere o f  
contemplation o n  which the Platonic philosopher 
enters , where all hypotheses and all sensible 
obj ects  are left out of sight and the mind deals 
with pure Ideas alone . 4 9  
The conclus ions of  So crates were the s tar ting point for Plato . 
He appears to have carried forward all the many-s ided arguments of the 
master through his d ialogues . By imagining So crates stil l  on earth , 
40 
Plato carries on perpetual conversations with him on the highest subj ect s . 
It is beyond the s cope of  this paper to  consider any more than a fragment 
of these philosophies . Our area of  concern is ethic s , its development as 
it af fected the concept o f  the orator and the pract ice of rhetoric . 
The foundation for Plato ' s inquiries was , "Namely , that in the 
affairs of human life it is absolutely necessary to obtain universal con-
ceptions ; that to arrive at these a suitable dialectic , and the refutation 
of inadequate not ions , are requisite ; and that it is the general outcome 
50 of all such inquiries to show that "virtue is a s cience . "  
Plato and "Virtue is a S cience" 
The questions asked by Plato concerned the four cardinal virtues 
identified by Socrates and generally accepted by his contemporaries . Thes e  
four were wisdom , j us t ice , courage and temperance . The problem he saw was 
4 9Grant , pp . 1 59 - 1 60 . 
50Grant , p .  183 . 
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to determine whether the virtues were an entity o r  separate and dis t inc t 
from each o ther . If vir tue were an entity in itsel f , why and how d id the 
different t erms come into b eing? There should be but one name for a whole . 
He also s eriously considered the ques t ion of virtue being a teachable sub­
j ect . The ques t ion he posed was : "If  virtue is a science ( capable of 
being learned) , then does it follow that vice is ignorance ? "  If this is 
true ( that vice is ignorance) , then it w01H d ·' folihow that no man can be 
blamed for vice s ince no man can b e  held liable for wrongs connnitted in 
ignorance .  This s t ep was further emphas ized by the previously s tated hypo­
thesis that no man is ever knowingly and will fully bad .  These problems 
are directly discus s ed in Protagoras , Gorgias , Meno and the Republic . 
To find the answers Plato called on psychology and we f ind the first 
5 1 introduct ion of  this d iscipline in ethics . 
The first  psychology was in a very rudimentary form . I t  result ed 
in Plato putt ing wisdom in a different category than the o ther virtues . 
The soul was d ivided into three parts : the Reason ( rulers ) ,  Anger ( sol­
diers ) , and Desire (working class) . From this he argued that wisdom , or 
thought on moral subj ect s , enters as a guide for all o f  the other moral 
vir tues , None of the o thers can exist without it . At the same time , 
thought or reason is one of the tripartite d ivisions of the soul � an 
intuitive faculty , po ssessed in some degree by all men . As an inherent 
quality it may be misdirected , it may be obscured , but it cannot be 
endowed by one man on another . Ac cording to Plato , the virtue of wisdom 
cannot be taught . The Platonic concept o f  wisdom is s imilar to our mod ern 
I . Q .  Present at b irth , the quality may b e  developed and d irected o r  sub-
5 1  Grant , p .  185 . 
dued and diverted from the realization of its po tential . S inc e this is 
42 
the case Plato emphasizes the importance of  turning the "eye o f  the soul " 
away from earthly vices toward higher purposes and a more noble life . 
While the child is young his direc tion of seeking for fulf illment should 
be turned to the acquisit ion of the o ther three virtues • 
• • • " and hence ;' it is said , ' 'while the other 
qualities (i . e . ,  Courage , Temperance ,  and Jus t ice) 
seem to be akin to the body , being infused by 
habit and exer cise and no t orig inally innate , 
the virtue of wisdom is a divine essence , and 
ha s  a power which is everlasting , and by this 
conversion is rendered useful and pro fitable , 
and is also capaBle o f  b ecoming hurtful and use� 
less . 1 152 
A reference is made to the "narrow intelligence flashing from the 
keen eye of the clever rogue . " This is recognit ion that a man highly 
endowed with this "vir tue of wisdom" may no t  treat it as though it is a 
virtue . Plato points out that a wisdom taken into the service of  evil in 
this fashion is dangerous in d irect proport ion to the degree of  intelli-
gence poss essed by the individual . In the Republic Plato propos es how to 
avoid this unfortunate situat ion . 
52 
But what if there had b een a cir cumcis ion of  such 
natures in the days of their youth; and they had 
b een s evered from the l eaden weight s ,  as I may 
call th.em , with which. they were born into the 
world , which hang onto sensual pleasu�es , such 
as those of eating or drinking , and drags them 
down and turns the vision o f  their soul s about 
thet th!lings that are b elow--if , I say , they had 
been released from them and turned around to the 
truth , the very same faculty in these very same 
persons would have seen the other as keenly as 
they now s ee that on which their eye is fixed . "  
In this passage al so is indicated the relation of 
at least  one o ther of  the cardinal virtues , name ly 
temperance , to the virtue of wisdom or thought . 
Grant , pp . 1 85- 1 8 6 . 
"llad sensual indulgence , "  says Pla to , "been 
checked in many a man when he was young , his 
innate d ivine power of thought would have 
turned around to the idea o f  Good , ins tead 
of fastening itself on Evil . 1 153 
4 3  
The relat ionship o f  temperance t o  wisdom i s  that it  conserves i t  
and i s  a necessary condition t o  it . Courage is expanded from s t eadiness 
in the face o f  danger to steadiness in the face of pleasure and tempta-
tion . Both temperance and courage play impor tant parts in preventing the 
disturbance of and misdirect ion of thought . At the s ame t ime that these 
qual ities are necessary to the proper function of thought , they in them-
selves have no ethical value without thought being b ehind them . There is 
no virtue in blind inst inct or in worldly and non-moral mot ives prompting 
courage or temperance . ( Phoedo , p .  68 d . )  Centuries later Quintilian 
writes about the qualit ies mos t  needed in the earliest associates o f  the 
child . He is relating to the Platonic principles of early d irec t ion 
determining the direction the soul will take in later l if e . 
In the Platonic concept , the three virtu�s o f  wisdom , courage and 
I 
temperance are not separate but rather s tand to gether and grow into a whole . 
This whole we may call virtue . Plato calls it Jus tice in the Republic 
where it is seen reigning over all the funct ions o f  the soul giving it 
supreme regularity , good order and sanity . 54 
Plato ' s  Concept of Eth.bs in Rhetor ic 
When this philosophy is appl ied to rhetoric we have the development 
of the Platonic ideal rhetorician . When considering rhetoric the quest ion 
53 Grant , pp . 185- 1 8 6 . 
54Grant , pp . 1 85-1 86 . This discus s ion o f  Pla to on "Virtue is a 
Sc ience" is found in Sir Alexander Grant ' s The Philosophies of Plato and 
Aris totle . 
44 
that bothered Plato was , "If truth alone is not suff icient to persuade 
men , what else remains that can be legitimately added? " The answers are 
to be found through interpretation of Plato ' s  Phaedrus . 
Truth plus artful per suas ion containing dialectic as its  f ir s t  
process will give the serious rhetorician an ethical art . The virtuous 
rhetoric ian as envisioned by Plato will have a soul of such movement that  
its  dialectical percept ion is consonant with that of  a divine mind . There 
is no true · rhetoric without dialectic having been used to determine the 
truthful orientat ion of the speaker . The true rhetorician is a noble 
lover o f  the good who works thorugh d ialectic and analogical assoc iat ion . 
The discourse o f  the noble rhetorician will concern itself with the unreal-
ized future . The discourse of the exaggerator speaks . '  of unreal po tenti-
ality . The noble rhetor has the insight to speak of real potentiality or 
possible actuality . This might also b e  called a responsible probablity as 
opposed to idle conj ecture . Und erstanding followed by actual izat ion seems 
to be the role of the universe and the interpretation is the d ialec titi­
cian followed by the rhetoric ian . SS  
The kind o f  rhetoric that is condemned by Plato is that which is 
uttered without the support o f  a pos it ion adj udicated by reference to the 
universe of dis course . Rhetoric at its trues t  seeks to perfect man by 
showing him b et ter vers ions of himself , l inks in that chain extending up 
toward the ideal , which only the intellect can comprehend and only the 
soul have aff ection for . 
A sununary of Plato ' s  theory for the rhetoric ian as descr ib ed in 
Phaedrus includes these eight concepts : 
SSRichard M .  Weaver ,  The Ethics of  Rhetoric ( Chicago : Heney 
Regency Co . ,  Gateway Edition , 1970) , this description of Plato ' s  refer­
ence is taken in its entirity from Weaver ' s  interpretation of the Phaedrus . 
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1 .  The mind o f  the speak.er should know the truth o f  what he is going to 
say . 
2 . The rhetorician must classify his subj ect with reference to his 
definitions as to possib il ity of debate upon them . 
3 . He mus t  introduce a principle of order in pres enting the topics . 
4 .  He mus t  s ee unity and plurality in nature so that he can class ify 
part iculars under a general head or break up universals into 
particulars . 
5 . He mus t  know the nature of  the soul . 
6 .  He mus t  speak of t he instruments by which the soul is af fected . 
7 .  Af ter having class ified souls and speeches , he mus t  point out the 
connec t ion between them , showing why one is persuaded by one kind 
of argument and another by a diff erent kind . 
8 . He will think l ittle o f  the art o f  writ ing . 
Thra�gh t :the•: vatious dialogues o f  Plato we are famil iar with the 
shor tcomings of sophistry .  In the Phaedrus the concept of the "noble 
lover " gave us his ideal rhetorician described above . 
Thus when we f inally d ives t rhetoric of all the 
no t ions of art if ice which have grown up around it , 
we are l ef t  with something very much l ike Spinoza ' s 
" intellec tual love of God . "  This is its  essence 
and the fans et origo of its power • .  It is "intel-:­
lectual " b ecause ,  as we have already seen , there ts 
no honest  rhetoric without a preceding d ialectic . 
The kind of rhetoric which is j us tly condemned is 
utterance in support of a position before that  pos i­
t ion has been adj ud icat ed with ref erence to the 
whole universe of  discourse--and of such the world 
always produces more than enough . It is love 
because it is something in addition to bare theo­
retical truth . That element in addition is a 
desire to bring truth into a kind of exis t ence 
or to give it an actuality to which theory is 
indiff erent . 5 6  
Richard Weaver admit s  that probably Plato had n o  intention of 
giv:Liig every meaning to  his dialogue that has b een imput ed to him . He 
56 Weaver , p .  25 . 
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does say , however , that it  f it s  nicely and the thought i s  certainly in 
line with Platonic reasoning . In this respect we might say that Weaver 
is to Plato as Plato is to Socrates . Each took the mas t er , s tud ied care-
fully his approach to rhetoric , then , us ing the master ' s own words pro-
ceeded on in the pointed direction to a more fully developed concept . 
Conclus ions 
Before leaving this d is cuss ion of Plato it would be well to once 
more look to the pages of Hunt ' s ar t icle on the "Rhetoric of Plato and 
Aristotle" for an evaluation of  the view of rhetoric developed by Plato . 
Aristotle 
At the conclus ion of  his earlier at tacks • • • Plato 
offers  an outline of a reconstructed rhetoric . 
Here , too , he shows his inab ility t o  conceive o f  
rhetoric as a tool ; the ideal rhetorician sketched 
in the Phaedrus is as far f rom the pos s ib il it ies 
of mankind as his Republ ic was from Athens . 5 7 
It  remained for Aristotle , as the pupil o f  Plato , to further r ef ine 
his ideas and make the pract ical application for rhetoric . During his 
years at Plato ' s  Academy Ar is tci»tle b ec ame increas ingly independent in 
thought and it is pos tulated that this resul t ed in his b eing pass ed over 
in the selection of a S cholar ch for the Academy Qn Plato ' s death . 58  Ar i-
stotle left Athens for a t ime and it was on his return that he established 
the Lyceum as his own s chool . Later it would be known as the Peripatetic . 
It became Aris totle ' s purpose to gather and systematize the 
writings of Plato . 
57 Hunt , p.  4 2. 
58 
Grant , p .  1 8 1 ,  see footnote . 
Aristotle , with the greates t gif t s  for the 
analytic syst ematiz ing of philosophy that  
have ever been seen ,  unconsciously appl ied 
himaelf to the required task . He treated 
the Platonic dialogues as quarries out o f  
which h e  got the materials wherewith t o  
build u p  i n  consolidated form all the 
department s o f  thought and science so far 
as they could be conceived by the ancient 
Greek . He thus codif ied Plato , and trans-
lated him into the pro se of  dogmat ic theory , 
at the same t ime that he carried further and 
completed many of his result s  and suggestions . 5 9 
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The aim of  Plato was that o f  a Dialec t ician and Poet . Aristotle ' s  aim w 
was directed at being a man of sc ience . The lat t er endeavored to collect 
all that could be known on a subj ect for the purpose o f  s tat ing it in pre-
cise terminology . Plato had a s trong moral earnes tness that never . .  los t  
sight o f  the importance o f  everything that might serve t o  improve o r  deter-
iorate the human soul . Aristotle endeavored to sift the truth of every-
thing and exp£es s  it as he saw it regardless of what the consequences might 
be . · 
This discuss ion of Aristotle will b eg in with his v iew of  the 
Virtues and the ethical character of  man . In Aris totle there is a clearly 
defined applicat ion of this ethical nature to the province of rhetoric and 
this applicat ion will b e  the subj ect o f  the second concern of this s ec t ion . 
Finally , ethos  as used in De Rhetorica will b e  examined keeping these f irs t 
basic conceptions of  Aristotle f irmly in mind as being the b as is for his 
applicat ion . The final section will be d evot ed to any conclusions po inted 
to at this point in the s tudy . 
59 Grant , p .  1 8 2 . 
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Virtues and the Character of Man--Aris totle ' s Perspective 
In reviewing the thoughts of  Socrates and Plato there have been 
rec1irrent references to Vir tue . Socrates held that ' 'Vir tue is Knowledge " 
or "Wisdom . " Plato redef ined Virtue as "Justice . "  Aris totle al t ers 
these concepts only sl ightly--but signif icant ly .  Vir tue , to Aristotle , 
is "accompanied by thought " rather than being equated with thought . Ari-
stotle then proceeds to divide thought or moral wisdom from philosophy . 
Plato requires that virtue is acheived by "flying as far as pos s ible from 
the evil o f  the world--to b e  as much like God as possible . "  There is a 
requirement here that every ac t  should take place in absolute cons cious-
ness and no distinc t ion is made between physical acts and pure speculat ion . 
The Aristotelian concept places vir tue in a more pract ical focus . 
The Peripatetic (Aris totel ian) account is that a 
moral consciousness mus t  accompany every act , a 
sort of wisdom which is the center o f  all the 
moral virtues ( Eth . VI . xiii. 6) , but this kind 
of consciousness is quite d is t inct from the philo­
sophic reason , it deals with the cont ingent and 
not with the absolute . The doctrine that Temper­
ance preserves Thought ( Eth . VI . v .  5) ,  and that 
Thought without Vir tuous hab its may degenerate 
into cunning , is taken f rom the Republic . 60 
Plato , it will be rememb ered , stated that through the development 
of courage and temperance in interac t ion with wisdom we will arrive at 
virtue in j us tice as governor of the soul . Aris totle rej ects this concept 
and instead d ivides virtue into many categories . To more clearly define 
"virtues" he class if ies , catego rizes and looks at contraries . These are 
6 1  
enumerated in D e  Rhetorica . 
60 
Grant , p .  1 94 • 
6 1  Aristotle , D e  Rhetorica ( list virtues or give locat ion in 
Rhetoric . )  
The virtuous acts o f  man are to be f irs t , conscious cho i.ces . To be 
classed as a vir tuous act it must be , f ir s t , a human act and not merely 
an act o f  man . Secondly , the act mus t  be habitual and no t an isolated 
instance . 
A human act as dis t inguishable from an act of  man can bes t be 
49  
described b y  illustration . Imagine someone walking through his neighbor ' s  
flower bed , s tumbling and falling . He knows that in falling he is go ing 
to ruin some of the flowers . He d id no t intend to fall and there is no 
way he can help hims elf . In Aristotle ' s  system this amounts to an act o f  
man , not a human act . 62 
A truly human act pro ceed s  from a rational agent who knows what he 
does and freely chooses to do it . Man is dis tinguished from beast by his 
reason . He knows the end of his actions , knows the means and knows the 
relationship . "To perform human acts we need knowledge and freedom o f  
choice so  that ' it i s  in our power t o  d o  or not t o  do , and to a c t  in this 
63 way or in that , and • • •  ( to) know the reason why . "' Whenever a man is 
free to know the consequences of his act and refuses to avail hims el f  of 
this informat ion , he is considered to be liable for the consequences . 
Where the person d id not realize his ignorance hP is , in the Aristottelian 
system , j udged innocent o f  the consequences . 
It is important to note that a choice of  alternative actions mus t  
be p�esent . Aris totle ' s  sunnnary o f  his doctrine of choice is given in 
Ethics , III . iii . 1 9 . 
62 Lawrence J .  Flynn , "The Aristotelian Bas is for the Ethics o f  
Speaking , "  Ethics and Persuasion , ed .  R .  L .  Johannes en (New York : Random 
House , 1 9 6 7 ) , pp. 1 1 6- 1 22 . 
63 b Flynn , p .  1 1 6 , from Magna Moralia 1 1 89 7 .  
As when the obj ect of choice is something 
within our power which after deliberation 
we des ire . Cho ice will be a deliberate 
desire o f  things in our power ; for we 
mus t  f irs t deliberate ,  then select , and 
f inally f ix our desire according to the 
result of our deliberat ion . 64 
Where external forcesis used to get the desired action the imputab il ity 
of the act to the agent is reduced or entirely removed . A man who is 
forced to give his friend ' s  car to a thief at the point of a gun is not 
said to have committed a human act . When volition is removed from the 
SP 
act through some mo tivating force such as f ear , the person canno t be said 
to have committed an imputable ac t . 65 
. Another bas ic tenet in cons idering the moral worth o f  a human act 
is the degree o f  habitual b ehavior it r epresents . 
The agent must also be in a certain condition 
when he does them ( acts) : in the f irst  place 
he mus t  have knowledge , s econdly , he mus t  choose 
the acts and choose them for their own s akes , and 
thirdly , his action mus t  pro ceed from a firm , and 
unchangeable character . 66 
The full meaning of this philosophy , according to Grant , cannot be ade-
quately translated from the Greek to contemporary English . We can explain 
his meaning , but to get the full concept we have to f eel rather than talk 
or read . A morally good act that is isolated is given little cred it in 
Aristotle ' s  syst em .  Rather , it is an act that comes from the stable , set 
charact er nf the per son who consis tently s t eers himsel f in that d irection . 
This f inal condition is compared to the relationship of  the flower to the 
seed or the s tatue to the rough block of marble . The orator who has 
64 Ar thur B .  Miller , "Aristotle on Hab it and Character : Implica-
tions for Rhetoric , "  Speech Monographs , 4 1 , 4 , 3 1 2 . 
65 Flynn , p . 1 1 7 . 
66  
Grant , p .  1 1 9 ,  Magna Moral ia , 1 1 95a 1 7 . 
achieved this s tate has answered his questions about ethics and set his 
sights f irmly on the truth in topics such as virtue . H is actions will 
67 consist ently reflect thi s deep connnitment to values . 
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Nor does Aristotle leave any room f o r  misconcept ions o n  the c ir-
tuous choices his subj ects are to make . First of  all , we mus t  realize 
the one key premise in Aris totle ' s  thinking on ethics is , "Man func t ions 
in society--the pol itical connnunity--as a political animal . 1 168 Next , 
"Early in the Ethics Aris totle ass er t s  that ' • • •  the good of man mus t  be 
the end o f  the science o f  politic s . ' "  (Ethics I ii 8) " ' This good 
relates , of course , to that of the nat ion or s tate and e q uates with 
happines s--the end at which all act ions aim . "' (Ethics I .  vii . 8) 69 
How does one obtain happiness within the context of the polis ? Aristotle 
states that : 
• • •  the Good (happines s )  o f  man is the active 
exercise of the soul ' s  faculties in conformity 
with excellence or virtue , or if there be 
several human excellences or virtues , in con­
formity with the best and m9at perf ect among 
them . ( Ethics I .  vii . 1 5) . 
Thus , within the polis , a person ' s  virtuous act ions will aim at happiness . 
There is certainly opinion exp�essed he re that what is fo r the good o f  
the s tate o r  society as a whole i s  the same as the good or happiness of  
the ind ividual . 
67 240-243 . Grant , pp . 
68Miller ' p . 3 1 0 . 
69Miller ' p .  3 1 1 . 
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Do ctrine of the Mean 
The individual is s t ill confronted with choices to make among the 
virtues enumerated by Aristotle . How i.s he to suit his act ions to make 
the mos t  prudent cho ices from those alternatives available to him? Here 
is found Aris totle ' s  doctrine of the mean . Aristotle does not in any way 
diminish the diff iculty inherent in choos ing the mid-po int between two 
extreme cour ses of  action . There are three guidelines to aid one in 
finding that mid-poi.nt . 
To aim at the mean we should use three pre­
cautionary rules : 
1 .  Avoid the extreme mo st oppos ed to the mean 
--take the leas t o f  the evils .  
2 .  No tice errors in which we are mos t  prone-­
s teer wide of our own errors . ( Our own 
errors are d is covered by observing our own 
pleasure or pain . )  
3 .  Mus t  be on guard agains t what is pleasant 7 1  
and against pleasure . (Ethics II . ix 3-6 . )  
Miller closes his discuss ion o f  the ethical views o f  Aristotle with this 
observation : 
• • • one may observe that man , the polit ical animal , 
is to strive to live vir tuously in the polis by 
aiming at the mean , that is , at perfec t ion . If  
he l ives by the mean he conunit s  neither defic iency 
nor excess ; that is , he lives according to moral 
virtue , and , combining that with experience ,  he 
makes prud ent decisions . Therefore , prudence is 
the virtue of del ib erat ion , and the prudent man , 
af ter deliberating ( calculat ing) , selects courses 
o f  action , ;:·t:}lent:he consciously "�d�sites ' them . Such 
cours es of act ion repeated unt il well engrained 
become states or depo s it ions . It  is thus that 
habitual behavior or ethos 7�s indicative of a man ' s . character or eethos . 
u 
Miller , p .  3 1 2 . 
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From this discussion it is evident why the "ethos " as conceived 
by Aris totle can be the mos t  powerful form of persuasion available . 
Application o f  Aris totelian Concept of Ethos to Rhetoric 
When Aris totle applies the actions o f  this ethical person to 
rhetoric he recognizes three components .  Firs t ,  the obj ec t o f  the ac t ; 
second , the intent o f  the agent ; third , the c ir cumstances . 7 3  
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Fir s t , the moral ebj¢ct :of a human act is the quality that gives 
it a name or puts it in a class such as murder , thef t , or charity donat ions . 
The obj ect is that in which the ac t naturally culminates or terminates . It 
is a goal that man ' s freedom of  choice gives him the opportunity to plan 
for hims el f . 
When we think of the agent ' s intent , we are talking o f  his purpose , 
aim or mo tive in taking some action . Here is the class ical concept that 
sees men always act ing with good intent . Even when the cho i.ce is evil , 
men are acting f rom what they consider a good intent , "For mankind always 
ac t in ord er to obtain tha t wrdch they think good . 1 17 4 Aristotle requires 
an evil intent as an essential condit ion for a morally evil act . It  makes 
no difference whether this intent is directly t ied to the obj ect o f  the 
act or more removed , as an ulterior mo tive . If the purpose  is evil , the 
entire act is mor ally evil . Conversely , to have an act b e  morally good 
it is essential that there be a morally good mo tive for "all virtue implies 
delib erate cho ice • • •  ( that) makes a man choose everything for the sake o f  
some end • • • which i s  the noble . "  7 5 
7 3  1 1 7 .  Flynn , p .  
74Flynn , p .  1 20 (Aris totle ' s  Politica , 1 2 5 2a2 . ) 
7 5  
(Ethica Eudemia , 1 230a27 -29 ) . Flynn , p . 1 21 
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In discussing what are to be considered virtuous intents , we have 
already explored the "doctrine o f  the mean . " There is ano ther concept in 
Aristotle that is particularly interesting in light o f  later obs ervations 
of a correlat ive nature mad e by o thers • 
• • •  some ( act ions or pass ions) have names that 
already imply badness , e . g . , spite , shamelessness ,  
envy , and in the case o f  actions , adul tery , thef t ,  
murder ; for all o f  these and suchlike things imply 
by their names that they are .themselves bad • • •  Nor 
does goodness or badness • • •  depend on connnitting 
adul t ery with the right woman at the right t ime , 
and in the right way , but s imply to do any o f  
them i s  t o  go �gng • • •  however they are done 
they are wrong . 
Here Aris totle makes it clear that he repudiates the no t ion that 
the end can j ustify the means . Under no c ircumstances will the ethical 
person employ anything less than ethical means to reach his obj ect . 
It is no t accord ing to  man ' s  nature as a free 
delib erate agent to do evil for the sake o f  
good . We have seen ,  moreover , that certain 
obj ects are evil in themselves , such as murder , 
theft and adultery . The se and o thers cannot b e  
whitewashed by good intent ions , "because however 
they are done they are wrong . " ( Nichomachean 
Ethics 1 1 07 a24 ) S ince laws b ind by nature or by 
precept ( the former of which man will know ins t inc-­
t ively : for there is a natural and univers al
b notion of  right and wrong ; (De Rhetorica 1 3 7 3  6 . )  
the latter we will learrt from social contact) he 
should know r ight from wrong . Besides , a j us t  
man does j us t , noble and t emperate deed s  (Nicho­
machean Ethics , 1 1 05b5- 1 2) so that human good 
turns out to be  ac t ivity of the soul in accord-
7 7  ance with virtue . (Nichomachean Ethics , 1 09 8a1 5 ) 
The question of circumstances invo lves all of  the other acci-
dental determinants accompanying a human act without which an act would 
�6Flynn , p .  1 1 9  (Nichomachean Ethic s , 1 1 07 a1 0-25) .  
7 7  Flynn , p .  1 2 2 . 
no t exis t but which in some ways add certain mo rality o ther than that 
derived from the obj ect and the intent . The c ircums tances included 
5 5  
here are : who ? what? where?  why ? when? and how? If  John Brown 
were to commit a felony as a private citizen it would no t b e  as bad as 
if he were to commit the same felony whil e serving as a Senator in the 
United S tates Congress . Again , Richard Nixon committing his Watergate 
indiscret ions had the criminal ity o f  his ac tions intens if ied by the fact 
that he was the Pres ident of  the United S tates at the time o f  the inci­
dent . 
To summarize briefly , then , Aris totle took his ethical person who 
had developed a habitually virtuous charact er through repeated delib erate 
choic e  of the moderate course of  action , and placed him in a position o f  
interact ion with his envirorunent . Here he is held respons ible for the 
obj ec t of his ac tions , his intent and the means he employs to attain his 
ends . Independent circums tances surrounding the event alon� could alter 
the intens ity of the moral imputat ions given to the act . 
Ethos as Viewed in De Rhetorica 
The f irst  cons iderat ion her e is to f ix the degree of  importanc e 
assigned to ethos in De Rhe toric a .  Next , the three aspect s  o f  ethos in 
the speaker will be  analyzed and this will b e  followed with recommenda­
tions found in De Rhetorica for acquiring these attributes in the eyes 
of the audience . 
The high charac ter of  the speaker is o f  paramount importance in 
subj ec ts that do no t allow ab solute certa ·l nty in their resolution . When 
a decision could go either way the high moral charac ter of the speaker 
can in itself influence the aud ience to accept  his pos ition over his 
opponent� s . The other modes of proof , pathos and logos , are also 
referred to in the following pas s age : 
The proof' s  provided through the ins trumental ity 
of  the .�peech are of three kinds , cons is ting 
either in the moral character of the speaker , 
or in the produc tion of a c�rtain dispos ition 
in the audience or in the speech itself by 
means of real or apparent demons tration . The 
ins trument of proo f is the moral  character , 
when the delivery o f  the speech is such as 
to produce an impression of  the speaker ' s  
credib ility ; for we yield a more complete 
and ready credence to persons of  high charac­
ter not only ordinarily and in a general way , 
but in such matters as do not admit of  ab so­
lut e certainty but necessarily leave room for 
difference of  opinion , without any qualif ica­
tion whatsoever . 7 8  
Unlike many others , Aris totle specif ies that the impress ion of  
the ethos o f  the speaker be  derived to tally f rom the speech content 
itsel f , and not from preconceived ideas of character the aud ience may 
have about the speaker . Certainly this is an ideal that can seldom b e  
attained . The speaker is ident ified in some way in the minds o f  the 
listeners and this id entification is certain to affec t  their j udgemen t 
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of  him and his message . However , when we rememb er Aristotle ' s  views on 
vir tue and morality , and apply them to the rhetorical scene , the moral 
rhetorician is going to cons is tently d isplay that quality through con-
sistently moral choices of topic s , arguments ,  goals and maxims . These  
are all part of the speech and if  no t evident would ind icate a lack of 
nobility in the speaker . When this nob le nature is cons istently mani-
fested throughout the speech we have a highly effective mode of proof . 
7 8Aristotle , The Rhe toric o f  Ar istotle , trans . J .  E .  C . Welldon 
(London and New York : Macmillan and Company , 1 886) , pp . 1 0- 1 2 .  
( It is requis ite , however , that this resul t 
should itself be  attained by means of  the 
speech and not of any antecedent concept o f  
the speaker ' s character . )  For s o  f ar from no t 
following the example of  some authors of rhet­
or ical handbooks , who in their art regard the 
high character of the speaker as no t b eing 
itsel f in any sense cont r ibutory to his per­
suas iveness , we may practically lay it down 
as a general rule that there is no �roof so 
ef fect ive as that of the character . 9 
There can b e  no doub t about :;the impor tance of ethos in speech from Ar i-
stotle ' s  po int of  view .  The question next arises o f  j us t  how i s  this 
moral character to be manifested in the speech body . 
He holds that there are three sources o f  
personal credibility in orators : "or in 
other words there are three things , apart 
f rom demonstrative proo f s , which inspir e 
belief , viz . , sagacity , high character 
and good will . 1 180 
5 7 
To demons trate what is involved in establishment of a high mo ral 
charac ter and sagacity in the eyes of the audience , the discuss ion turns 
to the various vir tues . As we have pointed out , Ar istotle defines eighteen 
distiD.c t . ;v:i.rtues and propo s es his doctrine of the mean . S ince this is a 
practical application of  the theory , reference is made to the delight f elt 
by the audience when the speaker c ites a par t icular qual ity everyone agrees 
is to b e  mos t  desir ed and is assuredly a sign of  good and high charac t er . 
This can b e  done through the use of  maxfms . 
7 9  
8 0  
A maxim is a declaration , not however relating 
to particulars , as • • •  , e . g . , to the character 
of  Iphicrates , but to universals ; nor yet again 
to all un�versals indis criminately , as , e . g . , 
Ar istotle , p .  1 2 . 
Lester Thonssen and A .  Craig Baird , Speech Criticism (New York :  
The Ronald Press Company , 1 94 8) ,  p .  3 84 . 
that straight is the oppos ite o f  crooked , 
but to all such as are the obj ects of human 
action and are to be chosen or eschewed in 
that regard . 8 1  
Aristotle gives several examples of  the pleasure given an audience when 
the speaker chooses a maxim involving something with which they are all 
familiar . To s trengthen his ethical appeal these max ims will assume a 
moral tone . 
It  is proper , therefore , to conj ecture what 
ar e the manner and chara cter of their pre­
poss essions , and , having done so , to pu t 
forward a general s tatement in regard to 
them . This is one advantage of  the use of 
maxims , but there is another which is more 
impor tant , as they impar t an ethical charac­
ter to our speeches . A speech is ethical if 
its moral purpose is apparent . But this is 
the invariable ef fect of maxims ; for a speaker 
who gives utterance to a maxim makes a state­
ment in general terms about the subj ect of his 
moral predilect ion , and hence , if the maxims 
are virtuous ' they give the appeara11.ce o f  a 
vir tuous character to the speaker . 82 
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The older or mor e  mature speaker is more effect ive in his use of 
maxims . With age comes prudence and prudence is needed in making j ud ic ious 
determination of the mean through the use of the three precaut ionary rules 
cited earl ier :ln the chapter . 
The prudent man will avo id excess and defic iency 
by habitually taking the forego ing precautions • 
• • •  Aris totle does not cons id er prudence a qual ity 
of the young . Therefore , a young person has dif f i­
cul ty in the area o f  ethical proof with an older 
aud ience . The greater the age dif f erenc e , the 
greater the dif ficulty . 83 
8 1Aristo tle , p .  1 84 . 
8 2  Aristotle , p p . 1 80-1 9 0 . 
83Miller , p .  3 1 2 . 
There are also indications that the use of  maxims is s imply unbecoming 
for a younger person , even without the foregoing cons id erations . 
The use of maxims is suitable to elderly men , and 
in regard to subj ects with which one is convers ant ; 
for sent iousness , l ike s tory-telling , is unbecoming 
in a younger man ; while in regard to subj ects with 
which one is no t convers ant ,  it is stupid and shows 
want of culture . It is token enough of this that 
rustics are the greatest  coiners o�4maxims , and the readiest to set forth their views . 
5 9  
The discus s ion of  method s used in rhetoric to convey the feeling 
of good will to the audience is .extens ive , implicit , and remarkably modern 
in concept . Kenneth Burke ' s identif icat ion ,  the Heider balance theory and 
others seem to b e  echoes o f  these early descr ipt ions . 
They are friends , then , for whom the same things 
are good and evil , and who are f riends and enemies 
of the s ame people ; for they mus t  need have the same 
wishes ; and so , one who wishes for another j us t  what 
he wishes for himsel f , appears to b e  that person ' s 
friend . Men like , too , those  who have done good to 
thems elves , or to those for whom they care ; --whether 
such benefits were great , or zealously done , or done 
at su§h and such moment , and for the recip ient ' s  
sake . 5 
The qual ities o f  friend ship are then enumerated in great detail . Ari-
stotle has analyz ed the human concept ion of what is pleas ant in ano ther 
person in a mos t  thought-provoking manner . The speaker wherever pos s i.ble 
should employ these methods to assure his listeners that he has their best 
interests  at heart . All the indications of  sagacity and character are 
useless if the recipients are left in doub t about the attitude of the 
speaker toward their best interests . The speaker should in no way pose 
himself or his actions as a threat to the l is tener ' s well-being . Rather 
a4Aristotle , The Rhetoric of Aristotle , trans . R. C .  J ebb ( Cam­
bridge , England : The Univers ity Press ) , II , iv , 3 2  ( 1 382a) . 
8$Aris totle , Jebb trans . ,  II , iv , 1 ( 1 3 8 1a) . 
he should ident ify himself with their interests and desires and show 
how their goals naturally coincid e with each other . 86 
Conclusion 
60 
This section concerning Aris totle has traced his ethical orienta­
tion in the hab itually moral character of the individual which follows 
the do ctrine of the mean:i ii.q exhibiting his vir tuous b ehavio r . This person 
will have a moral goal and means of obtaining that goal . If either o f  
these i s  not strictly virtuous i n  nature the act cannot be  called morally 
and ethically demand ing of approval . When these concept s  are appl ied to 
rhetoric , Aris totle is practical in realiz ing the effectiveness of the 
speaker is going to be l imited or enhanced by audience perception of him 
as an ethical person . The proper use of  maxims and choice of topic s  
should demons trate intelligence and character , but without good will these 
at tributes will b e  lo st  in the rhetorical situat ion . To establish this 
good will a bond of friendship is des cribed as deve1 oping between the 
speaker and the audienc e .  Although pract ical attention is given to the 
means of b e ing perce ived as an ethical person , in Aris totle we cannot 
separate the philosophical orientation of the ethical person from the 
ethical rhetorician . The rhetoric ian has special techniques to proj ect 
his true and good chracter to the aud ienc e . Certainly there is nothing 
in Aristotle ' s wr i t ings to sugges t that he seriously entertained any 
thought of this b eing a false representation . His ins is tence on ethos 
being established throught the body of the speech alone is evidence o f  
h i s  b as ic assumption that truly ethical behavior , in the Aristo telian 
86Ar istotle , Jebb trans . ,  I I  iv , 1 ( 1 3 8 l a) -32 ( 1 3 82a) . 
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sense , canno t be  faked . A statement was made earl ier in this study that 
Aris totle recognized rhetoric was amoral . I f this b e  true , certainly 
the statement could not be carried over into his concept of the practice 
of rhetoric or to the qualit ies of  the rhetorician . 
Isocrates 
Isocrates founded his school of rhetorical training ten to twenty 
years af ter Plato made his famous attacks on the sophist s  in Pro tagoras 
and Gorgias . Aris totle came even later and is  no t directly referred to in 
Isocra tes ' writings . Isocrates is discussed here to give the alternate 
rhetorical theories of ethos developed in oppo sit ion to the Platonic system . 
Isocrates critic ized his former master , Gorgias , in the area of  ethics 
quite as s everely as he did Plato . This coupled with definite Socratic 
influences place Isoc rates in a definite niche of  his own in rhetorical 
theory . Ther e are some indications that Isocrates had some assoc iat ion 
with So crates and was highly regarded by him . 87  
This discuss ion will b eg in with Isocrat es ' concept of the true 
meaning of philosophy . This will b e  followed with a brief look at his 
attitude toward the lesser socratics and the memb ers of  the Platonic 
school . After thus showing his r ationale fo r choos ing what has been 
called " the midd le cour se , " the maj or concepts of Isocrates philosophy 
will be d is cus s ed . Two primary concepts can be eas ily id entified here . 
The first is philosophy will provide a goal and that goal will b e  vir-
tuous and noble . S econdly , philosophy is the salvation of  the state and 
most  primarily of  the Athenian state . 
8 7werner Jaeger , "The Rhetoric of Isocrates and Its  Cul tural Ideal , "  
The Province of Rhetoric , ed . ,  Joseph Schwart z  and John A .  Rycenga (New 
York : The Ronald Press Company , 1 965 ) ,  p .  89 , footnote . 
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Isocrates developed a philosophy that was above all pract ical 
and put it to work in his s chool . To assess his concept of  ethos it is 
necessary to look at his concept of education . Tal ent or  natural endow-
ment , its value relat ive to educa t ion , and the value o f  educat ion to the 
individual will be explained f rom Isocrates ' point of view . Finally , 
Isocrates has some unique observat ions to make on aud ienc e evaluat ion and 
how best to adapt to the orientation of the masses o f  the people . 
The Philosophy o f  Isocrates 
In defining Isocrates ' concept of philosophy , we should first con-
sider the label given him by the moderns and then look at his own con-
ception of the meaning of the word . Jaeger ment ioned that Isocrates is 
the father of "humanis tic culture . "  
Histo rically , it is perfectly correct to des­
cr ibe him ( in the phras e  used on the t itle­
page of  several modern books ) as the father 
of "humanis tic culture"--inasmuch as the 
sophists really cannot claim that t itle , 
and from our own pedagogic methods and 
ideal s  a direct line runs back to him , 
as it does to quint il ian and Plutarch . 88 
Isocrates , in his conception of the meaning o f  terms , attached 
dif ferent values to philosophy and sophism than those with which we are 
familiar . 
88 
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• • •  but he preferred to apply the title "sophis t "  
only t o  theoristis , whatever their spec ial inter­
ests might be . He us ed it , among others , for 
Socrates and his pupils , who had done so much 
to dis cred it the name . His own ideal he called 
"philosophy . "  Thus , he completely invert�3 the 
meanings given by Plato to the two \VO rds . 
Jaeger , p .  84 . 
Jaeger , p .  88 . 
Norlin has a sl ightly different interpretation of the dis tinc tion made 
by Isocrates in the meanings of the two terms . 
In the "Antidos is , "  especially , Isocrates terms 
his culture a "philosophy" and himself a "philo­
sopher � "  He does no t disclaim the title "sophis t , "  
but seellls t o  prefer the other as mote des cr iptive 
o f  his work . The appropriat ion of this term has 
been imputed to gim for arrogance , as if he wished 
to set himself up as a Plato or Aris totle . How­
ever , the word has at this t ime no def inite asso­
ciat ion with speculat ive or abs tract thought , 
s ignifying only a lover of wisdom or a seeker 
af ter the cul t ivated life , and is in fact more 
general and modest than the honorable title o f  
sophist which the sham pretender s who called 
themselves sophis ts  were only j us t  b eginning 
to make invidious . Indeed , the use of this 
term by Isocrates may be no thing more than a 
protest against the prepo s t erous claims made 
by c ertain sophists for the omnipotence of 
their ins truct ion . 90 
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During our analysis of the works of  Gorgias , some of the sentiment s 
of Isocrates were cited as ins tances o f  current opinion regarding philo -
sophies and the practice of false d ialect ic among the sophistic teachers . 
Her e his cr it icism is centered upon two classes  
of sophis ts , the Eris tic s , who d evoted themselves 
to theoriz ing in the f ield of ethics , and the 
sophis ts  of the rhetorical school , who taught 
oratory as an ins trument of pract ical success . 
Of these latter he s ingles out , finally , for 
special rebuke the authors of " the so-called 
arts (of  oratory) . 
Both classes  are called to account b ecaus e o f  
their impos s ible pretens ions ; the fo rmer for 
pro fessing to teach an exact s cience of  happy 
and successful living and then indulging in 
captious logomachies which have no relation 
to lif e ;  the latter for pro fess ing to teach 
the s cience or art of oratory as if it could 
be acquired by anyone by rote , regardless of 
90George Norlin , Trans . ,  Isocrates , Vol . I ( Cambridge ,  Mas s . :  
Harvard Univers ity Pres s , 1 92 8 , reprint , 1 9 6 6 ) , introduction , p .  xxv . 
native abil ity o r  pract ical experience , as one 
learns the letters of the alphabet . Furthermore , 
the authors of  the "ar t s "  might have devoted 
themselves to a worthy oratory whose end is 
j ustic e ,  whereas in fact , they emphas ized only 
forens ic skill , whose  obj ect is to defeat 
j us tice , 9 1 
Isocrates ' well-known translator , George Norlin , never specif i-
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cally includes the teachings of  Plato in those so vigorously attacked by 
Iso crates . Werner Jaeger , on the other hand , sees much in the writ ings 
of Iso crates indicating the s trong disapproval he entertained for the 
type of  abs tract reasoning being d eveloped in the Platonic school . There 
is also some ind ication that Iso crates , along with many of  his contemp-
oraries , found little to dis t inguish the "d ialectic " of Plato from the 
"eris tic" of the other sophis ts . Both wer e completely repugnant to 
Is corates--perhaps useful as a gymnastic exercise for the mind , but 
nothing more . 
Now is it pos s ible , he asks , to put any trust in 
their yearnings for truth , when they themselves 
arouse so many f alse hopes ? Isocrates names no 
names , but every word o f  his polemic is aimed 
straight at Socrates , whom here and els ewhere he 
contemptuously calls · di�puter . In Pro tagoras and 
Gorgias Plato had presented dialect ic as an art 
f ar superior to the long winded orat ions of rheto ri� 
cians . His opponent makes short work of  d ialectic : 
he couples it with eris tic--namely , argument for 
argument ' s  sake • . • •  No wonder then that Isocrates 
does not see dialec tic in the same favorable l ight 
as the socratics , who thought it was a perfect 
panacea for all spiritual ills . The infall ible 
knowledge of  values which they promise as a result 
of their teaching must appear to ordinary reasonable 
people to be something too great for mankind to 
attain . ( "Against the Sophis ts , "  2) . 92 
9 1Norlin , trans . ,  into . ,  "Agains t the Sophis t s , " pp . 1 60-1 6 1 . 
92 Jaeger , p .  96 . 
Jaeger makes a case for the subj ect of  much of  the at tack against his 
contemporaries b eing aimed at the Socratic s  and their mos t  no table 
exponent , Plato . He points to ' : the f ac t  that Iso crates has gathered 
together all the features that made Platonism repuls ive to ord inary 
common sense . The method of  controversy by ques t ion-answer , the almos t  
mythical importance attached to "knowledge of  true values " a s  a special 
organ of reason , the intellectualism that holds that knowledge is the 
cure for everything , and the supernatural enthus iasm that imparts 
"blessedness " to the philosopher . 9 3  
Plato and t he  Socratic s  a r e  among the foremost of  
the opponents whom rsocrates attacks , and s ince 
he attacks them wi.th special violence and com­
p leteness ,  it is clear that he fully understands 
the danger that threatens his ideal from their 
teaching . His invective is entirely real is tic . 
He never makes it a theoretical refutation of  
his opponent ' s poS'i.tion , for  he knows that if 
he d id  he would lose his case . The :terrain he 
choos es is that of ordinary common sense . He 
appeals to the inst incts of the man in the 
street�who , without comprehending the philo­
sopher ' s  technical secret s ,  sees that those who 
would l ead their followers to wisdom and happi­
ness have nothing themselves and get nothing 
f rom their students . 94 
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According to Jaeger ' s  interpretat ion , the second type attacked by 
Isocrates includes those who teach their craf t without any sense of morai 
responsib ility . A third group includ ed those who taught nothing but for-
ensic oratory through patterns of speech making and abs tract forms , learned 
by rote to be called into play when needed . B ecause of  the subj ec ts used 
the topics could only be trifling and the techniques useles s . 
9 3 Jaeger , p .  86 . 
94 
Jaeger , p .  9 9 . 
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In f inding his own solution to the problem , Isocrates attemp ts to 
take the middle road . Somewhere between the completely amoral quibbl ing 
of the Eris t ic d is cour s e  and the ab stract realm of Plato ' s "Ideas , "  he 
forged a rhetoric pointed toward a moral , noble and compl et ely practical 
goal . 
Primary Philosophical Principles o f  Isocrates 
It has already been ment ioned that Iso crates was influenced by the 
Socratic movement for moral reform of rhetoric . Jaeger points out that he 
does not rej ect the doctrine of Ideas . "In fact , his' writings show that 
1 1  f 9 5 he largely adopted that doctrine . ( Plato s ) . Jaeger goes on to point 
ou t that Isocrates felt rhetoric was the answer to bringing the abstrac t 
idealism of  Plato into the real world . The goals to be found in philo-
sophy were those that would lead to a successful life s tyle in the society 
or po l is o f  Athens . The nature o f  the person who has achieved the heights 
of the Isocraten philosophy o f  pract ical ethics is describ ed in this passag e : 
95 
9 6  
Firs t ,  those who manage well  the cir cums tanc es 
which they encounter day by day ;  • • •  next , tho s e  who 
are decent and honorable in their intercours e  with 
all with whom they assoc iate ; furthermore , those  who 
hold their pleasures always under control and are 
not unduly overcome by misfor tune ; • • •  fourthl y ,  and 
most  important o f  all , those who are no t spo iled by 
success es and do not desert their true selves and 
b ecome arrogant • • •  Tho se which have a character 
which is in accord , not with one o f  these things , 
but with all of  them--these I contend , are wise  and 
complete men , possessed of  all the vir tues . 9 
Jaeger , p .  1 02 .  
Isocrates , "Panthenaicus , "  Isocrates , Vol . I I , trans . ,  George 
Norlin ( Cambrid ge , Mass . :  Harvard University Press , 1 929 , reprint , 1 962)  
30-33 , pp . 39 2-393 . 
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In Isocrates ' view the wise man would be a virtuous man . Jus t  
a s  the s igns of  virtue were completely pract ical , so were the reasons 
for assuming such traits • 
• • •  nothing in the world can contribute so much 
to mater ial gain , to good repute , to right action , 
in a word , to happiness , as virtue and the qual it ies 
of vir tue . For it is by the good qual it ies that we 
have in our souls that we acquire alsQ the o ther 
advantages of which we stand in need . � 7  
After point ing to the f act that the good qual ities of  our souls are 
respons ible for fulf illing our o ther need s , Isocrates cont inues in the 
same vein--expressing wonder that anyone should seriously b elieve there 
could b e  any other mo t ive for virtuous act ions than self-interes t .  
But I marvel if anyone thinks that those who prac­
t ice piety and j ustic e  r emain constant and stead-
fast in these v irtues because they expect to be 
wor se o f f  than the wicked and not because they 
consider that both among gods and among men they 
will have the advantage over others . I ,  for my 
part , am persuaded that they and they alone gain 
advantage in the true -sense -wh'ile.� the : .others 
gain advantage only in the baser sense o f  that 
term . For I observe that those who pref er the 
way of inj ust ice , thinking it the greatest good 
fortune to seize something that belongs to others , 
are in like case with animals which ar e lured by 
a bait , at the f irst  der iving pleasure from what 
they seize , but hhe moment after find ing themselves 
in desparate straits �while those who live a life of  
piety and j us t ice pass their days in security for 98 the present and have sweeter hopes for all eternity . 
A primary concern of  Isocrates was his theory that philosophy was 
the salvat ion o f  the state . He realized t?e futility of  the endless wars 
among the Greek City S tates and that their only defense from ultimate 
97 Isocrates , "On the Peace , "  28 29 , p • .  26 � 
98 Isocrates , "On the Peace , "  30-34 , pp . 27-28 . 
defeat by foreign barbarians lay in unity . As Gorgias had done before 
him , he called for a cessation of  inner host il i t ies and common purpos e 
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for all Greek S tat es--the Hellenes--in their effort s  to remain free . In 
this cause Isocrates saw a high moral purpo se and goal for his educat ion 
in discourse . The topic s  would be lo fty , the prose in a s tyle closer to 
poetry than to the pract ice of the forensic orator , and the b enefit s would 
go to Athens and to the newly trained s tatesmen of his s chool who were 
expounding these princ iples . 
But I urge and exhor t  those who are younger and 
more vigorous than I to speak and wr ite the kinds 
of d is cour ses by which they will turn the greates t 
states--those who have been wont to oppress the 
rest--into the paths of virtue and j us t ic e ,  s ince 
when the affairs of Hellas are in a happy and 
prosperous condit ion , it follows that the state 
of l earning and letters  is greatly irnproved . 9 9  
Jaeger points t o  the fact that in Isocrates the teachings o f  
rhetoric became naturaliz ed--par t o f  the Athenian life style . 1 00 The 
dialogues of Plato and the attitude of the t imes gave respec t to the 
great learning the spphists had in their own f ields . However , they 
were foreigners to Athens , to the problems of Athens and to the easy 
refinement of the Athenian l ife styl e . Isocrates , the Ahtenian sophis t ,  
changed this and made himself and his ar t typically local in nature . 
"Isoc rates ' rhetor ical teaching emerged as part of the great pos twar 
educational movement of Athens , into which al l the effor ts of his day to 
1 0 1 
reform and rej uvenate the Athenian state were inevitably destined to flow . " 
g g lsocrates , "On the Peace , "  1 4 5 , p .  97 . (A footnote by Norlin to 
the above states , "The state of af fairs and the state of learning are not 
disassociated in his mind ; philosophy is the salvation of the state . )  
1 00 Jaeger , p .  89 . 
1 01  Jaeger , p .  90 . 
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The cormnon nat ional purpose  needed t o  save Greece was equated with true 
statesmanship that saw the necess ity of eradicating corrupt ion and the 
cause of corruption--" the po isonous mutual hatreds of the s eparate s tates 
and parties . 1 1 1 02 
But Isocrates did not , like the Platonic Socrates , 
bel ieve that the sorely needed reformation could b e  
achieved b y  the creat ion of a new moral world , a 
s tat e as it were within each man ' s  soul . He held 
that the "nation , "  the idea of Greece , was the 
point round which the new element s in the spir i­
tual renaissanc e  were to crys talize . 1 0 3  
Educational Theories of  Isocrates 
These philsophical goals were to be reached through Isocrates ' 
system of  education incorporated into his school . We have only a broad 
sketch o f  his ideas on education , but some fundamental ideas do stand out . 
Elementary education had no s erious fault as it s tood . The study o f  eri-
stic disputat ions s erved as good gymnas t ic exer cises for the mind if no t 
carried too far . Higher education should b e  devoted to more serious 
studies . 
1 0 2  
1 03 
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What ,  then , is the nature of higher education? I t  
cons ists , says Isocrates , in the cul tivat ion of  the 
art o f  d is course  • • •  d is cour s e  is  both the outward and 
inward thought ; it is no t merely the form of expres­
s ion , but reason , f eeling and imaginat ion as well ; 
it is that by which we persuade others and by which 
we persuade ourselves ; it is that by which we direc t  
public affairs and b y  which w e  s et our own house in 
order ; it is , in fine , that endowment o f  our human 
nature which raises us above mere animality and 
enables us to l ive the civil ized lif e . 1 04 
Jaeger , p . 9 1 . 
Jaeger , p .  9 2 . 
Norlin , trans . ,  Isocrates , I ,  intro , p .  xxiii . 
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Isocrates becomes quite eloquent in his evaluation o f  the importance of  
discourse to the human estate . Both outward and inward speech ar e neces-
sary for the es tablishment and the maintenance of  c ivilized life . It  is 
necessary for the education of the ignorant , to persuad e people on the 
best course of ac tion and to debate subj ects in our own minds • 
• • •  for the power t6 speak well is taken as the 
surest index of a sound understanding , and dis­
course which is true and lawful and j us t  is the 
outward image of a good and f aithful soul • • •  And , 
if there is need to speak in brief summary of  this 
power , we shall f ind that none of the things which 
are done with intelligence take plac e without the 
help of speech, but that in all our. actions as well 
as in all our thought s ,  speech is our guide , and
1
&� mos t  employed by those who have the mos t  wisdom . 
Jus t how educat ion in his school is to carry d is cours e  in a direc-
tion to bet ter meet these goals is d iscus sed in the introduc tion by Norlin . 
Isocrates complains that rhetoric has been too limited in its s cope . 
Largely confined to the courtroom , there has been no consideration given 
to great caus es and to large id eas . 
He himself chose , he says , to write discourses which 
were Hellenic in their breadth,  deal ing with the 
relat ion o f  s tates , and appropriate to be spoken 
at the pan-Hellenic assemblies ; akin more to the 
literature that is composed in rhythm and set to 
mus ic than to forensic oratory • • •  And it is oratory 
on this high plane , dist inguished by bread th and 
view and nobleness of tone , by literary f inish and 
charm, and by permanence o f  interes t and value , 
which he proposes to cultivate in his students . 
They are to be led by their desire for praise and 
honor not to support causes which are unj ust or 
petty , but those which are great and honorable , . 
devoted to the general good and welfare of mankind . 1 06 
l OSlisoctates ' "Ant idos is ., " 2 5 5-25 7 , Vol . II , pp . 3 2 8-3 2 9 . 
1 06 Norlin , trans . ,  Isocrates , I .  intro . ,  p .  xxiv . 
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Iso crates in no way claims fo r his e ducat ion the powe r to endow 
eve ry man who comes to him wi th the powe rs to spe ak and th ink as des-
cribed . No r does he claim that thro ugh his educat ion the co rre ct answe rs 
wi ll come to mind in eve ry s i tuation . 
Fo r s in ce i t  is no t in the nature of  man to 
a t t ain a s cience by the possess ion of whi ch 
we can know p os i t ive ly what we should do o r  
wh at we should s ay ,  i n  the next resort I ho ld 
that man to be wise who is ab le by his p owe rs 
o f  conj ecture to arrive generally at the b es t  
course and I hold that man t o  b e  a philosophe r 
who o ccupies himsel f wi th s t udies fo r whi ch he 
will mo s t  q ui ckly gain that kind of insigh t . 10 7 
O f  the th ree at t ributes con t ribut ing to the succes s o f  a rhe to ri-
cian ,  native ab ility , p racti ce and e ducat ion , Iso crates p laces ability 
fi rs t and education las t . He admi ts  that the re i s  no e ducat ion that can 
make a dep rave d nature nob le , j us t  as the re is  no educat ion that can com-
ple tely compens ate fo r a comp le te lack of t alent in the p up il . 
He himse l f ,  at any rate , admi ts that fo rmal 
t raining p l ays a mino r part in the making o f  
a s uccess ful man : fi rs t  ·and mos t  importan t  
i s  native ab ility ; next is  p ract i ce and expe ri­
ence , and l as t  is e ducation ; and no e ducat ion 
amo unts  to anything whi ch does no t invo lve 
1 8 hard wo rk on the part o f  the s t udent hims el f .  O 
For those who go thro ugh the rigo rs o f this hard wo rk b ut do no t 
possess the talent to be highly s uccess ful in disco urs e , the re are s t ill 
rewards . The " e f fort  they make to wri te and sp eak on such themes will 
tend to liberate their minds f rom mean and sel fish interests  and s o  to  
1 09  enoble the i r  mo ral natures . 
10 7 No rlin , in tro . , I ,  pp . xxvi i- xxvi ii . 
108 Norlin , p .  xxvii . 
1 09 
No rlin , p .  vvi v .  
lso c rates p rides himself  mo re upon the sound 
mo ral in fluence o f  his work and teaching than 
upon any o ther thing . The p rimary obj e c t  o f  
his inst ruction i s  righ t  conduct in the man 
and in the cit i zen . I ndeed , there are t imes 
when he seems to think o f  his :i.nfluen ce 
exp res s ing itself  more wo rthily in action 
than in spee ch .  He says in the "Panathen­
ai cus " that he took greater pleas ure in those 
of his s t udents who we re respe cted for the 
cha racter of their lives  and deeds than in 1 10 those who we re reputed to be ab le spe akers . 
lso crate s on Audien ce Analysis 
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Isocrates co uld neve r be l abelled an idealis t when i t  came to his 
as ses sment of the t rue natures of men . He did  not share the Platonic 
ideal that no man would knowingly do a wrong act . He accep ts the fact 
that few men will seek to do ri gh t  even when given the oppo rtunity to 
know right f rom wrong . 
• • • they choose fo r the i r  as sociates thos e who share 
in , and no t those who dissuade them from the i r  faul ts • 
• • •  people p re fe r  to  occupy themse lves with each 
o ther's follies rather than wi th the admoni t ions 
of their  teachers • • •  if we are wi lling to survey 
human na ture as a whole , we shall find that the 
maj o rity of men do no t t ake p le as ure in the food 
that is  mos t  wholes ome , no r in the p ursuits  that 
are the mos t  hono rab le , no r in the actions that 
are the nob les t ,  no r in the creatures tha t  are 
the mos t  use ful , but that they have tas tes that 
are in eve ry way contrary to the i r  bes t interes t s , 
while they view those who have s ome regard for the i r  
duty as men o f  aus tere and l aborious lives . I l l  
When giving advi ce on the t reatment o f  an audien ce comp osed o f  s uch beings , 
lso crates is  real is t i c  in poin t ing o ut i t  does no good to  tell them wha t  i s  
fo r their  bes t  intere s ts-- for they will not lis ten . H e  admi t s  that a l l  men 
l l ONorlin , p .  xxv . 
1 1 1  Isocrates , " To Ni cocles , "  4 3-49 ,  I 6 8- 6 9 . 
7 3  
are no t so  di ffi cul t  to app roach a s  the one s de s c ribed , but reali s t i cally 
we mus t ac cep t the fact that thi s i s  the es tate of  many audience s .  
Conclus ion 
This much , however ,  is  clear , that those who aim 
to writ e  anything in verse or p rose whi ch wi il 
make a popular appe al sho uld seek o ut , not in the 
mo s t  p ro f i t ab le dis courses , but those whi ch mo s t  
abound i n  fi ct ions ; f o r  the e a r  de ligh ts i n  these 
j us t  as the eye del i ghts in games and contes ts  • • • 
Wi th such mo de ls , then , be fo re us , i t  is evident 
that  those who des i re to conunand the at tent ion 
of the i r  heare rs mus t abs t ain from admonit ions 
and advi ce , and mus t  s ay the kinds of things 1 1 2 wh i ch they see are mos t p le as ing to the crowd . 
Looking at the influen ce o f  these men o f  an cien t Gree ce from a 
dis t ance o f  twen ty- five hundred years , there i s  a t endency to dis tort 
the i r  relative importance during the i r  l i fe times . I t  was the influence 
of P ro t ago ras , Go rgias and I s o c rates that mos t  mo l ded the rhe toric of the 
Greeks . So crates and P lato we re no t highly though t o f  by the ir contemp-
oraries . I t  has been pos tula ted that Ari s t o t le's Rhe toric  was wri t ten as 
the out come o f  a feud with Iso crates--who was already we l l  e s t ab lished as 
a teacher o f  rhe tori c .  
The s t o ry s ays that during his  first  res idence in 
Athens ( 34 7- 36 7 B . C . ) Aristo t le snee red at the i deas 
o f  I s o c rates and the me thod o f  thei r dis seminatioy 1 3  in bundles o f  spee ches hawked by the booksellers . 
Ce.rtain i t  is  that the re mus t have been some rivalry between the two giants 
o f  Greek rhe tori c .  Norlin points o ut that in spite o f  the fact tha t  Iso-
crate s cha rged a very large fee , he had more s tuden ts than all o f  the o ther 
sophis t s  p ut toge ther . 
1 1 2 
Isocrates , " To Nico cles , "  49 , I 6 8- 6 9 . 
1 1 3  
W .  K .  Wims at t , Jr . , and Cleanth Brooks , " The Ve rbal Medium : 
Plato and Ari s t o t le , "  The Province o f  Rhe tori c ,  e d . , J .  S chwart z and J .  
Rycenga (New York : Th� Ronald P ress Comp any , 1 965 ) , p .  12 0 .  
I so c rate s , says Dionys ius , was the mo s t  i l lus t rious 
teacher o f  his time and made his  s choo l the " image 
o f  Athens . "  The ables t young men o f  Athens and o f  
Hellas came t o  s t udy unde r him ,  and went o ut f rom 
his t utelege to be come le ade rs in their variy�� 
fields--oratory , his tory , and s t atesmanship . 
P la to 's e f fo r 1· s to put rhe toric on a higher vis ionary p lane 
req uired the services o f  an Aris to tle to put into e f fect . While during 
their lifetimes Iso crates commanded the greater fo llowing , there can be 
no do ub t b ut what the movement toward a mo ral ly respons ib le rhe tori c 
res ulted in greater emphas is on this element than wo uld have o therwise 
occurred . 
The course (Aris to tle's )  was a chal lenge t o  the p ro­
fes s ional teachers of speech ; mo re parti cularly it 
was a gaun tlet thrown down be fore the ce leb rated 
leader of  the Atheni an s chool , I so crates , who had 
made the art o f  rhe to ri c both more elas t i c  and more 
e laborate ,  and in whose eyes rhe to ri cal e ducat ion 
was synonymo us with liberal e ducation and at the 
s ame t ime a p as sport to  a sp lendid p oli t ical career • 
• • •  Ari s t o t le ' s  Rheto��� • • •  b re athes the s ame contemp t  
fo r the fashionab le-- and p resumab ly o f ten s uc ce s s f ul 
devi ces as P lato ' s own polemi c agains t  rhe toric as an 
art o f  flat t e cy  o r  a s  the " art i f i ce r  o f  p ers uas ion" 
at all cos t s . 1 15  
--- ---------
1 14 Norlin , intro . ,  I ,  xxix. 
1 1 5 Friedrich Solms en , "No tes on Aris to t le ' s Rhe t o ri c , "  The 
Provin c�Rhe to ri£ , p .  1 3 1 . 
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CHAPTER I I I  
THE ROMANS 
This chapter will  show the developments and adap tat ions o f  con­
cep ts of e thos in rhe tori c made by the Romans . Generally , the Romans 
believed in man ' s capability and me thod fo r disce rriing right and wrong , 
good and evil . I f these concep ts are rooted ent irely in the sensat ions 
of each pe rson , then the rhe torician is perfectly free to choose his 
top i cs , his argumen ts , his pos i t ion on an issue , in the light of  the 
parti cular si tua tion or audience con fron ting him. He is  free to adap t 
in any way he feels desirab le to the "needs o f  the moment . "  I f , on the 
other hand , the theo ris t has ac cep ted the exis ten ce o f  certain unalter­
able " I deas" o f  right  and wrong , o f  moral con s t ructs o f  socie ty that are 
the s ame for all men fo r all t ime , then the o rator is ob ligat ed to sui t 
his dis course to these concep ts . The allowable adap tations for audience 
accep tance of these ideas is p roblematical and ce rtainly one of high 
inter.est to the speaker . Also , as thes e theories o f  man ' s percep tion of  
and relat ion to his  so cie ty change and adap t themse lves  to the di ffe rent 
cul tures under cons iderat ion in this paper , re currence , alteration or 
ab andonment of early theo ries and their  rep lacements wi th new can be 
identi fied . One o f  the primary que s tions to  be answe red by this paper 
is concerned wi th this philosophi cal app roach to  the concept o f  e thos . 
De tailed explanat ions are the only adequate means to  answe r this ques tion . 
Anything less would res ult in incomp le te and inconclusive answe rs . In 
short , i t  would defeat the purpose o f  the p aper . 
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Keep ing this in mind , b e fore con s i dering the wri tings found in 
the Ad Herrenium ,  the De Orato re o f  Cicero and the Ins t i tutio De Oratoria 
of Quintilian ,  the firs t conside rat ion o f  this chap ter wi ll be to t race 
the deve lopment of two oppos ing s choo ls o f  philosophical thought  as they 
developed be tween the Fi f th Cent ury , B . C . and the Fis t  Century of the 
Chri s t i an Era . Mos t  s imp ly i denti fied as the S toics  and the Skep tics , 
these two s chools o f  thought influenced the thinking o f  the Roman rhetori­
ci ans in the fields of ethics in rhe toric and the e thos of the speake r .  
The Ad He rrenium ,  author unknown , i s  the firs t Roman rhetori cal 
wo rk wi th which we are acquainted . Because o f  its  s t ruc tured form i t  has 
tradi t ionally been associated wi th the S to i c  S choo l . The Ad Herrenium 
gives p recise and , up to this t ime , unique ins tructions for p roj ection 
of e thos under varying circums tances . 
Becoming disillusioned after the death o f  Caesar failed t o  imp rove 
the polit ical climate o f  Rome , Cice ro wi thdrew for a time and devo ted him­
self to the development  o f  pol i t i cal and rhe to ri cal theory . He used 
current s choo ls o f  thought along wi th what he co ul d  le arn o f  Iso crates . 
De Oratore gives de tailed and p ra c t ical advi ce fo r e s t abli shment o f  e thos 
for the rhe to ri ci an .  
The l as t  Roman to be included in this s t udy i s  Quintilian .  The 
dis cus s ion wi l l  cons i der the " goo d man speaking well" concep t , the type 
o f  education p roposed and the ways in whi ch the " good man" p roj e c ted his 
ethos or made it felt by the audience . 
This will con clude the clas s i cal port ion o f  the s tudy . At this 
point , the ques t ions asked about o ur concep ts of e thos in rhe tori c  in the 
classical sources have been , answered . ' I '  Thes� ques t i ons ·are : 
1 .  Wha t value sys tems p rovided the bases  for the 
concep ts of e thos fotmd in classi cal rhetoric?  
2 .  What concep ts o f  e thos were s e t  forth by 
clas s ical rhetoricians ? 
3 .  What s imilarities and dif ferences exi s te d  be tween 
classical · value sys tems and clas s i cal concep ts o f  
ethos ? 
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Page re f erences will b e  given for each concep t that i s  cited i n  this com-
parison __ � tudy:a. . .:: These are found in re ference tables irtcluded in Chapter  VI . 
Philosophies o f  Early Rome 
The Greek Academy alte re d  over the years wi th e arly phi losophies 
changing , blending and lo s ing the dis t inct different iations of their  
earlie r form. Wi th these changes came the deve lopment o f  the Stoic and 
Skeptic s chools o f  tho ugh t on pe rcep tion .  
The S t oic  ep is temo logy as developed by Zeno des cribed four degrees 
of knowle dge . This as cending order o f  validi ty was used as the �as i s  for 
the S toi c  s tandard of truth . Beginning with impress ion , it  p roceeded to 
assent , comprehens ion and finally , s cience . 1 Ep ictetus s tates that , "We 
must remember cle arly tha t man meas ures his eve ry act ion by his imp ress ions . "  
These imp ress ions come to us in four ways : 
• • •  either things are and seem so to us ; or  they 
are not and seem not to be ; or they are �nd seem 
no t ;  or they are no t and yet  seem to be . 
The fur the r deve lopment o f  S to i c  though t embodies the i deal o f  
man ' s pe rcep tion of  the truth . A b i t  o f  S toic  wri ting by Aulus Gillius , 
a Latin grammarian , in Nos tes At ti cae reads : 
1Prentice A. Meador , Jr . , " Skep t i c  Theory o f  Percep tion : A Phi lo­
sophical Antecedent of Ciceronian P robability , " Quarterly Journal of Speech , 
LIV (De c . , 1 9 6 8 ) , p .  34 1 .  
2 Meado r ,  p .  342 .  
Impres s ions by whi ch man ' s  mind is  s t ruck 
are at firs t s i ght of any thing that re ache s 
his inte lle c t , and not under his wi ll o r  con­
t ro l , but th rus t thems elves on the re co gni t ion 
o f men by a ce rtain fo r ce of the i r  own ; but the 
assents by �hi ch these  imp ress ions are re cog-
3 nized are vol unt ary and depend on man ' s contro l .  
Me ador exp lains that i f  the soul corre ct ly accepts  o r  re co gni zes the 
impulse the exte rnal ob j e ct has been per ceive d . When thi s o c curs i t  
i s  a " catalep tic phantasm" involving inmiedi ate ce rtain grasping o f  the 
external obj e c t after the sense expe rience . This is oppos e d  to the 
Epi cure an " grasping b e fo reh and . "  
The soul mus t  as sent to an image whi ch is fai th ful 
to the obj e c t  i t  rep resents i f  " cat alep t i c  phant asm" 
is to be abs o lute and mo ral p ro gres s  i s  t o  t ake p lace . 
The mind , p as s i ve in the p ro ces s ,  re ceives imp re s s ions 
of exte rnal obj e ct s . Hence , i f  i t  imme di ately grasps 
the true nat ure o f  the exte rnal wo rld , an ab s olute 
corre l ation exi s t s  b e tween percep tion and re ali ty . 
By this me ans the gul f be tween the obj e c t  in 
though t  and the obj e c t  in nat ure is  b ri dge d and 
their  coexi s tensiveness i s  as ser ted . The adherence 
o f  this absolute cor rela tion res ul ts  in s cience . 4 
Me ado r illus t rates the re lationship o f  the di f fe rent leve ls o f  
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knowle dge wi th di f ferent p os t ure s o f  the hand . Wi th the finge rs s t re t ched 
out and the palm upward the re i s  p erce p tion . S l i gh tly close d  finge rs 
rep resent assent and the closed fi s t  is comp rehens ion . 
There is high tens ion in as sent . He who possesses  
the  " cat alep t i c  phantasm" truly comp rehends in this 
sense . While all men share p ercep tive ab i l i ties , 
only the t ruly wise man-- the one who possesses this 
insight--coul d  know the truth wi th re al ass urance . 
3Meado r ,  p .  342 . 
4Me ado r ,  p .  34 3 .  
According to  the S toi cs , this ep is temologi cal 
posi tion , when combine d wi th S to i c  e thi cs o f  
acquies cence , i s  ab le t o  produce the vi rtuo us 
man--one free from emotions . 5 
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In his re futat ion o f  the S to i c  posi tion , Arces i laus o f  the Academy 
agrees sense percep tion may be the so ur ce fo r human j udgement . Howeve r ,  
he firmly denies tha t such percept ion co ul d yield "knowle dge" and he intro-
duces the fo rmul a o f  s uspens ion o f  j udgemen t into the A cademy . 
. . •  subj e ctive limi tations p revent re liable re cep t­
abi l i ty of an exte rnal ob j e ct .  He argues : The 
S to i c  do ct rine o f  imme di ate percep tion is  incon­
s is tent . There is no per cep tion that has in i ts e l f  
the p owe r t o  re co gni ze truth , and co uld no t poss ibly 
be de ce ive d .  As sent to an idea as true is  an ac t o f 
j udgement , and like all j udgemen ts canno t rise abo ve 
op 1n1on . There can be no exper ience that bears the 
absol ute imp ress of t ruth . An une rring cri terion 
mus t no t re s t  only up on an i de a  b ut up on a j udge­
ment , and a j udgement canno t be a cri te rion o f  
truth , fo r one has no cri te rion o f  j udgemen t to 
p rove that i t  canno t e rr . Arces ilaus further 
as serts that it is imp os s ib le to dis tinguish 
t rue percep tions from false per cep tions . 6 
The culminat ion o f  Academi c Skep ti cism i s  seen in the wri tings o f  
Carne ades . He use d four arguments agains t the S to i cs . The f i rs t  was th at 
there are false p er cep t ions . Se condly , these do no t give us abs o lute know-
ledge . Thir dly , the re is no di f fe rence b e tween a false and true pe rcep t ion 
which we can de tect . Final ly , there i s  no t rue percep tion to whi ch the 
fal se one may be opposed whi ch di f fe rs in charac te r .  
5 
Carneade s  maint ains that no cri terion o f  t ruth 
is  pos sible thro ugh the re asoning p owe r s , be cause 
all the mate rial use d  by reason comes from expe ri­
ence th rough sense percep tion . Re as on does no t 
Me ador , p .  34 3 .  
6 
. 
Me ador , p .  343 . 
begin with any thing that is  imme diately ce rtain ; 
the re fo re , eve ry p roo f p resupposes o ther p roo fs 
fo r the validity of i t s  premises , whi ch brings 
about a regressus in inf ini t um,  and le ads to no 
de fini te res ul t . 7 
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Even C arne ades , howeve r ,  agrees tha t the re are di f fe rent de grees 
of probabili ty .  The firs t  degree is the "p rob ab le . "  This i s  the re alm 
of the leas t degree of p robabili ty and belongs to a s ingle ide a ,  one tha t  
s tands alone . The ne xt level  i s  the " p rob ab le and undisputed . "  These are 
ideas that can be united with other i de as wi thout cont radi c tion . The th ird 
level of p robab ili ty is  l abelle d  the "p rob able , undisp ute d and tes te d . " As 
the highes t sy!'} tem that can be re ached i t  is comp rise d  o f  a whole sys tem o f  
conne cted ideas , all agreeing lo gi cally wi th e ach o ther . These obse rva-
tions are fo und in _Outline s o f  Pyrrhonism by Sextus Emp iricus , t rans lated 
by Meador , on pages  2 2 7 to 2 2 9 . 
In interp re ta tion leve l  one is adequate fo r eve ryday li fe . Thi s  
level canno t be s ai d  to  s tand fo r knowledge . As so ciation use d  to  incre as e  
p rob ability is  important i n  development o f  unde rs t anding o f  rel ationships 
to the mate ri al wo rl d .  
Carneades may be the first  to re alize the imp ortance 
o f  the ass o cia tion o f  ideas in fo rming de grees o f  
p robabili ty in percep tion . I t  i s  no t in resemblance 
o f  sensations to obj e c ts one can find a cri te rion o f  
t ruth , as i t  i s  imposs ible t o  ve ri fy i t ;  nei the r i s  
i t  i n  the p owe r o f  the sens ation o f  the s ense s , for 
th at cannot be me as ure d .  But one can cons i der the 
comb ination and order o f  the sens ations and p ro duce 
the percep tion . Percep tion incl udes a family o f  
related ide as . In the ordinary circums t ances o f  
l i fe , i t  i s  impos s ib le to take all the precautions 
and one is content wi th the f i r s t  two degrees o f  
p rob abil i ty . 8 
7Me ador ,  p .  344 . 
8Meador , p .  345 . 
8 1  
When the act ual content of  appeals t o  the p robable i s  examine d there is  
found the element , always represented , of  what is  going to  a f fo rd light  
fo r practice . In this realm intellectual illumination i s  not rep resented 
as speculative curio s i ty , but as p racti cal application to eve ry day af fai rs . 
AD HERRENIUM 
As the e arlies t known representative Roman wri t ing on rhe tori c , 
the Ad Herrenium has long held an honored posi t ion in rhe tori cal theory . 
The autho r is unknown to us and any theo ries abo ut his mo tivating ph i lo-
sophy can be only theo ries . Ray Nadeau ,  the t rans l ator o f  the Ad He rrenium 
into English , has p ointed to the o rgani zation o f  the wo rk as dis t inctive 
f rom all other known cont emp orary wri tings o f  the p erio d .  
The Ad He rreni um rep resented S toic  flai r  for 
de tail and class i fication , and as s uch , i t  was 
dis tinguished from o ther contempo rary s chools  
of  rhe to rical though t : the At tic  i de al o f  
Calvus , Calidius and B rutus , the As i ani sm 
of Ho rtens ius , and the e cle ct i c  Rhodian o f  
Cicero . 9 
The Ad He rrenium is als o uniq ue among i ts contempo raries in its  
use o f  Roman illus trations , the clari ty of  i t s  app roach and the me thod of  
the Greek rhetoricians . 
The me tho d o f  the Ad Herrenium is tha t  o f  the 
Greek rhe to ri cian and He rmago ras , but many 
illus t ra tions from Roman hi s t o ry and o ratory 
and the clari ty o f  its  app roach give i t  a well 
dese rved reputation fo r o ri ginali ty . 10  
9Ray Nade au , " Rhe torica Ad He r renium :  Commentary and Translat ion · 
o f  Book I , " -�e e ch Monographs , Vol . XVI , Augus t ,  1949 , pp . 5 7- 6 8 .  
l ONadeau , pp . 5 7-5 8 .  
Since the identity o f  the autho r is  unknown the con side ration o f  this 
wo rk wi ll have to confine i t sel f to the writ ten pages themselves . He re 
we find a few gene ral admoni tions conce rning the general practice o f  
rhe to ri c .  The subj ect o f  the exo rdium i s  treated at length and s ome 
suggestions are given fo r the winning o f  audience app roval during the 
narration portion o f  the speech .  
Concep ts o f  Ethos in Ad He rreni um 
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The author o f  our st udy in rhe to ri c emphas izes , as had Iso crates 
before him , the importance of continuo us p ract ice in spee ch . Theory had 
to always be adap ted to p ract i cal application . The f i rs t  portion o f  the 
book also de al t wi th the educational qualifications o f  the orator as well 
as his nobility of charact er . 
The duty o f  the o rato r is to be able to speak on 
al l questions o f  civil o rde r whi ch are gove rne d 
by customs o r  laws , and to conduct hims e l f  s o  as 
to obt ain the agreement o f  the audience inso far 
as poss ible . I I 
Wi th this ef ficient di sp atch o f  these two quest ions , the author 
pro ceeds wi th the me tho Js to be · ised in winning the favo r o f  the audience 
fo r the speaker and fo r the speake r ' s case . Here the me thods seem to over-
lap .  To o ur writer it mus t seem sel f-evi dent that in winning app roval for 
oneself the feeling is going to carry ove r to the case being p resented . 
At the s ame time , gaining a favo rab le audience view toward the case being 
presented will also resul t in audience favor fo r the speaker and o ther 
rep resentat ions made by the speake r .  
I I  Nadeau , p .  5 9 .  
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The f i rs t cons iderat ion fo r the author is  to p oint o ut tha t the re 
a n: fo ur kinds o f  cases req ui ring the us e o f  two kinds o f  exo rdium .  1 2 
The fo ur kin ds o f  cas e s  are respec table , shameful , those of do ub t ful 
clas s i f i ca tion , and thos e o f  s l i ght impo r tance . 
The case is resp e c t able when we de fend the righteous or  at tack the 
wi cke d .  The case i s  shame ful when you de fend a wi cked man o r  p ro s e cute a 
right eous one . When the case is p artially rep s e c t ab le and partly shame ful , 
it i s  doub t ful and i t  is o f  l i t tle cons equence when an unimportant o r  
t rivi al ma t ter i s  cons ide red . 
In the cas e o f  the resp e c t able i t  is  only ne ces s ary to use the 
s imp le exo rdium or in t ro duc tion . In the mat ter o f  the shame ful cas e , the 
use of the ins inuatio i s  reconnnended . In the case o f  the doub t ful case , 
the speaker will t ry to re gain the goo d  will o f  the audience , and in the 
case of the tri fling case , he will attemp t to ge t at tent i on . 
In us ing the s imp le opening , i t  is de s irab le to achieve the trip le 
obj e c t ive for  an audience o f  having them amenable , atten tive and we l l-
disposed . 
1 2  
We shall b e  ab le to have amenab le audiences i f  we 
care ful ly exp lain the b as is o f  o ur cas e , and i f  
we gain thei r  in teres t ; for he i s  amenable , who 
consents to lis ten closely . We shall ge t atten­
tion , i f  we promise to con ce rn ours elves with 
things that  are impo rtant , new and ext rao rdinary , 
and wi th things wh i ch concern the S t ate , the audi­
ence , or the wo rship o f  the immo rtal go ds . We 
shall al so ge t attent ion , i f  we ask for i t , and 
i f  we b ring out in p ro�e r  orde r  the p oints we 
are go ing to t ake up . 1 
Nadeau , p .  6 0 .  The mate rial re ferre d  to in this  s e c tion is taken 
f rom Nade au' s t rans lation o f  the firs t b ook o f  Ad He rrenium and was p ub­
lishe d  in Speech Monogrpahs . 
1 3  
N adeau , p .  60 . Ad Her renium ,  Book I ,  I V .  
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Winning good feeling or ge tting the audience we ll disposed toward 
us entails the j udi cious use of fo ur pos s ib le courses . The one chosen 
will depend on the ci rucms tan ces being de al t wi th . Goo d  feeling is  gained 
by talking about : 
( 1 )  ourselves , i f  we evalua te o ur servi ces without 
arro gance , and if we dis cus s what we have done for 
the S t ate , our p aren ts , f riends , o r  even for tho se 
who lis ten to us , p rovide d that all these mat ters 
have a bearing on the mat ter in ques t ion . We als o 
win goo d feelings i f  we dis cus s o ur di fficul t ies , 
hardship s , lone liness  and mis fo rt unes . Finally , 
we gain goo d feeling i f  we ask for the help o f  
o ur hearers and make i t  clear that only in them 
are we wi lling to p lace o ur t rus t . 1 4 
Some times o the r me tho ds are mo re e asily adop ted and s ui t  the type o f  case 
better . The autho r re commends attacking the opp onen t to gain the s ame 
favorable audience re act ion achieve d  through p u t t ing ourselves in a favor-
ab le light : ( talk about ) 
( 2 )  our opponents , i f  we can caus e the audience to  
react agains t them wi th hate , envy , and contemp t .  
We shall  bring hate upon the:n ,  i f  we ment ion s ome 
infamous deed in their p as t-- some dee d  in whi ch 
they acted arro gan t ly , t raitorous ly , cruelly , p re­
s ump tuously , mal icious ly , o r  perve rsely . We shall 
b ring envy upon them , i f  we emphas i ze their influ­
ence , powe r ,  the p arty b acking them , the i r  riches , 
inordinate amb i t ion , nobility , the number o f  the i r  
clients , gues ts , friends , relatives , and i f  we show 
tha t they put thei r  confidence in these things rathe r 
than in the t ruth . We can make the'Qt fall into con­
temp t i f  we dwe ll upon the i r  lack o f  ene rgy , i gnor­
an ce , bad hab i t s  and s o f t  living . 15 
1 4Ad He rrenium ,  Book I ,  V2 - 1 4 . 
15 Ad He rrenium ,  Book I ,  V ,  1 5- 3 3 . 
The next me tho d for winning the good fee lings o f  the audience invo lves 
re counting goo d  things done by them in the p as t .  The case can be aided 
through clever p raise and through heap ing abus e on the opposing case . 
( 3 )  the audien ce , i f  we recall cases in whi ch their 
de cisions gave evidence o f  co urage , wisdom ,  me rcy , 
and greatnes s o f  soul , and i f  we make clear the 
high es teem in wh i ch we hold them , and the s uspense 
which awai ts  their decis ion . We can also make the 
hearer feel well- disposed by t alking about ( 4 )  the 
case i ts el f , if we b ring it forth wi th clever p raise  
fo r its  me ri ts and cover the case o f  the opponen ts  
wi th abuse . 1 6 
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When the case we are s upp orting is some thing les s  than hono rable , 
the autho r o f  this work recommends use o f  the Ins inuat io . This is  the type 
case where the s ubj e ct i t sel f turns the hearer agains t the speake r .  Thi s  
type opening sho uld be used when the listene rs seem to already have been 
won over by the opponents .  The th ird ci rcums t ance invo lves the members o f  
the audience already being bored o r  t i red f rom the spee ches whi ch have p re-
ceded o urs . 
When the case belongs to the shame ful c lass the re are five argu-
men ts to use : 
( 1 ) I t  is ne ce s s ary to have regard fo r the charge 
and no t the man ; ( 2 )  o r  fo r the man and no t the 
charge ; or ( 3 )  those things s ai d  by the opposi tion 
are no t p le as ing to  us and they are unwo rthy o r  
wi cke d .  Then , after having dis cus s e d  the gravity 
o f  the o f fense at  s ome length , we shal l  show that 
what we have done is nothing qui te l ike i t .  ( 4 )  
On o ther o ccas ions , we shall b ring up a de cis ion 
made by o ther j udge s in a s imil ar cas e , o r  a les s  
impo rtant one , o r  a mo re serious one ; then , we shall 
o ut line ·our cas e  s tep by s tep and show the s imi l ari ty 
be tween the two caqeq . (5 ) One can accomp lish the 
s ame e ffe ct by de claring that he will s ay nothing 
16Ad He rrenium, Book I ,  V ,  33-44 . 
about the opponents o r  s ome o ther ma t ter , and 
then actual ly talking on these s ub j e c ts by 
cas ual ly in terj e c t ing i deas in the co urse o f  
the spe ech . l 7 
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The author o f  th is wo rk ·goes to some length to show the me ans to 
wi.n ove r  the heare r  who has al re ady been convince d by the opponent . Among 
the di f fe rent ways lis ted to "wind one ' s way into the argument , " we find : 
Promise to talk fi rs t  abo ut the argument cons i de re d  s t ronge s t  by the oppo-
nent ; s tart w i th one o f  the opponent ' s  as sertions--maybe the las t ; b e  
hes i t ant , wondering whi ch argument t o  give p re fe rence t o  and whi ch o f  
theirs t o  attack f i rs t .  
When the audience is t i re d  wi th at tent ion wande ring , the autho r 
o f  the �� He rrenium s ugges ts a l arge repe rtoi re o f  at tention- ge t t ing 
devi ces to bring them back to a condi t ion of highe r int eres t ;  
be ginning wi th some thing to make them laugh , or even 
wi th an ap ology , a seemingly t rue s t ory ,  an imi t ation , 
an accusat ion , a p lay on wo rds , an ins inua tion , a s us­
pi cion , a mocke ry , some foolish allus ion , an exagge ra­
tion , a summary , or  a s ub s t i t ution o f  le t te rs . I t  i s  
espe cially e f fective t o  b e gin by excitin g  curios i ty , 
or  by o f fering a p arab le , some thing novel , an ane cdote , 
or a b i t  o f  ve rse . We mi gh t  well p ro fit f rom some kind 
of interrup t ion , or  a l augh from somebo dy in  the audi­
ence . We mi gh t  also s ay be fo reh and that we are go ing 
to t alk along lines o ther than those we had p revious ly 
p repared , and tha t we are no t go ing to e xp re s s  o ur 
though ts j us t  like o ther s are in the hab i t  o f  doing ; 
and in this las t ins t ance , we shall exp lain in a few 
wo rds the d i f fe rence b e tween the i r  me tho d and ours . 1 8 
The ne xt purpose o f  the author is to de fine five faul ts o f  the 
exo rdium to be avo i ded . Fi rs t , he ment i ons the import ance of speaking 
wi th a friendly exp ress ion wi tho ut wande ring f rom eve ryday language . A 
1 7Ad He rrenium,  Vo l .  I ,  VI , 14- 34 .  
1 8 
Ad Her renium ,  Vol . I ,  VI , 5 3- 7 3 . 
8 7  
unive rs al type exo rdium ,  one that can be app lied t o  many cases , i s  t o  be 
avo ided . A gene ral exo rdium whi ch the opponen t can us e wi thout alte ra-
tion is j us t  as bad as a unive rs al one . Even i f  the wo rding has to  be 
s li gh t l y  changed to use the exordium against you ,  it i s  s ti ll cons idered 
a poor cho ice . Finally , p oo rly chosen wo rding , lengthy , unrelated o r  
backward exo rdiums , calle d de tache d ,  are t o  b e  avoide d .  They d o  mo re 
19 
harm than goo d .  
I n  the narration po rt ion o f  the spee ch , the author goes into t e ch-
niques us ed to gain the cre dib ili ty o f  the audience . He mentions the 
importan ce o f  le t t ing peop le imply what went be fore rathe r than repeating 
the obvious to them . He als o gives advi ce on how best  to gain credib i l i ty . 
Narrat ion wi l l  b e  cre dib le , i f  we make o ur language 
con form to us age , general op inion and nature , and 
i f  we have regard for lap s es o f  time , the dignity 
of individuals , reasons behind de cisions 20
and the 
opportunit ies o f fe re d  by certain p laces . 
In conclus ion , the re is l i t tle to dis tinguish this author in the 
area o f  e thos from some o f  his Greek p re de cessors other than his organiza-
tion and the int ro duction o f  the concep t o f  ins inuatio . What he has given 
us is a ve ry re ad able , t i ghtly or gani zed sys tem o f  rhe toric that shows the 
p rimary importance to the sys tem o f  various me thods fo r es t ab l ishing and 
main taining e thos for the spe ake r and good will and credib ili ty from the 
audience . 
1 9  
Nadeau , p .  6 2 . 
20  Nade au , p .  6 3 . 
CICERO 
Tradi t ionally Ci cero was though t  to be the autho r o f  the Ad 
Herreni um .  In re cent years i t  has been de termined that th i s  i s  no t so . 
Al tho ugh the re are ce rt ain s imi lari ties b e tween De Inventione o f  Cicero 
and Ad He rrenium ,  the di f fe ren ces are even mo re s i gn i f i cant . I t  is now 
tho ught tha t the two p robably had a common o ri gin s temming from two 
di f ferent teachers who we re e ducated in the s ame s chool but who chose 
2 1  
to interp re t the teachings in a di f fe rent way . 
This s e ct ion will f irs t be con ce rned wi th Ci ce ro ' s concep t o f  
88 
p robab il i ty . Rhe to ri cal theo ries o f  e thos and e th i cs , vi rtue and educa-
tion will ne xt be dis c us se d .  Ci ce ro also gives applications o f  these p rin-
ciples in actual rhe tori cal p racti ce . 
Cicero ' s Philosophy o f  P robab il i ty 
Earlier in this chap ter an exp lanat ion was given o f  S to i c  and 
Skep ti c philosophy as i t  mani fes te d i ts e l f  during Cicero ' s e arly ye ars . 
We have seen how the arrangetnent and cl as s i f i ca tion o f  the Ad He rrenium 
le d some to the belie f th at the autho r was p rob ab ly S to i c  in his o rienta-
tion . C i cero commi ts hims e l f  to re lative o r  app roximate knowle dge . He 
exp resses his belief that while he does  not hol d  tha t no thing is t rue , 
s till he realizes that humans canno t pe rceive that whi ch i s  t rue and th at 
whi ch is no t true .  CJce ro adop ted the Carneadean theo ry that the re is no 
way to dis tinguish a t rue s ens ation f rom a false one . Fo r all prac t i cal 
theo ries man mus t operate unde r as s ume d  p ropo s i. t i ons o f  probab i li ty because 
he has no way o f  as ce rtaining absolute knowle dge . 
--------- ----
2 1 Rhe torica Ad He rreniu�, trans . ,  int ro . 
While he does J:>.o t deny the exi s tence o f  abs o l ute 
knowledge , he does maintain man canno t know i t . 
For Ci ce ro , the nature o f  man ' s pe rcep tion i s  
fallible . Put ano ther way , Ci ce ro ' s philosoph ical 
theo ry o f  p robab i l i ty is  the p ragmat i c  re al i z at ion 
man can conduc t his af fai rs wi tho ut absolute know­
ledge as long as he utili zes p robabili ty . 22 
Cicero was a s t udent o f  Philo and there is  evidence that the de gree of 
probability attributed to Carneades was the bas is for the concep ts o f  
89 
truths or accep ted p rob abili ties of t ruth adop ted by Cicero . These con-
cep ts o f  p robabil ity carried ove r into his rheori cal theo ries of argu-
ment ation and o f  e thos . 
Tha t thi s do c t rine o f  p robability carried ove r  in to rhe to ric 
canno t be in the leas t doub ted . We have seen the es t ab l i shment o f  de f inite 
degrees of t ruth or ac cep ted truth in the dis cus s ion o f  Carneades ' de grees 
of p robabili ty . When the orato r i s  p reparing h i s  arguments this rela tive 
degree of certainty attainable on ce rtain i s s ues  mus t be kep t in mind . 
Fo r the ac tual p rocess o f  divis ion , and those  o f  
de fining and dis tinguishing the two di f feren t 
me anings o f  an amb i guous s t atement , and knowing 
top i cs o f  argumen ts and b ringing the actual p ro­
ces s  o f  argumen t to a conclus ion , and discerning 
what  things are to be as s ume d in a line o f  argu-
. ment  and what consequence follows f rom these 
ass ump t ions , and dis t inguishing and di f fe ren­
tiating true from false and p rob ab ly from 
un t rus two rthy s t atemen ts or cens uring bad 
ass ump tions o r  bad conclus ions , and t reating 
the s ame top ics either wi th close  analys i s , 
as do those who are te rmed diale c t i ci ans � o r  
wi th brao d  expos it ion , a s  be fits  an o rato r ,  
2 2Pren ti ce A .  Meador ,  J r . , " Skep tic  Theo ry o f  Percep tion : A 
Philosophical Antece den t o f  Ci ce ronian P rob abi l i ty , " Quarte rly Journal 
o f  Speech , Vol .  LIV , De c . , 1968 , p .  345 . 
all come tmde r the exe rcises mentione d and 
are part o f  the s cience o f  s ub t le disputat i on 
and cop ious o rato ry . 2 3  
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Acco rding to this sys tem ,  man canno t always ind i cate a cons is tent , immut-
ab le vis ib le conne c t ion b e tween two i deas to demons t rate the i r  basic  agree-
ment  or disagreement . " So man , in the Ci ce ronian s ys tem,  admi ts p roposi-
tions as t rue upon arguments o r  p roo fs that are fotmd to persuade him to 
receive i t  as t rue , wi tho ut ce rt ain knowledge that i t  i s  so . Rheto ri c  is  
the ins t rument o f  such a p ro ces s ; having no infallible s i gn of  t ruth , the 
2 4 
wise man avails himsel f  of p rob abil i t ie s . " 
Ci cero ' s con cep t o f  rhe toric as an art is  also o f  in te res t in 
at temp t ing to ge t an overall p i c ture o f  his total rhe tori cal con cep t o f  
e thos . In the dis cus sion o f  rhe tori c as an art in De O ratore the fac t 
that s ince orato ry is s ui ted to the connnon unde rs t anding o f  the peop le 
and s ince this varies from t ime to time and place to p lace , there can be 
no exact s c ience or art o f  o rato ry .  The Cice ronian exp lanation o f  thi s 
is  tha t " rheo ri cal p rinciples lack unive rs al i ty b ecause the rhetori cal 
act is  s i tuationally condi tione d .  Rhe to ri c , in gene ral , may b e  cons i de red 
an art be cause  it is capab le of ab s t ract ing and sys tema t i zing the p ra c t i ces 
of e f fective orators . None theles s ,  rhe tori cal p re cep ts are limi t ed in 
25 
the i r  applica tion , and thus lack absol ute and unive rs al ce rtainty . " 
One of  the p rimary points  o f  in teres t in the p receding chap ter 
was the interp re t at ion of the quali. ty o f  virtue by various rhe toricians . 
Ci cero had a dis tinctive viewpoint o f  this quality : 
2 3Meado r ,  pp . 34 7- 348 , taken f rom Cice ro De Parti tione Orato riae 
39 .  1 39 .  
24Meado r ,  p .  349 . 
25  Meado r ,  p .  34 9 . 
Vi rtue for Cicero i s  the highe s t  goo d ;  ye t , 
vi rtue requi res ac tivi ty in the realm o f  human 
affai rs . He considers the as sump t ion o f  civic 
obl igations one of the fundamen tal " dut ies " o f  
men ( c ri t i cizing philos ophe rs like Pl ato on this 
count ) . Such a genuine so cial commi tment seems 
to accoun t  fo r his devo tion to rhe toric and for 
his sense of in te rconne ction among philosophy 
(heavi ly e thi cs } , rhe toric (heavily social 
con t ro l ) ,  and poli t ics . 26 
Baird no tes that Ci cero dis cussed  the moral q ual i ties o f  go od nature , 
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liberali ty , gent lenes s ,  p ie ty , grateful feel ings , freedom from sel fishness  
and ava ri ce . When the speake r has mas tered the  art o f  making the audience 
pen:eive these qualities in him he wi ll also alienate the audience from 
those in whom those quali ties are no t eviden t . Ci ce ro no tes tha t these 
qualities mus t be gen uine and no t j us t  an ac t . 
I t  con tributes much to the s uc ces s in speaking , 
that t he mo rals , p rincip les , conduc t , and l ives 
of those for whom they p lead , sho uld be such as 
to dese rve es teem ; and that those o f  thei r  adver­
s aries should be s uch as to deserve censure and 
also that the minds o f  those before whom the 
caus e  is p leade d sho uld be move d  as wel l  toward 
the speaker and toward him for whom he speaks . 2 7 
Ano the r  natural outgrowth o f  the theory o f  p robabi l i ty wo uld be 
that  th·� orato r mus t be an e ducated man . To have any unde rs t anding at  al l 
o f  the re la t ionship s and de grees o f  p rob abili ty that mus t be dealt wi th 
and j udged , an o rato r would have to be well ve rsed in many areas of know-
ledge . 
2 6 
2 7  
Ci ce ro , through his mouthp ie ce , Cras s us , ins i s t s  
upon the o rato r ' s having virtua lly unive rs al know­
ledge and skill . In the dialo gue , An tonious holds 
that somewhat less learning is necess ary , al though 
he , too , urges b ro ad familiari ty wi th the field o f  
Meado r , pp . 348- 349 . 
A.  Craig Baird,  Rhet o ric : A Phi losophical Inqui ry (New York : 
The Ronald Press Co . ,  1965 ) , p .  10 3 .  
knowle dge . But he insis ts upon a mo re in tens ive 
t raining leading to the acq ui s i t ion o f  oratorical 
excellence . Antonio us wo ul d develop the o rator ' s 
natural talents and cap aci ties for o ratory , even 
if his in tel lectual con t ro l  ove r  the field o f  
learning were somewhat mo re mo derate than Cras s us 
believed essen t ia l . 2 8  
9 2  
Jus t  how extens ive this knowle lge i deally should b e  i s  b rought o ut in the 
following pass age . Al tho ugh i t  so unds almos t l ike imp romp tu speaking , 
ac tually the type o f  knowledge that was to b e  acqui red held all the essen-
t ials fo r q ui te l i te rally any s ub j e c t  in the memory o f  the o rato r .  This 
fund of  knowledge coul d  be qui ckly drawn upon when the nee d arose . 
I f ,  therefore , anyone de s i res to de fine and comp.re­
hend the who le and p e culiar p owe r o f  an o rato r ,  that 
man , in my op inion , wi l l  be an o rato r ,  wo rthy o f  so 
great a name , who whateve r  s ubj e c t  comes be fore him , 
aa4nrequiree ( �heto.tica.il elucidation , can : 1speak ' .on it  
j udi cio us ly , in s e t  form , elegantly , and f rom 
memory , and wi th a ce rtain digni ty of action . 2 9 
Cicero had found much in the works o f  Iso crates that he admi red .  The two 
both encouraged the developmen t o f  s ta tesmanship . They were p ract i cal in 
their app roach to rhe to ri c and had no p a tience wi th the philosophe r who 
re fuse d  to ge t invo lved in human affairs and mat te rs of s t ate . They were 
also alike in the i r  e f forts  to b ro aden the field o f  rhetori c .  Cicero in 
his day hoped " to res to re rhe toric as a sys tem of gene ral cult ure whi ch 
wo uld t rain men to write and speak compe tently on all poss ib le s ubj e c ts . 
In thi s  e f for t  Ci cero was guided by the do c t rine s  o f  I s ocrate s whom he 
regarded as the ' father of �loquence . ". JO 
2 8Les t e r  Thonssen and A.  C raig Bai rd , " C.i cero and Quin tilian on 
Rhe to ri c , " The P rovince o f  Rheto ri c , e d . , J .  S chwart z  and J .  Ry cenga (New 
York : The Ronald P ress Co . ,  1965)�- pp . 14 3-144 . 
2 9Thonss en an d  Baird , p .  144 , from De Oratore , I ,  xv . 
30Thonssen and Baird , p .  142 . 
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In Rhe to ri cal P ract i ce 
I t  has al ready been men tioned that Cice ro advo ca te d  tha t the 
orator live a l i fe that would be ab ove rep roach . He re cognized tha t it 
wo uld be necessary to let the membe rs of the audience know that this was 
the charac te r o f  the person they we re listening to and that there we re 
ways fo r the sp eake r to p roj ect  an e thical p e rsonality . 
But the q ualities that att ract favo r to the o rator 
are a soft  tone o f voi ce , a cotmtenan ce exp ress ive 
of modes ty , a mil d  manner o f  speaking ; so that i f  
he at tacks any one with s everity , he may seem to 
do so unwil lingly and f rom compuls i on . 31 
The value of this type of p roj ected e thos was , in Cic e ro ' s op inion , 
uneq ualled by any o ther technique tha t might be employe d .  
Conclusion 
To des c ribe the character o f  your c lients in your 
spee ches , there fore , as j us t , full o f  inte gri ty , 
rel i gio us , tmp res umin g , an d patient  o f  inj uries , 
has an extraordinary e ffect ; and such a des c rip t ion , 
either in the commencement , o r  in the sta tement o f  
fac t s , o r  in the pero rat ion , has s o  much in fluence 
if it  is agreeably and j udi ciously managed , that i t  
o f ten p revails mo re than the me rit  o f  the cause . 
S uch influen ce , indee d ,  is  p ro duced by a certain 
feeling and art in speakin g ,  that the speech seems 
to rep res ent , as i t  were , the charac ter o f  the 
speaker ; for by adop t ing a peculiar mo de o f  
thought and exp res s ion , uni te d  wi th action that 
is gent le and indi cative o f  ami ab leness , s uch an 
e ffe ct  is  p ro duced , that the speake r seems to be 
a man of p robi ty , integri ty and vi rtue . 32 
Cicero has taken the Skep t i c  theo ry o f  p robabi lity and accep ted 
the s tandards needed fo r eve ryday t ruth . Vi rtue to him means no th in g  
3 1 c1cero , _J2e_Q_t�__!o re ,  Watson , t rans . ,  9 1 1 , 4 3 .  
32 Cicero , De O ra�o r� , 911 , 4 3 . 
wi thout act ion--and that ac tion should be for the good o f  the s tate--
the orato r sho uld be a st atesman . He sho uld also have a t t rib ute s  o f  
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hones ty , p i e ty , goo d na t ure dnes s  and gen t leness for these ,  when perce ived 
by the audience can c e rve as h i s  s t ronges t form of p roof . The educa tion 
of the o rato r should be ve ry thoro ugh leaving him cap ab le of speaking 
smoo thly and inte lligently in any s ubj e c t  tha t mi gh t be put to him .  
QUINTILI� 
Paramoun t .in the s tudy o f  Quin t i l i an ' s concep ts o f  ethos are his 
theo rie s on the cons truc ts of the goo d man . He does no t re co gnize that 
the s tudy of this con cep t be longs exclusive ly to  the field of ph i losophy . 
In fac t , he fee ls the en tire s tudy is  much mo re s ui t e d  to the field o f  
rhe to ric than to philosophy . Th is dis cuss ion o f  Quin t i l i an be gins wi th 
an exp lanation o f  this goo d  man theo ry . Following , an analy s i s  o f  
" speaking we l l" wi ll  comp lete this exp lanation o f  the de fini t ion o f  the 
3 3 
o rator--" a good man speaking we ll . " 
Quin t i l i an ' s sys tem o f  e ducat ion des i gne d to p ro duce thi s  happy 
comb ination wi ll be identi f ie d . I t  i s  o uts i de the s cope o f  this paper  
to  go  in to gre at de tail on this  topi c .  
Finally , Quintilian has some int e res ting theo ries o f  app lication 
of these theo ries to the actual p ra c t ice o f  rhe tori c .  These  will be ci ted 
and the rationale behind them explo re d  for p os s i b le rami fi cations . 
3 3Quintilian ' s _In�_!:_i t u�es _ _ _9_!� .Q_!'."_�_!_'?.!Y_, trans , , H .  E .  Butle r ( Cam­
bridge , Mas s : Ha rva rd Unive rs i ty Pres s , 1 9 20 ,  rep . 1 96 2 ) ,  I ,  9- 10 . 
Quintilian ' s  Good Man Theory 
Philosophy during the time o f  Quintilian concerned itself with 
such questions as rights to the succ ess ion to the throne , hereditary 
rights to property and positions of  power in the Empire ,  and related 
problems . Quintil ian was in favo r with the emperor and wisely chose to 
exclude himself from philosophical disputations of all kinds . 
When , in the course  of his writings , he expresses the desir-
ability of having ins truc tors and other associates of students well 
versed in philosophy , Quintilian is no t speaking of  tho s e  engaged in 
this sort of  disputation . Neither is he thinking of  a Platonic type 
philosopher taking refuge in f light from the real wo rld to a place o f  
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"Ideas . "  For Quintilian , as Isocrates and Cicero before him , the orator 
was to be  a man concerned in the practical af fairs of  men . His philo sophy 
and his education were to suit him for the execution of  his role as an 
effective member of society . Thes e  concerns were in the natural province 
of rhetoric , not philosophy . 
For I will not admit that the principles of  
upright and honorable l iving should , as  some 
have held , be regarded as the peculiar concern 
of philosophy . The man who can really play 
his part as a citizen and is c apab l e  of  meet ing 
the demands bo th of public and private business , 
the man who can guide a s tate by his counsels , 
give it a f irm basis by his l egislation , and 
purge its vices by his dec isions as a judge , 
is assuredly no other than the orator of  our 
quest . 34 
Above all other qualit ies , Quint ilian held good morality and good 
charac ter to be of primary importance .  He flatly stated that an education 
34Quintilian , Inst itute of Oratory , trans . ,  H .  E .  Butler ( Cambridge , 
Mass . :  Harvard Univers ity Press , 1 9 20 ,  rep . 1 9 62) ,  I ,  Pre . 9-1 0 .  
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that does no t emphasize and attempt t o  ins till good morals in the pupils 
is "both dangerous and pernic ious . " 
The orator , then , whom I am conc erned to form ,  
shall b e  the orator as def ined by Marcus Cato , 
" a  good man , skilled in speaking . "  But above 
all he mus t  possess the quality which Cato 
places first and which is in the very nature 
of things the greatest and mos t  important , 
that is , he mus t  be a good man . This is 
essential not merely on account of  the fact , 
if the powers of eloquenc e serve only to lend 
arms to crime , there can be  no thing more perni­
c ious than eloquence to public and private wel­
fare alike , while I mysel f , who have labored to 
the best of my ab ility to contribut e  something 
of value to oratory , shall have rendered the . ,  • -
wo rs t of  services to mankind , if I forge these 
weapons not for the soldier , but for a robber . 35 
In quo ting Cato ' s  statement that the orator is a " good man , skilled 
in speaking , "  Quint il ian takes this good man and gives him the qualities 
of a good speaker . 
At the out set let us no t think of rhetoric as 
something quite artif icial and stultifyingly 
formal , for it can be def ined s imply as the 
study of the effec t ive use of language or the 
art of clear , accurate , and skillful expres­
s ion in speaking and in writing , an art cru­
cially important in the counnunication of 
ideas . 3 
Quintilian points out that speaking well does not s imply involve 
the memorization and practice o f  the rules of good rhetoric . Just as Iso-
crates recognized the needs for certain rules , Quintilian states that he 
will lay them down . However , again , as with Isocrates , he c autions that 
35 Quint il ian , xii , i ,  1 .  
3 6  Frederick M .  Wheelock ,  ed . ,  Quintilian as an Educator (New 
York : Twayne Publications , Inc . , 1 9 74 ) ,  p .  1 5 . 
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the rules are no t rigid but are t o  be applied with d iscretion . There 
is no system that can be  assured of working for everyone under every 
circumstanc e .  From the practical standpoint i t  i s  necessary for the 
orator to recognize c ircums tances that require adj ustment s of standard 
procedure . 
I will not deny that it is generally expedient 
to conform to such rules , o therwise I should 
not be writing now; but if our friend expedi­
ency suggests some other course to us , why , 
we shal l disregard the authority o f  the pro­
f essors and follow her . 3 7 
It is not enough , therefore , that the "good man" should know the 
rules of good rhetorical prac tice and be able to use them , he must  also 
know when c ircums tances demand abandoning all rules and us ing conunon sense 
to meet the contingency at hand . 
Education of the "Good Man , Speaking Well" 
Without going into detail on methodologies us ed in Quintilian ' s  
system for education , it is important to look at a f ew of the maj or tenets  
making up his philosophy of  education . Firs t ,  unlike his contemporaries , 
Quintilian d id not begin the orator ' s  education with the higher education 
of the rhetor . This d id no t begin until age sixteen and by that time 
Quintilian recognized the "good man" part of  the requis ite would have to 
have been incul cated into the would-be orator . Nothing else speaks so 
clearly of Quintilian ' s  serious ef forts to eff ect  his des ired training 
as the detail ed ac counts given of proper care of the infant , bes t  qual if ica-
tions for the . nurse , attitude for the parenfs ,  and othet details of  everyday 
living that inevitably will shape the developing personal ity of the child . 
37 Quint ilian , xii , i ,  1 .  
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He realizes that everything the child hears , the attitude of his asso-
ciates , the approach to education , will ultimately aff ect the end produc t 
of the education system .  The program described shows great ins ight and 
is surprisingly modern in concept . 
Quint il ian ' s  educational doctrines , promulgaten 
nineteen hundred years ago , represented the best 
thinking of  the ancient world concerning education 
and culture . These doctrines reflect the id eals 
and practices of his time ,  as , for example , in 
their emphasis upon skills of communication and 
rhetoric , ess ential elements o f  higher education 
in the Roman Empire . Yet , Quintilian ' s  educa­
tional philosophy was surpris ingly modern in 
tone and character , antedating by nearly two 
millenia our cont emporary respect for the 
rights and needs o f  children ; and many o f  his 
views on learning , ethical training , and child 
development deserve to be s tudied and imple­
mented in education today . 3 8 
The curriculum recommended by Quintilian could best be described 
as a broad humanis tic basic liberal arts progr am .  Not everyone would com-
plete every subj ect and not everyone would b ecome a rhetoric ian . The 
foundation for this education was literature , with lib eral additions of 
graunnar and l inguis t ics . He recogniz ed o ther advantages of this s tudy 
of a more charac ter-building nature . 
38 
39 
Furthermore ,  literature ( e . g . , all branches of  
Greek and Lat in poetry , his tory , philo sophy , and 
oratory) was no less impor tant in the paramount 
matter of character (morals )  indicated above ; 
for by the reading , analyz ing and memorization 
of great liter ature , the s tudent gained ideas 
and philosophies and examples of great heroes , 
actions , characters and ideals which should be 
imitated , and also examples of  o thers which 
should be avo ided . Thus l iterature would 
mold a boy ' s  character and would provide a 3 9  thesaurus upon which t o  draw throughout life . 
Wheelock , p .  1 ,  int�o . 
Wheelock , p .  1 6 .  
From a mode rn s tandpoint the curric ul um lacke d re fe rence to any 
training for " trade ski lls . " This  was a so cie ty uti lizing s lave lab o r  
for meni al t asks and on- the-j ob training for o the rs • 
• • •  i t  was t radi t ion that e ducation sho uld be 
liberal and sho ul d  be b ased on what Cice ro 
called the " libe ral arts , "  subj e cts  sui t ab le 
for f ree men ,  whi ch include d li te rature and 
language , rhe tori c , philosophy , mus i c ,  mathe­
mati cs , geome try and as tronomy . Though the 
l is t  mi ght vary somewhat , l i te rat ure and 
rhe tori c p redominate d . Such is the o ri gin 
of the liberal arts curri cul um ,  whi ch , wi th 
some vari at ions and addi t ions , has s urvived 
down to  our twentie th cent ury , some times 
unde r the name of the humani ties in cont ra­
di s tinction to the s ci en ces . 40 
Appli cation of E thical and Educational Concepts to E thos in Rhe tori c 
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Quintilian followe d the concep t that e tho s of the speaker was one 
o f  the mos t  powe rful we apons he co uld pos sess . The nat ure o f  that e thos 
is des cribed in the fo llowing p as s age : 
The (e thos ) o f  whi ch we form a conce p tion , and 
whi ch we des i re to find in speake rs , i s  re com­
mende d ,  above all , by goodne s s , being no t only 
mild and p lacid , b ut fo r the mos t p art p leas ing 
and polite , and ami ab le and att ract ive to the 
heare rs ; and the gre ates t me r i t  in the exp res­
s ion o f  i t  is , that it sho ul d  seem to flow f rom 
the nature of things and persons wi th whi ch we 
are conce rne d , so that the mo ral ch aracte r o f  
the speake r may clearly appe ar , and b e  re cog­
nize d , as i t  we re , in his  dis course . 4 1 
Thi s  e thos i s  no t to be an act on the part o f  the speake r .  Unle s s  the 
q ualities are genuine , the e f fe ct ivenes s  is minimized . 
40 Whee lo ck , p p . 16- 1 7 .  
4 1  Quinti li an , Ins ti tutio de Orato ri a ,  trans . ,  J .  S .  Watson (London : 
H.  G .  Bohn , 1 85 6 , 2 vo l . ) , VI , 2 , 1 3 . 
All this spe cie s o f  eloquence , howeve r ,  req ui res 
the speaker to be a man of good charac te r  and o f  
p le as ing manners . The vi rtues whi ch he ough t  t o  
p raise , i f  possib le , i n  h i s  client , h e  sho uld 
posses s ,  o r  be tho ught to posses s , himsel f . 42  
1 00 
Another aspe c t  o f  e thos is  adap tation to the audience . Obviously 
still spe aking of fo rensi c  type s i tuations , Quinti lian has thi s  to s ay :  
The favo r o f  the j udge we conci liate , not me re ly 
by o f fe ring him p raise , (which ough t  indeed t o  b e  
given wi th mo de ra tion , tho ugh i t  is  to be remem­
bered at the s ame time , that the privi le ge o f  
o f fe ring i t  i s  common t o  both p arties . )  But b y  
turning h i s  p raises to  the advan t age o f  o ur 
caus e , appealing ,  in behal f  o f  the nob le to 
his di gni fie d s t ation , in behal f  of the humb le 
to his  j us t i ce , in behal f o f  the un for tunate 
to his p i ty ,  in behal f of the inj ure d to his 
seve ri ty ; and using simi lar appeals in o ther 
cases . 4 3  
Turning from fo rens i c  type oratory , e thos i s  rate d o f  p rimary 
importance in delibe rative o ra to ry . Here the ch arac te r and inte gri ty 
o f  the spe ake r is d i rectly relate d to the validity o f  his p ropos als in 
the eyes o f  the audience . 
But what is  o f  mos t  wei gh t  in delibe rative 
speeches is  authori ty in the speaker ; fo r he 
who des i res eve rybody to t rus t  to his opinion 
about what is expe dient and hono rable , ough t  
to b e  es teeme d , a man o f  the gre ates t j udge­
ment and p rob i ty . 44 
Much o f  the good will o f  the audience and the p roj e ct ion o f  one ' s 
own goo d  charac te r is  ac comp lishe d in the exo rdi um. As wi th o the r cl as s i-
cal wri ters , Quinti l i an re co gni ze d the advantage t o  be gaine d when the 
introduct ion of the speech e f fe cted this end . 
4 2Quinti li an , VI , 2 , 10 . 
4 3Quin tilian , IV , 1 ,  16 . 
44 Quintili an , I I I , 8 ,  1 3 . 
In giving the exordium at all the re i s  no 
o the r obj e c t  b ut to p rep are the he are r to  
lis ten to us mo re re adily in the s ubsequent 
p arts pf o ur p leading . Thi s  obj e ct , as i s  
agree d among mo s t  autho rs , is p rincip al ly 
e f fe cted by three means , by se curing his 
goo d  wi ll and attention , and by rende ring 
him des i ro us of furthe r information ; no t 
that these ends are no t to be kep t in view 
throughout the whole p le ading , but be cause 
they are p re-eminently ne ce s sary at the 
commencement ,  when we gain admi s s ion as 
it we re into the mind of the j udge in 45 
orde r  to pene t rate s t ill  far ther into i t . 
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Whi le fo r the mos t p art  good charac te r o f  the speake r i s  imp res sed on the 
audience through ob vio us mani fes tations o f  e thos , there are rhe torical 
e f fe cts to be use d  to gain the des i re d  re ga rd from the audience . 
But as the ch aracte r o f  the spe aker b ecomes thus 
o f  the h i ghes t  e f fi cacy , i f , in his unde rtaking 
the b us ines s , all s uspi cion of me anne s s , or hatre d , 
o r  amb i tion , be far remove d f rom him , s o  i t  i s  a 
sort o f  t aci t commendation to him ,  i f  he rep re­
sents hims e l f  as weak , and inferio r in ab ili ty 
to those acting agains t him , a p ract i ce whigh is 
adop te d in mos t  of the exo rdi a of Mes s al a . 4 
Quint ilian on Me ans to the End 
One i s s ue in Quint ilian h as caus e d  1some analys ts  dis t re s s  and 
o thers downright con fus ion . The p rob lem lies in the inte rp re tation o f  the 
e thical concep t o f  the p rope r  me ans to be emp loyed to rea ch a des i red end . 
But i t  i s  even t rue , al though at fi rs t  s i ght i t  
seems hard t o  bel ieve , that the re may b e  s o und 
reason why at times a goo d  man who is appearing 
fo r the de fense sho uld attemp t  to conce al the 
truth from the j udge . I f  any o f  my re ade rs is 
s urp ri sed at my making s uch a s tatement ( altho ugh 
this op inion is  no t o f  my own invention , but is 
45Quintilian , IV , 1 ,  8 .  
46 Quintil ian ,  IV , 1 ,  8 .  
de rive d  from thos e whom an tiq ui ty re garde d  as 
the greatest te ache rs o f  wis dom) , I wo uld have 
him re f le c t  that th e re a re many things which 
a r e  made hono rab l e  o r  the re ve rs e no t b y  the 
na t ure of the facts , but by the causes f rom 
wh ich they sp ring . • . • ! can see th at the re wi ll 
be many poss ib le eme rgen cies such as to j us t i fy 
an orator in unde rtaking cases o f  a kind whi ch 
in the ab sence o f  any h�no rable re ason , he wo uld 
have re fused to to uch . 4 
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In  the p rac ti cal ap pli cat ion of  e th i cs in a rhe torical s i tuation , Quinti-
lian '  s " goo d man" may have to go furthe r to att ain his  des ire d ends . 
I s  no t this ano the r cas e whe re the orator will 
no t shrink even f rom lies , if so he may s ave one 
who is not mere ly inno cent , b ut a p raisewor thy 
c i t izen? Again , s uppose that we re ali ze that 
ce rt ain acts are j us t  in themselves , tho ugh 
p rej udi cial to the s tate unde r  e xis t ing ci r­
cums t an ces . Shall we not then emp loy me thods 
o f  spe aking whi ch , des p i te the exce llence o f  
the i r  in tention , bear a close resemb l ance to 
fraud . Fur the r ,  no one will hes i t ate for a 
moment to hold the view that i t  is in the 
inte re s t s  o f  the commonwe al th that gui l ty 
pe rsons sho ul d be acq ui tted rather than 
p unished , i f  i t  be p os s ible the reby to con-
ver t  them to a be t te r  s t ate o f  mind4 8
a p os s i­
b i l i ty wh i ch is general ly conce de d .  
When re ading these p ass ages there are two th ings t o  remember . The 
firs t  is the de fini t ion o f  an o ra to r  and the s e cond is the p o li t i cal climate 
o f  Rome at the time unde r cons i de ration . 
No man , ac co rding to Qunitlian ,  i s  an o rator who is no t first a 
goo d  man . Anyone ava:tling himsel f o f  th i s  l i cense to lie as an orator is 
wise eno ugh and righ teo us enough to co rre ctly assess  re lat ive meri ts o f  
4 7Quin tilian , The Ins ti tut i o  Ora to ria o f  Quinti lian , t rans . ,  H .  E .  
Butle r ( Camb ri dge , Mass:=- Harvarcl" Unive rs i ty :P-res s , i9 60 f:° XI I ,  i ,  36- 39 . 
4 8  Quintilian , trans . , Butle r ,  XII , i ,  4 1-42 . 
pos s ib le pos i tions . Do ub t ful me ans wo uld only be employed when o the rs 
wo uld end in dis as t er fo r the ri gh t  cause . 
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Se condly , the poli t ical condit ion o f  Rome during the t ime o f  
Quin tilian was no t conduc ive t o  the ci t i zen being as s ure d a fai r  or  even 
re asonab le t ri al under any kind of l aw .  The Empe ro rs that fo llowe d Ne ro 
we re o f ten utte rly selfish , ab solute , some times lunati c in the adminis t ra­
t ion of j us t ice . For the we l fare o f  Rome circums t an ces could arise demand­
ing that  the counse l for the de fense emp loy ext rao rdinary means for the 
pro te c t ion of a client condenmed by the arb i trary rulings o f  a ty ran t . 
Con cl us ions 
Th is di s cus s ion of Quintilian has exp lo red  the b as i c  tene ts o f  
Cato ' s " Goo d man , speaking well . "  Education s ui ted  to the deve lopmen t o f  
such a pe rson will be  i n  the liberal a r t s  wi th a he avy emphas is o n  lite ra­
ture . The e thos o f  the spe ake r wi ll be evi dence d th rough the quality o f  
the spee ch , and the adapta.t"ion t o  audience and s ub j e c t  ma t t e r .  Be cause o f  
circums t an ce s , there may b e  times when the o ra to r  will use dishono rab le 
means to at t ain an . end that will p rove to be for the goo d  o f  the s t ate 
CHAPTER IV 
THE BRITISH 
It is  beyond the s cope of this p ap e r  to at temp t an exhaus t ive 
s tudy of  B ri tish views o f  e thos in rhe to ri c . Time and sp ace limi tations 
will alllow analyses of the rep resen tative wo rks of Hugh Blai r , Geo rge 
Campbe ll , and Ri chard Whately . Fo r the s ake o f  o rientation and contin­
ui ty three in fl uen tial phi lo sophe rs , Thomas Re id , John Locke and D.3.vid 
Hume , will be dis cus s ed .  These three are f req uent ly ment ione d by Blai r ,  
Campbell and Whately . Cer t ainly the views o f  thes e  phi los ophers colore d  
the innova tive app roaches to rhe toric during the e i gh teenth cen tury . 
After brie fly s urveying the wo rks o f  the three phi los ophe rs men­
tioned above , each o f  the th ree rhe to ricians will be examine d  from the 
s tandpoints , firs t , o f  their philosophi cal and e th i cal o rientations and 
app roaches to rhe tori c .  Examp les o f  spe ci f i c  app lications o f  the i r  con­
cep ts o f  e thics as exhibi ted in the e thos o f  the speake r and adap t ations 
to be made to the audi ence will  follow .  A s e c t i on of brie f comment and 
conclus ions will close the chap te r .  
THOMAS REID 
The f i rs t  cons i de ration fo r this dis cus s ion of Re i d ' s conunon sense 
app roach to philosophy an d  rhe to ri c will f i rs t  s t at e  exactly what Rei d  
mean t  by " common sense . "  H i s  re asons f o r  p re fe rring " common s ense "  t o  
reason and me thods f o r  tes t ing first  p rinciples will be exp laine d . Finally , 
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some re fe rences will be made relating Re id ' s con cep ts wi th some alre ady 
cove red in the clas s i cal po rtions o f  the s t udy . 
The Me aning of Common Sense 
Common sense can only be called a me tarational app roal h to the 
t ruth . The process is fundamental to the reasoning p rocess and ye t i t  
t rans cends reason . These two s t at ements form the fo\llldation f o r  Re id ' s  
theory . About the fi rs t , the me tarational app roach , Reid has thi s to say : 
I f  there are ce rt ain p rin cip les , as I think there 
are , wh i ch the cons ti tution o f  o ur nature leads 
us to believe , and whi ch we are unde r a ne ce s s i ty 
to t ake for  granted in the common con ce rns o f  li fe , 
wi thout being ab le to give a· reason fo r them-- these 
are wh at we call the p rin cip les o f  common s ense ; 
and what is mani fes tly contrary to them , is what 
we call absurd . I 
These first  p rincip les are the one s tha t  are l as ting and accep ted by all 
men eve rywhere in all ages . 
We o ught likewise to take for granted , as f i rs t  
p rincip les , things whe re in w e  find an llllive rs a l  
agreement ,  among the learned and unle arne d ,  in 
the di f ferent nations and ages o f  the world . A 
consent o f  ages and nat ions , o f  the learne d and 
· the vul gar , o ugh t , at le as t , to have great 
autho ri ty , • • • The re are many t ruths so  obvio us 
to the human facul ties , that i t  may be expe c te d  
that me n  sho uld unive rs a l ly agree i n  them. 2 
In Re id ' s  con cep tion there can be no con f li c t  b e tween the re ason 
and common s ense . They are not the s ame but the y go hand in h and . 
1Thomas Reid , "An Inqui ry into the Human Mind , "  The Works o f  Thomas 
Reid , ed . , S ir William Hamil ton (Edinbourgh : Mac lachlan and S tewart , 186 3) , 
I ,  108 . 
2 Re id , " Es s ays on the Intelle ctual Powe rs o f  Man , "  Wo rks , p .  49 1 . 
Reid s ays , " I t  is abs urd to con ce ive that the re 
can be any oppos i t ion be tween reason and common 
sense . I t  is in deed the fi rs tborn o f  re ason ; and 
as t hey are commonly j o ined to ge ther  in spee ch and 
wri ting , they are in sep arable in their  nature . "  
He adds further that , "A man who h as common sense 
may be t aught to  re ason . But i f  he h as no t that 
gi f t , no teaching will make h im ab le to j udge o f  
firs t p rincip les o r  re as on from them. " Common 
sense cons is ts  o f  sel f-evi dent p rincip les whi ch 
are unive rs ally t aken for granted and whi ch unde r­
gird t rue p ropo s i t i o ns . Perhaps inadve rten t ly 
exposing his in teres t in rhe to ri c , Re id adds that 
" • . .  the p rovince o f  common sense is  mo re extens ive 
in re futation than in con fi rmation , "  and s t a tes 
furthe r tha t "a con clus ion d rawn f rom t rue p rin­
cip les c anno t poss ibly con tradi c t  any de cis ion o f  
common sens e , be cause t ruth will always b e  con­
s i s t en t  wi th i ts e l f . 3 
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Re id ' s con cep ts of firs t  p rincip les de rived f rom common sense bear 
close resemblan ce to clas s i cal maxims and the firs t p remises of diale c t i c  
-- tho se concep ts gene rally accep ted b y  all as true . 
There is no s earching fo r evidence , no wei gh ting 
of arguments ; the p roposi tion is  no t de duced or 
infe rred from ano the r ;  it has the l i ght  o f  t ruth 
in itse l f , an d has no o ccas ion to borrow it f rom 
ano the r .  P ropos i tions o f  the las t kind , when they 
have been used in mat te rs of s cience , have com­
monly been calle d axioms ; and on whateve r  o cc a­
s ion they are used , they are calle d f i rs t  p rin­
cip les , p r incip les o f  common sense , common not ions , 
sel f-evident truths . 4 
Common Sens e P re fe r re d  to Reas on 
- ·-
Thomas Re id fe l t  that too great re liance on reason resulted in 
hopeless entanglemen ts o f  do ub t  and an actual ces s ation in acqui s i t ion 
o f  knowledge about our so cie ty and phy s i cal envi ronment . 
3 Wi lliam G .  Ke lley , Jr . , " Thomas Reid  on Common Sense : A Me ta-
rat ional Approach to Truth , "  :fh.e. -�out:_l'lc:.r:.� .. J>J>_e� ch _ _g_<?mml:l}li <:.?_!:ion .-!<?��l. 
( Fall , 1 9 7 3) , pp . 39 , 4 5 . 
4 Reid , p .  4 34 . 
The ancients seem to have had too high not ions , 
both o f  the force o f  the re as oning power in man , 
and o f  the art o f  syllogism as i ts guide . Me re 
reasoning c an carry us but a very l i t t le way in 
mo s t  s ubj ects . By obse rvation , and experiments 
p roperly conduc ted , the s t o ck o f  human knowledge 
may be enlarged wi thout end ; but the p owe r o f  
reasoning alone , app lied wi th vi go ur and through 
a long l i fe , would only carry man aro und like a 
ho rs e  in a mi ll , who labours hard but makes no 
p ro gres s  . 5 
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Rei d  does no t , i t  shoul d  be no ted , acco un t  for the syllogis t i c  bas i c  p re-
mise in his wri t ings . He do es ,  however , dep lo re endles s  logi cal re asoning 
exercises tha t res ul t in uncert ain con clusions . 
Guideline s fo r Tes ting Truth of Firs t P rinc!£ le� 
The unders t anding of common sense and i t s  relat ionship to reasoning 
leads to  the tes ts to be used  for so de rived f i rs t  p rincip les . This tes t-
ing is a natural function o f  man . 
But the powe r o f  j udging in s e l f- eviden t p ropo­
s i tions , whi ch are clearly unders too d ,  may be 
compared to the p owe r o f  swallowing o ur food . 
I t  is purely natural , and there fore common to 
the learned and the unlearne d ,  to the t rained 
and the unt raine d . I t  requires ripeness  o f  
unde rs tanding� and f reedom from p rej udice , but nothing else . 
The firs t s ugges tion for di f fe rences o f  op inion con ce rning the 
validi ty o f  a firs t p rinciple , is that e ach pe rson put away his own p re-
j ud i ce and " app ro ach the p ropos i t ion wi th a s o und mind , b ut when the f i rs t  
task p roves fut ile , and when the oppos ing views s t i l l p revail , then the 
parties mus t seek the marks or charac te ris t i cs o f  an il�egit imate firs t  
5Reid , "Aris totle ' s Logic , "  p .  70 1 .  
6 Ke lley , p .  4 7 , quo t ing Re id . 
principle . 1 1 7 The mo st  o uts t anding ch arac teris t i c  o f  the fi rs t false 
prin ciple is : 
that they are no t only fals e but ab s urd ; and 
to dis co untenan ce abs urdi ty , nature hath given 
us a p arti cular emotion-- to wit , tha t o f  ridi­
cule--which seems intended fo r this ve ry p urpose 
o f  p ut ting o ut o f  co un tenance what is abs urd , 
e i the r in op inion o r  in p ractice . 8 
The five me thods for p roving an argumen t  abs urd are these : 
1 . A goo d argumen t is  to  show a rej e c te d  p rincip le 
s t ands on the s ame foo ting as an accep te d one . 
2 . Any firs t p rinciple will have a chain o f  con­
sequences that p ro ceed f rom i t . I f  these con­
sequences are absurd ,  then the firs t p rincip le 
is also conside re d  abs urd and rej e c ted . 
3 .  The thir d  me thod is autho ri ty that invo lves the 
consent of ages and the nations . A p rincip le 
that has been unive rs ally reco gnized fo r many 
years by all o f  mankind may be accep ted  as a 
fi rs t p rin cip le . 
4 . Op inions appearing so  early in the minds o f  men 
that they we re not p lace d  the re by e ducat ion are 
firs t  prin cip les . 
5 .  Finally , a firs t p rinciple is  indispens ib le t o  
the conduct o f  li fe . 9 
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Obvious ly , these tes ts coul d  be  ridi culed and excep tions made for e ach in 
t urn . Ke lley does this in his ar ticle and seems to :i.ndicate a p re fe ren ce 
for a more skep t i cal app roach to o ur envi ronmen t .  Rei d ' s  philosophy could 
be carried to the point of abs urdity . I ts use lies in the fa ct that for 
all prac t i cal purp oses  i t  is  ac cep ted and use d  by mos t  people . I t  i s  al s o  
an o f t- ci t e d  f a c t  fo r the rhe to ri cian i n  his  philosophi cal app roach t o  the 
e thical pos i tion of truth and man ' s  cha racter in and through communi cation . 
7 
4 8 . Ke l ley , p .  
8 4 8 .  Kel ley , p . 
9Kel ley ,  pp . 49-5 2 . 
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JOHN LOCKE 
In the wri tings o f  John Lo cke and David Hume the theo ries o f  
degrees o f  p rob ab i l i ty used during the time o f  Ci ce ro are fur the r  <le vel-
oped .  These two rej e c t  the t rans cendent al origin fo r concep ts of right 
and wrong , goo d  and bad in the human mind . They are gro unded in the 
theo ry that all we know is gained through the senses . These sens o ry 
experiences are individual , canno t be  transmi t te d ,  and the only knowle dge 
that is truly p as s e d  from one pe rson to ano the r is th at that can be ve ri-
fied by repe ate d sens o ry exp e rience s . The mind can re fl e c t  on these 
expe riences and draw infe rences . I t  may spe culate , es tablish de grees o f  
p rob ability , but i n  all cases al l knowle dge comes from sens ory expe rience . 
The intelle ctual climate o f  the seven teen th century was p repare d  
fo r ai : epistemolo gy o f  rhetori c  tha t wo uld call phys i cal and expe rimental 
dat a the only genuine knowledge . The realms o f  values , beliefs and opin-
ions crucial to t raditional rhe toric we re rej e cted as p s eudo-knowledge . 
Seen from this p e rspective , the Locki an epis temo­
logy res ted on what W. T. Jone s h as terme d  " a 
dras t i c  change in the conception o f  autho ri ty , 
f rom tha t o f  the wri t ten wo rd , especi al ly the 
insp i re d  Wo rd of God , to that of nature and 
emp i ri cal fact'! • • •  In shor t , Lo cke syn thes i zed 
a vari e ty o f  empi d eal inclina tions into a 
thoroughly nominali st  ep istemology wh i ch 
es chewed conce rn fo r unive rs al p rincip les 
o f  value s and "held that only p art i culars 
are re al . " The c ataclysmi c imp lications o f  
this p os i t ion for rhe to ri c be come cle are r as 
we examine the cent ral feature s of Locke ' s  
thought  •
10 
10John H .  P at ton , " Expe rience and Imaginat ion : Approaches to 
Rhe toric by John Lo cke and David Hume , "  The S outhe rn �pee ch Conununi cat i on 
Journa� , 4 1 , 14 .  
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I t  was Lo cke ' s belief tha t the mind is like a b lank , whi te shee t 
o f  p ap e r  in i t s  o ri ginal form . There are no wo rds the re , no re fe rences 
or i de as of things . From s enso ry experience re fe rences are accumul ated 
and word symbo ls are att ache d t o  them.  Lo cke ' s e xp ress ion of these i de as 
sparked at tacks on rhe to ri c  as " fanci ful" and he i gh tene d di s t rus t o f  the 
medium.  
Thus , by means o f  the basic  p o s t ulate tha t words 
are sep arab le from ide as , Lo cke s upp lied a p rin­
cip le whi ch formed the cynosure o f  a t t acks on 
rhe toric as a " fanc i ful devi ce" in the seventeenth 
century . Lo cke arrived at thi s de cis ive p remise as 
a function o f  his be lief  that there we re no innate 
i de as p resent in the mind . Indee d ,  his views on the 
issues  of innatenes s  cont ain the cen tral tene t o f  
what later evolve d  in to gene ral semant i cs , namely , 
that words have no me aning by thems elves but rathe r 
are as s i gned a me aniyf arb i t rari ly as a res ul t o f  
so cial conditioning . 
In de aling wi th the rhetori cal s i gni fi can ce o f  the Lo cke an p os i-
tion , we have to give at tent ion to his criteria fo r " s ensation" and 
" re flection . "  
The p rimary and mos t p owe rful means o f  exp e rimen ting 
i s  through the mind . " The mind , "  s ays Lo cke , "has 
seve ral dis tinct pe rcep tions of things " whi ch result 
in ideas s uch as "yel low , whi te , heat , co l d , s o f t , 
ha rd , b i t te r , swe e t , and all those whi ch we call 
s ensib le q ual it ies . "  Only i f  one s enses the obj e c t  
i n  thi s dire c t  manne r can he have a genuine idea o f  
what i t  is ; i de as ne2e r  p re ce de the s ens ible p er­
cep tion of obj e cts . 1 
Re fle ction as the o ther aspe ct o f  expe rience has two dis tinct 
di f ferences f rom sens a t ion . Called an in te rnal sense by Lo cke , i t  i s , 
f i rH t , not di rectly s t imul ated by obj e c t s  exte rnal to  use . Secondly , it  
cannot o c cur at all unles s  i t  is se condary t o  o ther men t al act ivi t ie s . 
1 1  Pat ton , p .  1 5 . 
12 P at ton , p .  16 . 
The as sump tion , however , that re flection could 
only occur fol lowing sens ation is  ext remely vi t al 
f rom a rhe tori cal s t andpoin t . Indeed , Lo cke ' s  
cri ti cism o f  rhetoric is p e rhaps  bes t unde rs tood 
when it is  real i zed that  he indicted rhe tori c for 
engaging in re flection without the bene fit  of 
p rior sens at ion . 1 3  
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The imp li cat ions for rhetoric we re p ro found . Ce rtainly , as s ug-
ges ted by P at ton , the dual fo rm o f  s ens ation and re fle c t ion s ugges ts a 
cons t ructive refinemen t for rhetoric ; at  the s ame t ime , i t  fos te rs se rio us 
drawbacks . Locke re interp re te d  Ari s t o t le , s ub s t i tutin g  authenti c . .  subj.ect 
mat ter for the topics s ugges ted in De Rhe to ri c a .  Wi lbur Howell poin ted 
out that he would remove top ics as the vi t al cente r of rhe tori c and 
dialectic  and :  
re commend mathematics as a p re ferab le p at te rn  for 
arriving a t  p rob ab le truth . Thus did Lo cke lend 
heavy autho rity to the belief  that the top i cs 
would have t o  be  ab andoned in the new rhe tori c , 
and the p ro cedures o f  s cience and s cholarship 
e s t ablished in the i r  p lace . 1 4  
He re is  a rhe toric concerned wi th the t ransmi s s ion o f  actual sens o ry 
experien ce s  f rom one p erson to another . Wo rds s ymbolize the s ensory 
happening . There i s  no room fo r emo t ion and comp le te knowle dge o f  the 
subj e ct is an impo sed requiremen t o f  the individual . 
1 3 
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Locke seems to affi rm ,  j us t  a s  Aris to tle did , that 
the speaker sho uld "know" h i s  subj e c t  as tho roughly 
as possible be fore speaking . He also ho lds tha t 
senso ry expe rience is the only way fo r such know­
le dge to o ccur . While this may p rovi de an adequate 
bas is for rhetori cal p resen tation of the p redomin­
ately o r  p ure ly informat ive sort , i t  can nei ther 
Patton ,  p .  1 7 .  
Wilbur S .  Howell , " John Lo cke and the New Rhe tori c , "  Quarte rly 
Journal o f  Speech , 5 3 ( 1 96 7 ) , 32 3-32 4 . 
acco un.t for nor generate fo rms o f  speaking whi ch 
trans cend e f forts  to e s t ablish the mere exis tence 
or non-exis tence of events . 1 5 
Lo cke has re lega ted " re flect ion" to a s e condary realm o f  know-
1 12 
ledge . This fur the r rai ses the q ues t ion o f  whe ther his app ro ach le aves 
any room fo r pe rsuas ion . This art essentially has to do with in fluenc ing 
"be liefs , "  part of the realm of " re f lect ion . "  
In o ther words , i f  rhe tori cal invention i s  re s tri cted 
to  senso ry experience , can a spe ake r eve r at temp t to 
alter gene ral at t i t udes , change fi rmly hel d  belie fs , 
or  mo t ivate speci f i c  action s ? I 6 
This is a sys tem that qui te j us t i f iab ly demands that a speaker have know-
ledge about h i s  subj e c t  o f  dis cours e . Howeve r ,  when you limi t  that know-
ledge to dire c t  senso ry expe rience you h ave also limited the s ubj ect 
matter . Thi s  p re cludes any dis cuss ion about the future , about what sho uld 
o r  sho uld no t be , for these  are mat ters that are barre d  from our p ersonal 
realm o f  expe rience . So , too , are moral values , for there can be no sen-
so ry expe riences tha t could in any way ascert ain wha t  these might b e . 
Indeed , by Locke ' s  ep istemo logy , i t  be comes vi r­
tually impos s ib le to include p ropos i ti ons of value 
o r  policy wi thin the domain o f  rhe to ri c .  The upsho t 
i s  a tend;ncy toward a di s co urse vo id o f  e thical 
q uali ty . 1 
The Lo ckean epistemology has cleared the way for a sys tem o f  what  Wayne 
Bro ckriede calls ' 'non- argumentative p ro cessess"  s uch as des crip t ion and 
clas s i fication . 1 8  
1 5 1 8 . Pat ton , p .  
1 6Pat ton , p .  1 8 .  
1 7 1 9 . Pat ton , p .  
1 8wayne Bro ck dede , "Rhetori cal Cri t i c ism as Argumen t , " 9�arter_!x_ 
_Jo�al _o_!__��ch ( 19 74 ) ,  60 , 1 65- 1 74 . 
Becaus e ques tions o f  value and policy are p re­
cisely those whi ch are mos t open to disp ute ( i . e . , 
are debatab le in the fulles t s ens e) , the ir omis­
s ion under the guise o f  adhe ring to an apparen tly 
" s cien tific" and " veri fiab le" app roach renders 
rhe toric li feless by reducing , i f  not eliminating , 
i t s  cap aci ty fo r t rue advocacy . 1 9  
The facts a s  seen b y  P a t ton indi cate that what  has happene d t o  
1 1 3  
much o f  modern rhe torical s cho larship i s  a res ul t o f  this . The following 
is his illus t rat ion of j us t  what has happened .  He i s  speaking o f  Robert 
Je f frey ' s  di smay over the p ress handling o f  the Wate rgate epis ode o f  
Pres ident Nixo n .  
Our own p ub l i ca l ions re fle c t  a p reoc cup ation with 
Nixon ' s  p re di c t ab i l i ty , his appeals to audiences , 
his mas te ry o f  the televis ion medium , and s o  on . 
Few art i c les have analy zed the e th i cs o r  mo rality 
of his s tatemen ts . 20 
Other ins t ances o f  mo de rn  abs tinence f rom evaluation o f  ethical qual i t i e s  
i n  a rhetori cal event coul d  be c i te d . I t  co uld further be pos tulated tha t 
these ins tances are related t o  Lockean ori ginated theories . 
One mo re di f f i culty wi th this sys tem comes in conside ring " i den t i-
fication . "  I f  sens ory expe rience i s  the b asis for all  knowledge , then we 
are re turned to the Co rgian p roblem o f  relatin g  my re fe rrent to my co rre-
sponden t ' s s ince we do no t have i den t i cal re ferrents for the mes s age to 
be transmi t te d .  
I f  the exp e rience o f  the speake r , then , i s  funda­
men tally di f fe rent from the expe riences of the audi­
ence , the Lo cke an app roach would no t allow for the 
pos s ibi lity of genuine communication . By Lo cke ' s 
analy s is , cro s s- cultural communicat ion , for examp le , 
-- --- -- ·---
1 9Patton ,  p .  1 9 . 
20 Patton , p .  20 . 
while not being a comp letely meaningle ss te rm ,  
would yet b e  limi ted t o  connnun i cat ion b ased  on 
conunon expe riences alone . 2 1 
DAVID HUME 
1 1 4 
Like John Lo cke , Davi d Hume s tands firmly in the emp i ri cal t ra-
dition . Unlike him , he does no t feel that pure sens o ry experience i s  
suffi cient fo r ma n  t o  reas on at his  bes t and arrive at the bes t conclu-
s ion . Locke cert ainly had fowd a respec tab le b as i s  for the transmiss ion 
o f  info rmation , but he ma de any furthe r deduct ions f rom those expe rien ces 
solely the respons ibi l i ty o f  the individual . In short , he le ft  no room 
for the pers uas ive p owe rs of the rhe torician . Hume remedied this . 
Hume rej e cted s uch zealous confidence in reason , 
con cluding that the very eleva tion o f  reason as 
the con temporary god- te rm a cco un te d  in large part 
for the de cline o f  orato ry . Fur thermore , i t  i s  
p re cisely on these gro unds t h a t  h e  cont ras t s  ancient 
wi th mo dern rhe tori c : "Ancient e loquence , that is 
the s ub l ime and p as s ionate , i s  of a much j us te r  
t as te than the mode rn ,  o r  the argumentative and 
r ational : and i f  p rope rly exe cuted ,  will alw�2s 
have mo re command and autho ri ty ove r mankind . 
Hume no tes that any s ubj e c t  can be s ui tab le for deba te , that reas on is 
ce rtainly not  always the bas is for argument ,  and that p rob ability in 
di f fe rent degrees is an elemen t  in pers uas ion . 
2 1 
22  
S i gn i f i cantly , he ties thi s  obse rva tion to his 
s uspi cion o f  expe rience-based reas on and cer­
tainly , no ting that the ro le o f  re as on is .no t 
always dominate in rhe toric and that legit imate 
dis co urse can o ccur on other b ases b es ides  reason 
alone . Consequently , Hume maint ains tha t , "Amids t 
Pat ton , p .  2 1 .  
Pat ton , p .  22 . 
all this bus tle ' tis  no reason whi ch carries the 
p rize , but e loq uence ; and no man needs eve r  des­
pair of gaining proselytes to  the mos t  ext ravagan t  
hypo thes is , who has art eno ugh to rep resent i t  in 
favo rab le colo rs . "  • • •  Hence , whe reas the Lo ckean 
ep is temology con fined the p ract ice o f  rhe to ri c  t o  
the use o f  words as " sens ible marks o f  ideas , "  
Hume supp lies the essential co unterp oin t for a 
full-bodied rhe toric by accen tuating the re alm 
of men tal interp re t ation and pe rs uas ive dis course . 2 3 
1 15 
In attemp t ing to exp lain Hume ' s rationale for the rein t ro duction 
of  pass ion · and imaginat ion into o ratory , it is nece s s ary to real ize that 
he s aw a differen ce in the " l iveliness" of beliefs de rived from sens ation 
and those de rived f rom fan cy . Thi s  s upe rior fo rce o f  the ide a  allows 
Lo cke ' s s terile rhetoric to take on the l i fe and vi tality of a more viab le 
fo rm.  He main tains that , " an  idea as s ented to feels di f fe ren t from a fie-
ticio us ide a ,  that the fancy alone p resen t s  to us : And this di f feren t 
feeling I endeavo r  to exp lain by calling i t  a s upe rior force , or  vivaci ty , 
24  o r  solidity , o r  fi rmnes s ,  o r  s teadines s . " 
2 3  
2 4  
The int ro duct ion o f  degrees o f  liveline s s  among 
ideas sustains the imagination by supp lying the 
essen tial raw mate rial i t  requires . This opens 
the way fo r the fo rmat ion of men tal images no t 
immedi ately p resen t  to the senses and for the 
syn thes is of images derived from concre te expe ri­
ence . While degrees of livelines s remain emp i ri­
cally ve ri fiab le , Hume ' s  do ct rine o f  belie f 
reshapes Locke ' s ins is tence on ideas de rived 
only from sensory experience into a much more 
rhe t o rically vi ab le concep t . In s um ,  the way 
an i dea " feels " in co rporates a personal element 
in to the ep is temology o f  expe rience and the 
dynami cs of language , leading toward a rhe toric 
which seeks to  influence the fundamen tal belie fs 
and bas ic commi tmen ts of pe rsons . Z S 
P at ton , p .  2 3 . 
David Hume , A Treatise o f  Human Nature (London and New Y�rk : 
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Hume explained an ass ump t l.on the mind mus t make when p e r c e i v i n g  
an obj e c t . Th is i s  that the obj e c t  wi l l  con t inue t o  e xis t .  The mi nd 
mus t j ump to a conclus ion o f  thi s  kind to go beyond the momen t ary sensa-
t ion o f  recogni tion . In fact i t  is in ferring a do uble exi s t ence and 
supposes a rela tionship of resemb lance and caus at ion . This cap aci ty 
makes poss ible the development of a full interpe rs onal and persuas ive 
conununication theo ry . Unde r Lo cke ' s  o rientat ion this lack of identi cal 
sens o ry experience p rohib i t ed t rue communication . 
The role o f  the imagination , then , as s umes para­
moun t  impo rtance fo r Hume as the means by wh i ch 
obj ects  are conne c te d  in the min d .  Rh eto ri cally 
thi s  posit ion s ugges ts the pos s ib i l i ty that the 
mo s t  e f fect ive communication i s  tha t whi ch mo s t  
dire c t ly engages and p laces the heaviest  demand 
upon the image-making po tential o f  an audience , 
a pos s ib il i ty b eyond the s cope o f  Lo cke ' s 
s t rictly de f ined sensory ep is temology . 2 6 
Hume remained to tally wi thin the emp iri cally o ri en te d  con cep t ion o f  ori gins 
fo r al l subj e c t  mat te r fo r tho '. tght . In o ther words , he  did no t in any way 
as s ume Reid ' s  phi los ophy t ha t  anything migh t  be known by ins t inc t .  This 
became a con t roversial subj ect  in dis cuss ions on religio us q ues tions . This 
awakening of s cience s aw many doub t s  and q ues t i ons raised on the authen-
ticity o f  Bibli cal accounts o f  miracles . Hume was one o f  the f i rs t to 
voi ce these doub ts and he devised  a sys tem fo r evaluation of tes timony in 
the p ro ces s . In an e s s ay ,  ' 'Of  Miracle s , "  and late r in a book , Enqui ry Con-
cerning the Human Unde rs tanding , two argumen ts on validi ty o f  tes timony 
about events are p resented . 
The firs t argument s t ated that no tes t imony can be accep ted as 
t ruth unles s the falsity o f  the tes t imony would be mo re imp rob ab le than 
2 6 
Ralph S .  Pomeroy , "Whately ' s  ' His toric Do ub ts ' :  Argument and 
Origin , "  J.'hLQ_uarterly Journal of Spee ch , pp . 65- 66 .  
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the non-exis tence o f  the alleged fac t . In s ubs t an tiat ion , he p oints out 
tha t all inference is founded on o ur expe rience with the consis tency with 
whi ch certain events  t ake p l ace . These consis tent experiences include 
the tes timony o f  othe r:s who have ob served them . When non- conc·.irrent 
tes t imony is  heard , this vio lates two accep ted experiences-- consis tent 
tes t imony about an event and o ur own sensory exp eriences relating t o  the 
event . I t  is Hume ' s  cont1•ntion that in the cas e o f  miracles , the value 
of  human tes t imony is reduced t o  an absolut e  ze ro thro ugh the emp loymen t 
2 7 o f  these known cons is tencies . 
Se condly , Hume con tends that no mi racle has eve r  been advanced to 
the s tatus o f  "p robabili ty" le t alone , "p roven , "  s t atus . There has neve r 
been a suffi cien t numbe r o f  unimp eachab le witnesses to a miracle . Wide-
spread belief in "miracles" is accounted for by the unive rs al "pas s ion" 
for s urp rise and wonde r .  He points o ut , next , the "miracles"  occur among 
primi tive and barb arous people or  else are handed down thro ugh the gene ra-
tions from a histori cal background o f  p rimi t ive and b arbaro us p eop le .  He 
finally s t ates tha t s ince an in fini te number o f  people tes t i fy agains t the 
miracle , no t only does the mi racle des t roy the credit  o f  the tes timony , 
but the tes t imony des t roys itse l f . This  is made so by the fact that con-
flic ting religions tes t i fy agains t each o ther ' s  mi racles . 
2 7  
The s cope o r  adequacy o f  t es timony for any even t is 
dete rmined by the number o f  wi tnes ses who claim to 
have observed the event directly . Thus , the more 
unus ual the even t , the more imp robab le the tes t imony , 
and the mo re imp laus ible the wi tness claims . The 
funct ion of tes timony is t o  gain " degrees o f  ass ur­
ance" for a p ropos i t ion rather than to e s t ablish 
Pome roy , pp . 65-66 . 
o c currence s o f  event s . Thus , the primary 
condi t ion fo r accep ting a witness-claim is 
p laus ibili ty . A wi tness-claim sho ul d  be 
j udge d  p laus ib le only if i t  satis f ies , 
rathe r than con fli cts with , mos t o f  the 
l i s tene rs ' "habitual expe ct at ions . "  The 
eventual value o f  te s timony is  p rimarily 
corrob o rative . A wi tne s s - cl aim,  in o the r 
wo rds , is  no t ne ces s ari ly a s i gn (much les s 
a p roo f)  that event . X o c curre d . I t  is a 
s t atement o f  what  the wi tne s s  either believe s  
o r  wants the lis tene rs t o  believe abo ut X .  
I t  should be ac cep ted only to  the de gree 
that i t  con fi rms what the lis teners would 
expe ct to ob se rve--had they been the wi t­
nes ses . 2 8 
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Lo cke and Hume both be long t o  the ranks o f  those who place the 
source o f  all we know in sens o ry experien ce . The two vary in the i r  inter-
pre tations o f  as so ci at ions and the i de as tha t may be arri ve d  at through 
the utili zat ion o f  these s to re d  expe rience s . Lo cke trus ts no thing to  com-
muni cation that canno t be mutually expe rience d whi le Hume allows e100 tion 
and fee lings to have thei r p lace in human dis co urs e . 
Conclus ions · 
The phi losophies o f  the three th at h ave been dis cusse d in thi s  
chap ter  all influence d  the rhe tori c  o f  Hugh Blai r , Geo r ge Campbe ll and 
Ri chard Whately . While the re may be s ome indi cation o f  the individual 
wri ters leaning toward one philos ophe r mo re than the o thers , there are 
indi cations of Lo cke and Hume in all three and o f  Rei d  in at le as t two 
of them . Inte rp re t at ions and adap tations vary , relat ive s trengths flue-
t uate throughout the wri tings . Since thi s  i s  not a comple tely comp rehen-
s ive s tudy from every pos s ible aspe c t , some theories belonging to the 
2 8 Pome roy , p .  6 6 . 
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phi losophe rs may b e  re fe rred to that are no t include d in this p aper . The 
theo ries that have been covered are those that seem mos t  closely allied 
to e thos in rhetori c . The o ther references tha t  are made are relat ive ly 
sel f-explanatory . 
HUGH BLAI R 
Al though living during the period o f  the Gre at Awakening and the 
evangelical movements on both s i de s  of the Atlan ti c ,  Hugh B1ai r remained 
aloo f f rom the religious con t rove rsies o f  his day . This was due , firs t , 
to  his own convi ctions , and , se condly , to his awareness  o f  the beliefs o f  
his cons ti tuents . The skep ti cism o f  the day s t rongly a f fe cted his Chri s ti an 
te aching . Thomas Rei d ' s philosophy o f  common sens e was the b asis for much 
of Blai r ' s concep t o f  " good t as te" or the cri ti cal evaluation o f  any rhe­
tori cal wo rk o f  art , whe ther wri tten or spoken . 
E thos in rhe tori c was o f  p rimary importance to Hugh Blai r . This  
wo rk wi ll exp l ain the two requi rements fo r charact e r  in  the  spe 3.ker , me tho ds 
fo r t reat ing the audience , requi rements of good t as te , and the func tions o f  
the exordium in respe c t  t o  e thos . 
E th i ca� Principles o f  Hugh Blair 
One of the o uts t anding qualit ies in Blair was his ab ility to as s im­
i late many divergent philosophies and use them in the ways that best  
suited his ends . As a popular minister  o f  the P resbyterre an Ch urch in the 
eigh teen th century , he was faced with the de cis ion of e i ther j o ining the 
evangeli cal movements of Geo rge Whi te field and the Wes leys , o r  of s t aying 
in the mains t re am of p opular reli gio us do gma of the day . Hugh Blair chose 
the la t ter course . 
Blair made l i t t le , i f  any , re fe rence to the vi t al 
re ligious issues p aramount in the eighteenth cen­
tury . While Whi te fie ld , Wesley and many o f  the 
S co t t ish divines we re p reaching the do c t rines o f  
o ri ginal s i n  and e te rnal punishmen i: ,  the mini s te r  
o f  S t .  Giles care fully avo ided such cont rove rs i al 
mat te rs . 29 
120  
The p rob ab le re asons fo r th is cho i ce are two- fol d .  The f i rs t  is exp lained 
be low . 
. . .  impo rtant in dete rmining Blai r ' s cho ice o f  s ub­
j e cts were his own re ligious views . He f reely 
admi t ted to Boswel l  th at "he did no t beli eve in 
the e te rnity o f  puni shmen t . "  And at a time when 
the p ious church le ade rs frowne d up on s uch wo rldly 
amus emen ts as card p lay ing and the the atre , Carlyle 
reports that he taught B l ai r  and Rob inson how to 
p lay cards and di ce , and that Blai r vis i te d  the 
great act re s s  Mrs . Si ddons in p rivate . 30 
The se cond re ason for his avoidance of re li gious con trove rsy 
invo lved B l ai r ' s re ali s t i c  as sessment o f  the sent iments of his p ari shioners . 
The course chos en by Blair allowe d  for Ch ris t i an e th i cs wi tho ut o f fense to  
skep ti cal inte llectualism.  
The agnos t i c  tendencies whi ch characte ri ze d the 
thinking of the e i ghteenth century S cot smen we re 
so p revalen t tha t in many commun i t i es the Church 
los t i t s  influence . Men • . .  now op enly exp re s s e d  
their disbe lie f i n  the exis tence o f  a Divine Be ing . 
Since Blair p reached to the "mo s t  re fine d congre­
gation in S co t l and" skep ticism was a s e rious 
p roblem . 3 1  
Wh ile be ing care ful no t to o f fend his l i s tene rs wi th a too funda-
men t al app roach to Ch ri s t i ani ty ,  Blai r  neve r wave re d  from high moral s t and-
ards in his s ermons o r  in his pe rs onal li fe . 
----------- -- --
29 James L .  Go lden , " Hugh Blai r :  Mini s te r  of  S t .  Giles , "  The 
Quarterly Jou_i:_l'!_al ���e �� . p .  1 5 7 .  
30Gol den , p .  1 5 7 .  
3 1 Gol den , p .  15 7 .  
He cons t ructed his dis co urs es around those 
e thi cal p rinciples whi ch , re adily accep tab le 
as theore t i cal t ruths , are o f ten ne gle cte d  in 
daily li fe . The following lis t o f  t i t les 
illus trates the mini s t e r ' s p re fe rence for 
mo ral rather than evange li cal ques tions : " On 
Gen tlenes s , " " On  Cando r , "  " On Sens ib ili ty , "  
" On Fo rtitude , "  " On Envy , "  " On  I dlenes s , "  "On 
P at ience , "  " On  Mo de ration , "  " On the Infl uence 
o f  Religion on P rospe rity , " an d " On Devotion . 1 1 32 
12 1 
From the organi z ation o f  these s e rmons i t  is evi dent , a cco rding to Go lden , 
that they we re no t writ ten to tell the listeners what  they wanted to  hear , 
but rather to st imul ate them t o  lead a be tter l i fe . 
Al though seeming to j o in the skep t i cs in the i r  que s t ioning o f  b as i c  
Ch ris t i an do c t rine s , Blai r  app rove d o f  Geo rge Campbell ' s  refutat ion o f  
Hume ' s  att ack on the validity o f  Bib l i c al tes t imony conce rning mi ra cle s .  
He also re co gnized an inbo rn ins t inct in eve ry human that , when developed ,  
res ult s  in relatively s t able s t andards o f  what is  consi de red " good t as t e"  
in  art , lite rature and oral  del ivery . 
To cons ider Blai r ' s concep t o f  good taste i t  i s  ne ces s ary to ac cep t 
his de fini tion o f  terms . 
B l ai r  be gins his analys i s  b y  de fining t as te as 
" the p ower o f  re cei3ing p leas ure from the beauties 
of nat ure and art . "  3 
This t as t e  is  mo re than a reasoning p owe r o f  the mind . Since 
re cep tion o f  a wo rk that is in good tas te give s p le as ure , and s ince p lea-
sure is no t no rmally as so ciated wi th reasoning p owe rs , and s ince the s ame 
obj ects  illicit  pleas u re from people o f  varying e ducational backgrounds , 
it is  fur the r  no ted there mus t b e  some innate charact eris t i c  o f  man de te r-
mining the p leas an t  and unp le as ant . 
32 Golden , p .  1 5 7 .  
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Hence , t as t e  seems mo re closely  a l l i e d  t o  a 
fe e l i n g  o r  sense than to a p ro cess  o f  the  mind . 
Al though he believes that tas t e  is ul t imately 
founded on a ce rtain nat ural and ins t inctive 
sens ib i l i ty to beauty , B l ai r  is  care ful to 
p oin t o ut that re as on is no t ent i re ly exclude d 
f rom i ts exertions . 34 
122  
Th is innate o r  ins t inct ive sensib i li ty is allied to Thomas Re id ' s  " common 
sense" through i t s  unive rs al p resence as an inherent q uality . On the 
other hand , Hume inf luence d Blair in his explanation o f  the deve lopmen t 
and re f inement o f  this  good tas te .  Re finements o f  taste are cult ivated 
through repeated expos ures to highly resp e c ted  wo rks of art . The bas i s  
fo r those  re finemen ts remain indelibly eng rave d i n  the natural ins tin c ts 
o f  men . 
Tas te , in B l ai r ' s view , is  far from being an 
arb i t rary fo rce whi ch is subj e c t  to the fan cy 
o f  eve ry indivi dual and whi ch admi ts o f  no 
criteria for de te rmining whe ther it is false 
o r  true . I ts foundation is  the s ame in all 
human minds . I t  i s  bui l t  upon sentimen ts and 
percep tions which belong to o ur nature ; and 
which , in general , ope rate wi th the s ame uni­
formi ty as o ur o ther facul ties . When those 
sen timents are p e rverted by i gnorance and 
p rej udice , they are cap ab le o f  b eing re cti fied 
by reas on . Thei r  s ound and nat ural s t ate i s  
ul t imately de termined by comparing them wi th 
the gene ral tas te o f  mankind . 35 
Ethos in Rhe toric 
---- -·-4 - ---- ·- -
It  can neve r be do ub ted that Hugh Blai r p laced e thos for the 
speake r in high prio r i ty both for hims e l f  and o thers . 
The e thi cal appeal o f  the speake r was further 
enhanced by his virtuous charac te r .  As he s tood 
be fore his audi t o rs , he was regarde d as a good 
34cohen , p .  266 . 
35 Cohen , p .  2 7 3 .  
man who p rac t i ce d  as we ll as p reache d a h i gh 
s t andard o f  mo ral s . At no t ime did he deviate 
from high principles , and consequen t ly his 
character  was resp ected througho ut his l i fe . 36 
For t he spe aker h imsel f , Blair ' s  advi ce was two- fol d : 
1 .  Le t i t  be kep t in view , that the foundat ion 
of all that can be cal le d e loquen ce , is  good 
sense and solid 1 hough t . 
2 . In the next p lace , in orde r to be p ers uas ive 
speake rs in a p ublic  as semb ly ,  i t is , in my 
op inion , a cap ital rule that we be o urse lve s 
pe rsuade d o f  whateve r  we re commend to o thers . 3 7  
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Blai r he re vo i ce d  his dis appoval o f  young spe ake rs t aking the we ake r s i de 
o f  an argument fo r experience ' s  s ake . Th is only se rved the deve lopment o f  
flimsy and t rivi al dis course . I t  also co ul d  lead t o  later imputat ions on 
cha racter i f  done in p ublic . 
E thos in Rhe toric--Audience 
The audience should be t re ated wi th resp e c t  at al l t imes . Even 
when the speaker ha s a rathe r low regard for the i r  general in telligence 
leve l this is so . 
Even the common people are be t te r  j ud ges o f  
argumen t and goo d  sense than w e  some times think 
them ; and upon any que s t ion o f  b us ine s s , a p lain 
man , who speaks to the p oint wi thout art , wi ll 
generally p revail ove r the mo s t  art ful speaker , 
who deals in flowe rs and o rnamen t , ra the r than 
in reas oning . Much mo re , when pub l i c  speakers 
address  themselves to any as sembly where the re 
are persons of educat ion and improved unde r­
s t anding , they ought to be care ful no t to  
t ri f le wi th their hearers . 3 8 
---- -- -----
36 Golden , pp . 15 6- 15 7 .  
3 7Hugh Blair , Le cture XXVI I ,  " Di f fe rent Kinds o f  Public  Spe aking-­
Eloq uence o f  Pop ul ar As semb lies--Extracts from Demo s thenes , "  ed . , Jame s L .  
Go lden and James P .  Corbe t t , The_�heto_r:_i_c o !:__ _B lai�.L -�ampbell and What� 
(New Yo rk , Chicago : Hol t ,  Rinehart & Wins ton , Inc . , 1 96 8) , p .  100 . 
38Blai r ,  Le cture XXV I I , p .  100 . 
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Al though convi ct ion i s  no t won withou t appe als to re ason , Blai r realized 
mo re than thi s  is needed for pers uasion . 
For argumen ts may convin ce the unde rs tanding when 
they cannot conque r the p assions . I r re s i s t ab le 
they seem in the calm ho urs o f  re t reat ; but in the 
s ense of action , they o ften vanish in to smoke . 
The re are o the r and mo re p oswe rful sp rings , which 
influence the gre at movements  of the human frame . 
In orde r  to  operate with succe s s  on the ac tive 
powe rs , the hear t mus t b e  gained .  Sent imen t and 
a f fe c t ion mus t be b rought to the aid o f  reason . 
I t  is no t eno ugh that men believe reli gion to be 
a wis e  and rational rule of conduc t , unles s they 
relish it as agreeab le and find it to carry i t s  
own reward . 39  
Blair showed his accurate knowledge o f  audience psy cho lo gy in  other  ways . 
Th is was a day o f  sermons o f  in te rminab le leng th by mo de rn s t andards . Hugh 
Blair limi ted his d i s co urses to one-hal f hour and furthe r enhanced their 
ac cep t ance . 
E thos in Rhe toric--Good Tas t e  
Hugh Blai r , a s  p revio us ly mentioned , fe lt  good t as te t o  be  
innat e  in  human beings . This goo d t as te mus t be deve loped and p oin te d in 
the right dire c t ion thro ugh exp os ure 1 · 0 highly regarde d works o f  art . 
Pass ing fads may for a time dis tort this sense but the tes t o f  time will 
see the " t ried" and " t rue" good t as t e  again p redominate . This is t rue 
wi th art , literature and all b ranches o f  o ratory . Good tas te in oratory 
will re cognize that di f ferent types o f  speaking call for di fferen t mani-
fes tations of cha racter . 
The eloq uence o f  a lawyer i s  fundament ally 
di f fe rent f rom that of a divine or a speake r 
in parliamen t ; and to have a p re cise an d p rope r  
39Blai r , Sermon " On Devotion , "  p .  1 6 .  
i dea o f  the dis tinguishing charac te r whi ch any 
kind o f  p ub l i c  speaking requi res , is the fo unda­
t ion o f  what  is c alled a j us t  t as te in that kind 
of speaking . 40 
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No t only mus t one conside r  the type o f  speaking b eing done , h e  mus t also 
realiz e  the t yp e  of speaking that is bes t  suited to his person . 
No one shoul d  eve r  rise to  speak in pub l i c  wi thout 
forming to hims e l f  a j us t  and s trict  idea of what 
suits  his own age and character ; what s ui t s  the 
s ubj e c t , the hearers , the p l ace , the o ccas ion , and 
adj us t ing the whole train and manne r  of his speaking 
on thi s  i de a . 4 1  
One aspect  o f  tas te is t re ated in gene ral as a rr:atter  o f  tas te and then 
more spe ci f i c ally as used in the exo rdium.  The de gree of  vehemen ce or 
pass ion exh ibited by the speake r mus t  be conside red care fully when con-
forming to good tas t e .  in mo s t  s i t ua t ions " a  tempe rate tone o f  speech" 
wi ll be found to be the mo st use f ul . On the other h and , "he who is , on 
eve ry s ubj e c t , pas s ionate and vehemen t ,  will be conside re d  a blus terer , 
and mee t  with l i t t le regard . 
There i s  also the q ue s t ion o f  age . A pe rs on in autho ri ty may use 
a vehemen ce that would be q ui te unsui t able fo r a yo un ge r  p erson . The young 
are �xp e c te d  to  be more mode s t  in their  p resentat ion . 
However , vehemence and p as s ion exp res sed  in speech can b e  e f fe c t ive 
when p rope rly use d .  On thes e  o c cas ions , one who h as mas tere d  the te chnique 
can be t ruly an ins p i ring sp eake r .  Oc cas ions for such emp as s ioned exp res­
s ion are des c ribed below . 1 1 42 
40 Blai r ,  Le c t ure XVI I , p .  9 9 . 
4 1 Blai r ,  p .  9 9 . 
42 
Blair , p .  1 04 . 
The ve ry aspe ct o f  a la1·ge assembly , engage d in 
some debate o f  momen t , and at tentive to the dis­
co urse of one man , is  sufficient to  insp i re that 
man with s uch e levat ion and warmth , as both give s  
r ise to  s t rong imp ress ions and give s  them p rop rie ty . 
Pass ions eas i ly rise in great asemb lies , whe re the 
movemen t s  are communicated by mut ual symp athy 
b e tween the o rato r and the audience . 4 3  
This type o f  eloquence , p rop erly us ed , i s  certainly one o f  the highes t 
types o f  o ratory .  
That ardo r o f  spee ch , th at vehemence and glow o f  
sentiment whi ch arise from a mind animated and 
ins p i red by some gre at and pub l i c  obj ect , from 
the pe cul i ar characteris t i cs of popular eloquen ce , 
is i ts highes t degree o f  pe rfect ion . 44 
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This pas s ion and e loquence mus t be s ui t ab le to the oc cas ion and the subj e c t . 
The warmth should always be genuine , never co unte rfe i t . The speake r should 
no t in the exp ression of p as s ion lose command of h ims e l f  or go further than 
the audience is willing to tole rate . Finally , again Blair reminds us to 
re tain the ameni ties p rop er  for the t ime , p lace and character of  the 
45 speaker . 
One f inal word should b e  said  on this s ubj ect . The he i ghts  o f  good 
tas te in rhe toric are shown in naturalnes s  in manne r and s tyle . 
E thos in Rhe toric-- the Exo rdium 
The beginning o f  the speech can cause the speake r the mos t  t rouble 
and is  a t  the same time the mos t impo rtan t p o rt ion o f  the spee ch fo r acqui r-
ing the good will of the aud ience . 
4 3 Blai r ,  pp . 102- 1 0 3 . 
44Blai r , p .  1 0 3 . 
4 5Blair , p .  1 04 . 
I t  is always o f  importance to begin wel l ; to 
make a favo rable imp ress ion at  firs t se t t ing 
out ; when the minds o f  the hearers , vacant  as  
ye t and free , are mos t  disposed to receive any 
imp re s s ion e as i ly . 46 
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Gene rally speaking , the re are two kinds o f  exo rdi ums , the P ri n-
cip ium ,  "whe re the o rator p lainly and dire c t ly p ro fe s s e s  his  aim in 
speaking , "  and the Ins inuato :  
• . •  where a large r comp as s mus t be t aken , and 
whe re , p res uming the disp os i tion o f  the audi­
ence to be much agains t  the o rato r , he mus t 
gradually re concile them to he aring him be fo re 
he p lainly dis cove rs the point whi ch he has in 
view . 4 7  
Since the fi rs t  imp re s s ion o f  the speake r i s  to b e  gained in the 
exo rdium ,  Blai r  exp li c i t ly s t ates wh at should be done to make tha t imp res-
s ion as f avo rable as pos s ib le . 
All appearance s  o f  mode s ty are favo rab le and p re­
pos sess ing . I f  the o rator s e t  out with an ai r o f  
arro gance and os tent ation , the sel f- love and p ri de 
o f  the heare rs wil l  b e  p resently awakene d ,  and will 
follow h im wi th a s us p i ci o us eye througho ut all his  
p rogres s .  His  mo des ty sho ul d  dis cove r  itself  no t 
only in hi s e xp re s s ions at the beginn ing , but in 
his who le manner ; in hi s looks , in hi s ges ture s , 
in the tone o f  his  voi ce • • • •  Indeed , the mo des ty 
of an introduction shoul d neve r  be t ray any thing 
me an or  abj e c t . I t  is always of gre a t  use to an 
o rato r ,  that toge ther wi th mo des ty and de fe ren ce 
to his heare rs , he sho ul d  show a ce rtain s ens e o f  
digni ty , aris ing f rom a persuas ion o f  the j us t i ce 
o r  importance o f  the s ub j e ct on whi ch he i s  to 
speak . 4 8  
The exo rdi um should begi n wi thout full s t rength o f  vo i ce o r  pass ion , le aving 
this fo r more ful l  deve lopment late r on . There are occas ions and sub j e cts 
46Blai r , Le cture XXXI ,  " Conduc t of a Dis course in All I ts Parts-­
Int ro duc t ion , Divi s ion , Narra tion and Exp li cation , "  e d .  Go lden and Co rbe t t , 
p .  10 8 . 
4 7 
Blai r ,  p .  10 8 . 
4 8 
Blai r ,  p .  1 10 . 
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whi ch are excep tions to this . Whenever s t arting vehement ly , howeve r , 
the speake r is cautioned to  be  ce rtain he can main tain the degree o f  
intens i ty througho ut the dis co urse . These are the uses fo r a pass ionate 
exordium: 
Theri> are cases , however , in whi ch it is allowab le 
fo r him to s e t  o ut f rom the fi rs t  in high and bold 
tone , as , fo r ins tance , when he ri ses t o  de fend some 
c ause whi ch has been run down and de cried by the 
pub lic . Too mo des t  a beginning mi gh t then be  a 
confe s s ion o f  gui l t . By the boldness and s t rength 
o f  his exo rdium he mus t ende avo r  to s tem the tide 
that is agains t him,  and to re�9e p rej udi ces , by 
encoun tering them wi tho ut fe ar . 
GEORGE CAMPBELL 
Campbell clearly re flected the class i c al influence as well as 
current philosophical theo ries being dis cus s e d  by his  contemporaries . 
As an e ccles i as t i c  his wri t ings are f i l le d  wi th p ro ce dures t o  be used in 
homile t i cs . 
Thi s  p aper will f i rs t look at the philosophi cal conce p ts that may 
have shaped Campbell ' s  concep t o f  e thos . Next , spe ci fi c re fe rences to 
e thos will be re ferred to . Campbell re cognized the di f fe rent characters 
in the lawye r ,  senator and divine s pe ake r .  He t re ated each at s ome length . 
Adap tat ion for the audience will be looked at f rom the s t andp oint of  Camp-
be ll as wel l  as his views on the purpose o f  the exo rdium.  
The philosophi cal views of Campbe l l  we re d rawn from a number o f  
sources . James Go l den and Edward Corbe t t  p oin ted to four tene ts drawn 
from Lo cke , Hume and Hartley . 
4 9Blai r , p .  1 10 . 
1 .  The mind is  s ep arated into facul t ie s . 
2 .  Expe rimen tal me thod i s  s upe rior to 
syllogi s t i c  re ason ing.  
3 .  I deas are he ld t oge ther by laws o f  
as sociation . 
4 .  Be lief and pe rs uas ion are dependent on 
the l ivel ines s  o f  an i de a  and the fo rce 
o f  emo t ional appe als . S O 
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To these sho uld � : e added a furthe r dis cus s ion o f  wo rds and the i r  meanings 
that ties  in closely wi th the as s o cia t ion of me anings but goe s a b i t  beyond 
this . 
Even wh ile accep ting many ide as from these s o urces , Campbell fo und 
some of their bas i c  conce 1pt ions untenab le .  
When Campbe l l  s tated that intui t ive evi dence 
consis t s  in the immedi ate p e r cep tion of con­
formi ty be tween " concep tion" and i t s  " arch type , "  
he dis avowed , in one bold  s t roke , the rep re­
sentative theory o f  ideas whi ch Lo cke had so 
reluc t antly emb raced and whi ch lay at the 
heart of Be rkeley ' s i dealism as we ll as Hume ' s  
skep ticism.  5 l 
In looking at  Campbell ' s theo ries o f  lo gi cal t ruth , Edney also writes o f  
Rei d ' s as s e ssmen t o f  Lo cke and Hume ' s skep ti cism . 
Neith e r  Lo cke no r Be rkeley , nor Hume , Re id p ointe d  
out , p roduced an y  evi dence f o r  the as s ump tion that 
all the obj e cts o f  knowledge are but  ideas in the 
mind . The theo ry of ide as as obj ects , he argue d , 
is in cons is tent wi th the " common sense" o f  mankind . 
. . .  I t  was wi th Thomas Re id that Geo rge Campbell 
j o ined han ds . There is no ques t ion b ut that his 
Philosophy of Rhe tori c s upplemented  what Mi lls 
calls the "world o f  argument and illus t ration" 
emp loye d by Reid to re fute the do ct rine of p e r­
cep tion by me ans o f  i de as . 5 2  
---- --- - ---
50 James L .  golden and Edward P .  J .  Corbe t t , eds . , The Rhe tori c o f  
Blai �1- Campbe l l  and Wha��1:Y (New York , Chi cago : Hol t , Rineh�-"ts;-winS ton , 
Inc . , 1 96 8) , Intro , , p .  1 5 . 
5 1 c .  W .  Edney , " Geo rge C ampbe ll ' s Theo ry o f  Lo gica l Truth , "  §_Ee�ch 
Monograp}l_� , 20 .  
5 2 Edney , p .  2 3 .  
In keeping wi th this adhe rence to the viewpoint expres s e d  by 
Re id and to his clas s ic al o rientation , Campbe l l  gave his  own mean ing 
on " vi rtue . "  
One re duce th all the vi rtues to .E_ruden c� and i s  
ready t o  make i t  clear a s  s unshine that the re 
ne i the r is nor can be ano ther so urce o f  mo ral 
good , a ri gh t- conduc ted sel f- love ; ano the r is 
equally con fi dent that all the vi rtues are but  
di f fe ren t mo di fications o f  dis intere s ted benevo-_ 
-�nc:._�; a thi rd wil l demons t ra te to you that ve ra� 
� i ty i s  the who le duty o f  man ; a fourth , wi th mo re 
ingenui ty and much great e r  appe arance of  reason , 
ass ures yo u that the true sys tem o f  e thics i s  
comp rise d in one word , -�mpa_!:l:!.Y._ . 5 3  
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Wi th these noted excep tions , whi ch , as we shall see , are no t the 
excep tions they wo ul d  firs t appear to be , we c an re t urn to the four tene ts  
derive d  from Lo cke and Hume and examine , in turn , the us e made o f  them by 
Campbel l . 
1 .  Firs t , the mind is  separated into  facu l t ie s . 
There is some di s agreement conce rning the extent o f  Campbell ' s 
accep t ance o f  " faculty psycho lo gy . "  Campbe l l  clas s i fie d the faculties  of  
the human mind iden ti fied by  the  philosophers as  the resp onse aims o f  e lo-
quence . These f acul ties incl ude d  unde rs t anding and reason , wi ll , app e t i t e 
and affe c t ion , and imagination . While he re co gni zes the dis t inctness of 
these f acul ties in the col lective minds o f  membe rs of an audience , Campbell  
is also  we l l-aware of  the in terrel ationship s . 
5 3  
On the s ur face , C ampbe l l  appears to b e  a facul ty 
psychologis t. .  His is no t ,  howeve r , a s t ri c t  divi­
s ion of faculties . The faculties of unde rs tanding , 
imagina t ion , p ass ion , and wil l , b lend in to one 
ano the r .  The un de rs tanding as sis ts the imagina­
t ion , the imagination s t imulates the p as s ions , and 
Edney , ' ' Campbe l l ' s Le c ture s o f  Pulp i t  Eloq uence � "  �-��-ch Mc:1�_c:._-
_gra1��:�. (March , 195 2 )  XI X ,  3 .  
the pass ions move to a c t i o n .  i\ny o r w  d i s c o u rs e  
may b e  co mp l e t e ly a n d  t h o ro ugh ly ra t ional i n  
n a t ure ; ano t he r  may b e  p r e d omi n a t e l y  l'mo t i on a l .  
Any given speech may be located a t  any p oin t 
be tween thes e  ext remes o f  emo t ionalism and 
rationality . 54 
Th is use o f  the va rious funct ions o f  the human mind as the bas i s  for 
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Campbe l l ' s recogni tion o f  the di f fe rent ends o f  spee ch , affected  bo th the 
e thos of the sp eake r in the di f fe rent s i t uations , and the p e rcep t ions o f  
the audien ce a t  the t ime . 
Next , Campbe l l  fe l t  the expe rimen t al me tho d to be  superior to  the 
syllo gis t ic .  Here i s  what may have been an internal in cons i s tency in 
Campbe l l . Tho ugh he ins i s ted  the mind held  ce r t ain intui t ive t ruths , he 
al so ins i s t s  these  t ruths are arrive d at by repeate d consis tent experiences . 
The re se ems to be no q ue s t ion that Campbe l l  con­
fus e d  the " intui t ive per cep t ion" o f  t ruth with the 
" rational" acqui s i t ion o f  t ruth . We have no t i ce d  
that he clas s i fied s uch generali zat ions a s  " the 
course of nature will be the s ame tomorrow as i t  
is  to day" a s  " in t ui tive" t ruths . Actually , gen­
e ralizations o f  this kind are induct ive references , 
al though p robably no cons cio us p rocess o f  " intel­
lection" went in to thei r  app rehens ion . The s ame 
may be s ai d  i f  o ther " intui t ive" t ruths f urnishe d 
by our author . 5 5 
Al though Campbe l l  use d  the uni fo rmi ty o f  nature as a fundamen tal 
p rincip le of induct ion , he did no t admi t the uni fo rmi ty of nature as a 
s uppressed  maj o r  p remise in reasoning . (As p ropo s e d  by Ri chard Wha te ly . )  
However , Campbe l l  d i d  re cogni ze ce rtain " fi rs t  t ruths" on whi ch all o thers 
were b ased . 
54 Edney , " Campbe l l ' s Le c t ure s o f  P ulp i t  El oq uen ce , " §_P.ee ch _Mono­
.s_ra�hs (March , 1 9 5 2 ) , XIX , 3 .  
55 Edney , p .  2 4 . 
No attentive p ro cess  o f  reasoning , he argue d ,  
i s  necessary to arrive at intuitive t ruth . 
In tui t ion furnishes us wi th f i rs t t ruths . 
Wi thout fi rs t  t ruths , knowle dge would be in 
a s ad p li gh t ; " the inves t i gat ion o f  t ruth 
wo uld be an endless and frui tless t as k ; we 
shouJ d be e te rnally p roving , whi ls t nothing 
co uld eve r  be p rove d .  ! • 5 6  
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These f i rs t " t ruths" come f rom three s o urces : inte l l e c tion , con-
s ciousne s s  and coimnon sens e . The firs t , inte llect ion , is the ins tan t  
re cogni tion w e  have o f  the t ruth o f  ma themati cal relationship s , s uch as 
one and four make f ive . Cons ciousness  is o ur as s uran ce o f  o ur own exis t-
en ce-- tha t we are living and b reathing enti ties . I t  is also the source 
o f  mental j udgemen ts made by the mind " con cerning res emb l ances or  di sp ar-
i t ies in vis ible  obj e c ts ,  o r  s ize in things t angib le , darke r or l i ghter 
tints in colo rs , s t ronge r or weake r tas tes or  sme l l s � ' From " coimnon sens e" 
we de rive o ur as s uran ce o f  s uch t ruths as "whateve r has a be ginning has a 
cause . "  '�he course o f  nat ure wi l l  be the s ame tomo rrow as i t  is  today . " 
I t  is apparen t  tha t  Campbe ll was in comp le te acco rd 
wi th Lo cke and wi th Mi l l  on the emp i ri c al view that 
int ui tionism cons is ts in Qercep tions de rived from 
s ens ation or re fle ction . 5 7 
Campbell ' s theo ry o f  " deduc tive evidence" i s  q ui t e  di fferent from 
gene ral to spe ci fic  and in no way relates to s y l lo gi s t i c  re asoning . I t  
cons i s ts o f  tminterrup ted s e ries o f  axioms , a chain o f  intui t ions o r  immedi-
a te ly perceive d  t ruths tha t in themse lves  mean no thing but toge the r  lead to 
a perfectly conclus ive argument . "As se rt ions oppos i te to demons t rat ive evi­
dence , being inconce ivable and con tradicto ry are not on ly false but ab s urd . 1 1 5 8 
5 6  
Edney ,  p .  2 4 . 
5 7  Edney , p .  2 4 . 
5 8  Edney , " Logi c , " p .  25- 2 6 . 
The s e cond form o f  deduct ive evi dence is  mo ral evidence . 
Mo ral evi dence i s  that form o f  belie f wh i ch is 
derived from the act ual , though p e rhap s  variab le , 
connexions subs is t ing among things actually 
exi s t ing . Moral evidence is in re al i ty a group 
o f  independent t ruths , e ach o f  whi ch bes t ows a 
ce rt ain degree o f  like l ihoo d upon the credib i l i t y  
o f  a fact • • • .  Re co gni z ing , as h a d  Lo cke , t h a t  we 
think and speak and act upon the bas is  of p ro­
p os i tions that vary in de gree f rom ce rtain ty down 
to improb ab i l i ty , Campbel l  p ointed  o ut that , although 
we reach toward actual t ruth or mat t e r  o f  fa c t  thro ugh 
mo ral evidence , we ach ieve only variant degrees o f  
l ikel ihood . 5 9  
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In eve ry ins tance ment ione d , sy llo gis t i c  s tyle has been ab andone d in favor 
of the emp i ri cal o r  exp e rimental . 
Next , Campbe ll re al i zed that i de as are he ld toge ther by the laws 
o f  as sociation . All we know is pe rceive d  thro ugh the senses . This  is 
s t o red in the memory .  These two facul ties could give us on ly isolated 
facts  f rom pas t o r  p resent that have no use wi thou t further f unct ion . 
One co uld pe rce ive tho us ands o f  s imi lar indivi dual 
facts  and ye t not perceive unive rs al t ruth i f  the 
mind h ad not the powe r o f  fo cus ing i ts at t ent ion 
upon q uali ties whi ch the individual has " in common 
wi th the o rde r" while o ther q ua l i t ies  o f  the indi­
vi dual remain unno t i ce d . Campbe l l  agreed  wi th 
Lo cke that the gene rals whi ch remain after we 
have q ui t  p arti cul ars " are only cre atures o f  our 
own making : the i r  gene ral nature � e ing no thing 
b ut the cap aci ty t hey are put into by the unde r­
s t anding o f  s i gn i fying or rep rt!sen ting many 
p art i c ulars • . • •  Gene ral and unive rs al be long 
no t to  the re al exis ten ce o f  things , but are 
the inven tions and cre atures o f  t he un de r­
s tanding , made by i t  for i ts own use . 6 0  
Th is abi l i t y  t o  as s o ci ate i deas and imp re s s i ons is  e s s ential to 
the deve lopment of l anguage in Campbell ' s  theo ry . In o rdinary ma t ters it 
5 9Edney , " Logi c , "  pp . 2 5- 2 6 . 
60Edney , pp . 2 3-24 . 
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is nat ural and easy for the mind t o  comp are wo rds wi th knowledge o f  things 
s i gni fie d ; in ma tters of an abs t rus e and in tri c ate nat ure , or in ma tters 
treated in an uncommon manne r ,  re fe ren ce to fact is  mo re d i f f i cult to 
achieve . There are three kinds o f  wo rd us age in whi ch we are l ike ly to 
be impos ed by wo rds without me an ing : " f irs t , by an exube ran ce of  me ta-
pho r ;  s e condly , by the use o f  un f ami l i ar te rms o f  a comp li cated nature 
(s uch as church , p owe r , s t ate ) ; and th · dly , in kinds o f  communication 
in whi ch the te rms emp loyed are ve ry ab s t ract , and consequen tly o f  ve ry 
t . . . f .  . . , 6 1  ex ens 1ve s 1gn 1  1 cat1on . 
Mere so unds , wh i ch are use d  only as s i gns and 
whi ch have no natural conne c tion wi th the ob j e c t s  
o f  which they a r e  s igns , convey knowledge t o  the 
mind even though they excite no i dea  o f  the thin gs 
s i gn i f ie d .  Thi s  curio us fact is acco un te d  for by 
an exp lanat ion o f  ( 1 ) the connection that s ubs is ts 
among things , ( 2 )  the conne ction that s ubs is t s  
among words and things , and ( 3 ) the conne c t ion 
that s ub s i s t s  among wo rds . 6 2  
The conclus ion drawn from these  obs e rvations comp ose Campbell ' s theory of  
p ropos i t i ons . 
1 .  No ide a i s  known in i s o l at ion--on ly its  relat ion­
ship to o ther obj e cts ,  ·things or events . 
2 .  " As s ociation o f  ideas "  me ans p ropos i t ions to Campbe l l . 
3 .  Inferen ce is relationship wi thin p roposi t ions and 
be tween p ropos i t ions . 
4 .  Propos i tions are t radi t ional s ub j e ct-predi cate type . 
5 .  Campbel l  didn ' t re cogni ze ei ther the hyp othet i cal 
or dis j un c t ive p ropos it ion . 
6 .  Campbe l l ' s relation o f  things ( resemb l an ce , 
iden t i ty , equal i ty , contrarity , cause and e f fe c t , 
con comi tan cy , vi cini ty in t ime and p lace ) . 
7 . P roposit ions are ass e r t ions respecting things no t 
ideas o f  things . 
8 .  He obj e c ted t o  the asse rtion th at the p redicate o f  
a p ropos i tion is a "name o f  the s ame thing o f  which 
the subj e c t  i s  a name . 1 1 6 3  
6 1 Edney , " Logic , "  p .  2 2 . 
62 Edney , p .  2 3 .  
6 3Edney , pp . 2 1- 2 3 . 
1 35 
The las t  p oint men tione d by Go lden and Co rb e t t  as o ri gina ting 
wi th Lo cke and Hume , des cribed belie f and p e rs uas ion as dependen t on 
the liveline s s  of ideas and the force of emot ional appeals . 
Campbe ll clas s i fies spee ches according to the audience re ac t i on 
des i red . He iden tifie d  the exp l anat ory speech as purpos ing to inform 
the listener . The cont rovers ial s pe e ch is also addressed  to the under-
s t anding fo r the purp ose of " conquering e rro r" and to p roduce belie f .  
The commendatory speech pleases the imaginat ion . S timulat ion o f  pas s ions 
in the pathe tic dis course relies on heavy emo t ional appeal . Pe rs uas ive 
dis cours e , des igne d to in fluence the wil l , i s  the n;os t complex fo rm . 
The speech to p ersuade includes all the ends of  
o ral dis co urs e ; i t  informs , convinces , p leases , 
and moves . I t  is a comb inat ion or  blend o f  
reason and emo tion whi ch purposes to b ring 
about act ion . To make me beli eve it is enough 
to show me that things are so ; to make me act , 
it  is ne ce s s ary to show that the action will 
answe r some end . That can neve r be an end to  
me whi ch grat i f ies no passion or affect ion in 
my nature . In order to p e rsuade , i t  is always 
ne ce s s ary to move the p assions . Pass ion is the 
mover to action , reason is the gui de . 6 4 
Though much in the philosophy o f  Geo rge Campbell is  dire c ted toward 
rhe to ric , and thouih many of t hese theo ries are de rive d  from the writ ings 
o f  Locke an d Hume , the re s till  seems to  b e  eno ugh evi den ce here to show he 
had s ome leanings toward emp i r i ci sm and even skep ti cism.  Howeve r , Campbell 
re cognized the re were different levels  for t ruth and our asce rtainment o f  
i t . There are seen varying degrees o f  p robabi l i ty f rom the cer tain ty o f  
" firs t t ruths" a l l  the way t o  the alt e rnate p ropos it ions de rived from 
64Edney , f rom Campbell ' s "Lec ture s on Pulp i t  Eloquence , "  p .  5 . 
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mo ral evidence . He clearly re co gnized the d i f fe ren t mental facult ies 
but also sees them ac ting in consort during the rhe tori cal p roces s 
called "persuas ion . "  
Campbe ll ' s  Views of Ethos in Rhet o ric 
In Campbel l ' s  eyes , e thos as p ro o f  carried this meaning : "By 
this we are to unders t and . . . that wh i ch is ob taine d re fl e c t ive ly from the 
op inion en tertaine d of him by the he arers or the charac t e r  whi ch he bears 
with them . 1 1 65 The impor tan ce of e thos for the pub l i c  speaker was re co g-
nized by Campbell as being o f  p rimary importance . 
I t  was remarked in general , in the p rece ding 
chap te r ,  that fo r p romot ing the succes s of the 
o rator , it is a mat ter o f  some consequen ce that , 
in the op inion o f  those whom he addres se th , he 
is  both a wise and good  man . 6 6  
E thos , n o  mat ter  what end o f  speech is sought , i s  b es t  achieved 
th rough thoro ugh e duca t ion in relevan t  s ubj ect  mat ter .. For the pre ache r ,  
tho rough knowle dge o f  the S crip tures i s  ve ry imp o rt an t . Also in clude d in 
this educa t ion should be the development o f  the cap ab i l i ty al lowing for 
relevan t , co:np rehens ive and mut ual ly exclus ive parti tioning o f  speech 
con tent . The orator  also mus t have a thorough unders t anding o f  " the 
na tural and genuine grotmds of reasoning . . .  eve ry p ubl i c  speake r should be 
conve rsant wi th the wri tin gs of Aris to t le , Cicero and Quin t i l i an . • •  and fo r 
the p araphernal ia for whi ch these three rhe to ricians . are almo s t  excl us ively 
ib l 1 1 6 7 respons e .  
65McDermo tt , p .  4 9 7 .  
6 6 campbell , " The Philosophy o f  Rhe tori c , " e d . , Go lden and Corbe t t , 
Chap ter 1 0 , p .  22 6 . 
6 7Edney , p .  9 . ( Lect ures on Pulp it Eloquence ) 
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Edney furthe r  exp lains the fo rms o f  logi c wi th whi ch the speaker 
i s  to  be f amiliar as well as the essen ti al di fferences in things . This 
is an unde rs tanding of " fi rs t  t ruths" comp are d to those  p ropo s i tions 
de rived from mo ral evidence . A speake r living in this newly skep tical 
age was mo re creditab le to his audience when he cle arly unde rs tood his 
own pos i tion on these fac tors . 
In re gard t o  libe ral education , Campbell  st ates 
emphatical ly that "whateve r be the spe cies o f  
eloquence a man aims to at t ain , eve rything that 
serve s t o  imp rove his knowle dge , dis ce rnmen t and 
good s ense , also serves to  imp rove him as an 
o rato r .  Als o , he remarks that " t rue logi c , i t  
mus t b e  acknowledged , i s  bes t s t udie d not i n  the 
s cholas t i c  sys tem , but in the wri t ings o f  the 
mos t  j udicious and b es t  reas one rs on the vario us 
s ubj ects s upp lied by his tory , s cience and philo­
sophy . 1 1 68 
The di f fe ren t  types o f  p ublic  speake rs we re e xpected by thei r  
listeners t o  have d i f fe ren t types  o f  charac te r o r  "e thos . "  Campbell r e  cog-
nized thi s an� gave his readers an account o f  what was expe cted from the 
senator , the lawyer and the p reache r .  Firs t , f o r  the senator : 
• . •  reputa tion o f  s agaci ty , experience in af fai rs , 
and as much in tegri ty as is though t at t ainab le by 
those cal led men of the wo rld , will add wei gh t  t o  
the words o f  the senator . 
Fo r the lawyer : 
• • •  that o f  skill in his p ro fess ion , and fideli ty 
in his rep res en t ation , wi ll se rve to re connnend 
what  is sp oken by the lawyer at the b ar .  
Fo r the " divine" : 
But i f  these charac ters in gene ral remain unimpeached , 
the public will be suffi cient ly iarlul gen t to both in 
eve ry respect . On the cont rary , the re is  li t t le o r  
n o  indulgence i n  re gard t o  his own failings , t o  b e  
6 8Edney , p • 1 0 . 
expected by the man who is p ro fessedly a s o r t  
o f  autho ri zed censo r ,  who hath i t  in his charge 
to mark and rep rehend the faults o f  o thers . And 
even in the exe cut ion o f  th i s  s o  t i cklish a p art 
of his  o f f i ce , the leas t exces s on ei the r hand 
expose th him to cens ure and dislike . Too much 
lenity is eno ugh to s t i gmat i ze him as lukewarm 
in the cause o f  vi rtue , and too much seve rity as 
a s t ranger to the sp i ri t  o f  the Gospe1 . 6 9 
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The manner o f  spe aking for the preache r is also a mat te r  for dis-
cus s ion and explanat ion . The deli cacy he speaks o f  should be eviden t in 
delive ry . 
The re i s  a certain de li cacy in the character o f  
the p reache r which h e  is neve r  at liberty totally 
to ove rlook , and to whi ch , i f  the re appear any­
thing in congruous , e i ther in his conduc t o r  in 
his public  performance , i t  wi l l  neve r fail to 
inj ure the i r  effe c t . 70 
George Cambell shows a dep arture from the c las s ical concep t in 
his t reatmen t  of the �udien ce . Th is is  l arge ly due to his clas s i fication 
o f  the ends o f  speech . He t reats wi th "men in gene ral" and then "men in 
p arti cular" as Ari s to tle did , but he has a new lis t o f  the condit ions that 
ope rate on the p as s ions of men . These con di tions include : p robabi lity , 
p lausibility , import ance , p roximi ty o f  time , conne ction o f  p lace , rel at ion-
7 1  ship to the persons conce rned and the degree o f  in t e res t in the consequen ces . 
When the audien ce had developed an un favo rab le at t i t ude t oward the 
speake r , Campbell re connnends the use o f  s ome specifi c te chniques : 
2 2 7 . 
Fo r this is only endeavoring , by the aid o f  
laughter  and con temp t , to  diminish o r  even 
quite undo , the un friendly emo tions that have 
6 9Geo rge Campbel l ,  " The Philosophy o f  Rhetori c , "  Chap te r 1 0 , p .  
70 Campbel l ,  2 2 8 . 
7 1  
Golden and Co rbe t t , foo tno t e , p .  1 0 .  
been raised in the minds o f  the hearer s ; or , on 
the contrary , by satis fying them o f  the se ri o us­
nes s  o f  the s ubj ect , and of  the importan ce of the 
consequences , to extinguish the con temp t ,  and make 
the laugh ter , whi ch the an tagonis t wan te d  t o  exci t e , 
appear , when examined ,  no be t ter than madnes s . 72 
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The exo rdium o r  proem o f  the spee ch shoul d  p redispose the audi-
ence in favor of the speaker •; Howeve r ,  Campbell  does not see this as a 
funct ion for  the int ro du.:'.tion o f  a s e rmon . 
Although Campbel l i s  in symp athy with Ari s totle ' s 
s ugges t ion that the p roem remove any un favo rab le 
p repo ssess ions that exis t in the minds of the 
audience , he does not accep t i t  for  the pulp i t . 7 3 
RICHARD WHATELY 
In analyz ing the views o f  Richard Whately on con cep ts o f  e thos in 
rhe tori c , s urely the firs t thing to cons ider is h i s  censure of j us t  the 
type o f  ana ly s i s  being given the s ubj e c t  in thi s  work . Whately cri t i cized 
the perspect ive tha t put s morals , politi cs , l aw and o ther s ubj ects all in 
the realm o f  rhe tori c .  He c laime d  no s uch con cerns  for  the rhe torician 
and furthe r doub te d  any o f  his con tempo raries would serious ly cons ider  
these ques tions as be ing re lated to the subj e c t  . 
. • •  some o f  the ancien t  wri t e rs • • .  even ins i s ted on 
virtue as an es sential quali fi cation for the perfect 
orato r : because a goo d  character , whi ch can in no 
way be so  sure ly es t ab lishe d as by des e rving i t , 
has great wei gh t  wi th the audience . These no tions 
are combatted  by Ari s to t le ; who a t t ributes  them 
ei ther to the i l l- cultured unders t anding o f  those 
who main tained them , or to the i r  arrao gan t and p re­
tending dispos i t ion ,  i . e . , a des i re to extol and 
magni fy the art they p ro fe s s ed . 74 
72Golden and Corbe t t , pp . 22 1- 2 2 3 . 
7 3Edney , p .  9 .  
74Golden and Co rbe t t , p .  2 80 . 
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Whately chooses to limi t  his wo rk on rhe to ric to " argumentat ive 
composi tion , "  generally and excl us ively . 75 
Philosophy o f  Whately 
To Whately the province o f  philosophy in cluded inve s tigation 
leading to ce rtain conclus ions . When the conclus ions are made known to 
others , this is the p rovince of rhe tori c .  His views are mos t  clearly 
s een in re ligious related wri tin gs and theo ries . 
I f  a man begins ( as is too p l ainly a f requent mode 
o f  p ro ceeding) by has tily adop t ing , or s t rongly 
leaning to , some op inion which s ui t s  his inclina­
t ion , or whi ch is s anctioned by some autho ri ty that 
he blindly vene rates , and '. then s tudies with the ult i­
mate dili gence , not  as an Inve s t i gator o f  T ruth , but 
as an Advo cate laboring to p rove his point , his talent 
and his researches , whatever e f fe c t  they may produce 
in making conve rts to his not ions , wil l  avail no thing 
in enligh tening his own j udgement , and se curing him 
from e rro r . 7 6  
H i s  re ligi ous views he ld the Word o f  the Bible to b e  the t ruth for P ro-
tes tants . 
The p rinciples that  gove rned the s t and he took in al l 
religio us con trove rs ies was Chillingworth ' s p remise 
that , " the Bible , and the Bible alone , is  the re li­
gion of the P rotes tants . And it  was this alle gience 
to the S crip tures that acco llll.t s  for the emphas is  he 
puts on tes t imony in his Elements  of Rhetori c . 7 7 
The skep t i c ism o f  the day challenged his logi cal mind to realis t i cally 
ree s t ab lish the validity of Bibli cal tes t imony o f  Miracles that had been 
ques t ioned and repudi ated by David Hume . Whately wro te " Hi s tori c Doubts"  
75Golden and Corbe t t , p .  2 8 1 . 
76Golden and Co rbet t ,  p .  282 . 
7 7Golden and Corbe t t , p .  2 74 . 
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us ing Hume ' s own criteria for accep tenace o f  tes t imony to p rove that 
Napoleon Bonap arte never really exis ted . The work eloquently shows the 
app lication of Hume ' s tes ts  for the t ruth of tes t imony can be used to 
prove even well-know facts to be mere myths . 7 8  
Whately on E thos in Rhetoric 
Quint ilian ' s  good  man theo ry came under f i re from Whately . He 
asserted the theo ry was not so wi de sp read as the clas s i c al wri ters had 
imagined-- and certainly he felt the practice was even less wide spread . 
Wha tely feared the res ul t s  o f  a theory that posed all o rators as being 
good . This in terp re ta tion igno re s Quintilian ' s s tatement that the "bad 
man" is no t to be called an orator . 
I t  seems gene rally admi t ted that skj. 1 1  in compo­
s i t ion and speaking , l iab le as it eviden tly is 
to  abuse , is to be considered on the whole as 
advan t ageous to the pub l ic . • •  b ecause  t ruth , 
having an in t rins ic  superio rity ove r falsehoo d , 
may be expected to p revail when the skill o'f ; the 
con t ending p art ies is equal ; whi ch is mo re like ly 
to take p lace , the more widely such ski ll i s  
di f fused . 79 
Wha tely s imp ly makes the do ct rine o f  e thos conform to what he 
observes  in orators . He demands excellen t  t rai ts  in the speake r , both 
because i t  is the j udgement a "wise" man wo uld make and be cause an audi-
ence , in mos t  cases , es teems the good . He also views i t  as be ing of p ri-
mary importance that the o rator a t  leas t seem to fee l the sentimen ts he is 
de live ring are t rue and ri gh t .  " The personal sympathy fel t towards one 
who appears to be delive ring his own sentiments , is s uch , that i t  usually 
7 8 
Pomeroy , p .  75 . 
7 9 
Richard Whately , Elements o f  Rhetoric ( Oxford : John Murray , 
1 82 8) ,  p .  1 7 . 
rivets  the at ten tion , even involuntarily , though to a discours e that 
s eems hardly worthy o f  i t . , , BO 
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Whately re �o gnized  the s ame three general comp onent s  in indivi-
dual e thos as s igned to it  by Aris to tle . Goo d  ch aracter , good wi ll toward 
the audience and knowledge or intelligen ce eviden ced in the speech wi l l  
al l a i d  i n  giving e tho s t o  the speake r .  
The q ualities o f  e thos are cal led goo d  p rinciple , 
goo d sense and good wil l .  Whately is speaking o f  
audien ce opinion , no t the t rue charac ter o f  the 
speaker . He doe s , neve rtheless , advise that the 
speake r possess these qualit ies . B l 
Wha tely recognized that the re is  o ft en a "p arty spiri t "  o r  feeling 
p resent in the audience to be addres sed . This "sp iri t "  or  poss ib ly p re-
j udice mus t be as certained by the speaker and he mus t take app rop riate 
s teps to o f fset  i t . To do this there are s t rategies that can be emp loyed 
d h 1 . d 82 an t ese are exp aine • 
The ehtos o f  the speake r can p l ay so impo rtant a role in the 
rhetori cal process tha t Whately s ees i t as a p o tent i al threat to an 
intelligent decis ion making p ro cess . 
80 
8 1 
What ely views this audience preoc cup a t ion wi th 
character  or p ers onage of the speake r a p rimary 
cause o f  inab i l i ty to j udge ac curately . He sees 
lit tle hope for remedying the s i t uation . He also 
holds with Aris totle on the advi s ab i l i ty of  p ro­
j ec t ing wise , amiab l
g 
and gene rous sentiments 
toward the audience . 3 
Wha t ely , p . 3 7 7 .  
Wha tely , pp . 1 2 2- 12 3 .  
82 Golden and Co rbe tt , p .  1 45 . 
83 Go lden and Corbe t t , pp . 14 5- 1 5 0 .  
O ther advi ce for the e f fect ive o rator includes the concealment 
o f  any obvious mani fes tation of rhetorical skill . Obvio us rhe tori cal 
devices se rve to arous e  susp i c ion in the audience . The natural and 
1 4 3  
unaffected s tyle o f  speaking is to be high ly p re fe rred to  give the audi-
ence the imp ress ion of s ince rity and spontane i ty . Be low is a sununary of 
s ugges t ions for es t ablishment o f  e thos wi th an audience . 
1 .  Speake r wi th the authority o f  Pericles may 
exp li ci tly s tate his  good q ualit ies o f  characte r .  
2 .  Maxims and t ruisms may not be  use d  indis crimina tely . 
3 . Spee ch mus t be adap ted  to the e ducation , p ro fess ion , 
nation and character o f  the aud ience . 
4 .  To the deg ree the speake r ' s arguments disagree wi th 
the audience they will tend to dep re ciate his  
intelle ctual and mo ral worth . 84 
In regard to this las t point Whately did no t mean to s ay that no speake r 
should at temp t  a top i c  tha t was not alre ady accep ted by his audi ence . This 
wo uld remove the purpos e and all persuas ion f rom rhetori c . He did mean to  
show the speake r the dispos i t ion o f  the audience to be ove rcome . The 
" divine" par t i cularly wi l l  o f ten find h imse l f  talki ng about a subj ect  the 
l i s teners would rathe r i gnor e .  
The preacher , who is  b ound to be  as serting things 
the audience does not accep t , sho uld win p eople by 
degrees--no t demand too much a t  one time . Begin 
speech with p ropos i tions mos t  p eop le will agree wi th . 85 
Wha tely , in con cl us ion ,  caut ione d that we ak argumen ts woul d not be 
enhanced by sub lime l anguage . To enhance e thos wi th the audience , speak 
because you have s omething to s ay .  Moral excellence in the speake r is 
shown in lack of disp lay or os tent ation in manne r .  De livery should  be 
natural , not to the point of be ing careless ,  but at the s ame t ime no t 
governe d by s t ri c t  rules . 
84Golden and Corbe t t , pp . 2 75- 2 80 .  
85Golden and Corbe t t , p .  2 82 . 
CHAPTER V 
THE MODERNS 
I .  A .  RICHARDS 
This discussion of R.i:chard s .r philosophy will necessarily include 
his views on rhetoric . Inherent in Richards '  view o f  man is his symbol-
using power . This i.s the quality he has that sets him apart and above 
the other l if e  forms . He speaks of this as the stimulus-response pattern 
that in its mos t  primitive form is common to all l ife . The response may 
accept or rej ect the stimulus and on this bas is it is s tored within the 
memory for recall at will .  Man recalls these pas t s timuli to compare 
wi.th current ones in a constant s earch for s imilarity . Richards has 
d ef ined fout. 1 ph;Uosophies r elated to this pat tern . 
I .  Sorting 
The organiza t ion o f  thes e s t imuli is needed to make them useful 
as ref erenc es for future experienc es . Sorting is a part of  this process . 
A s ensation would be  something that was just  so , 
on its own , a datum ; as such we have none . Ins tead 
we have perceptions , responses whose charac ter comes 
to them from the pas t as well as the present occas ion . 
A perc eption is never j us t  of  an it ; perception takes 
whatever it perceives as a thing o f  a certain sort . 
All thinking from the lowes t to the highes t--what­
ever else it may be--is sorting . I 
I r .  A .  Richards ,  The Philosophy of Rhetoric ( New York : Oxford 
Univers ity Press , I 9 36) ,  p .  30 .  
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2 . Abs tract ion 
Man ' s respons e to a s t imulus can at one and the same t ime be bio-
logical , emo t ional and conceptual . It  is in the use of language it becomes 
conceptual . All three responses may f ight for dominance within the indi-
vidual in any stimulus-response situation . The process of  selec t ing one 
of these pat terns is abs tracting and is used as a bas is for sorting . In 
other words , instead of a conceptualized , or worded respons e , the ind ivi-
dual might make a completely emot ional one . It is reason that makes the 
difference . 
Richard s ' answer to this complexity of cho ice in 
the abs trac t ive process is the reason whose func­
t ion it is to control both the emo t ional and the 
conceptual element s in the process in a way that 
ensures the proper , realistic ,  and balanc ed whole 
meaning of the event . It  is  under the guidance 
and control of the reason that the process of  
abs trac t ion can produce true and real is tic 
ab stract symbols . 2 
Inherent in this process is the context or environment of the event--
where and und er what circumstances the event takes place . From the 
observed environment of the event we may recall other c ircumstances in 
s imilar environments which will affect our :llmn�diate reason or j udgement 
af fecting the ab s tract ion or choice o f  responses to make in the given 
s ituat ion . 
Richards '  f inal admonit ion abou t the ab s traction 
is that we should rememb er it is a mental ac t ivity , 
and valid only in tha t sens e . In the discuss ion of  
parts o f  context and the conf lict between emot ion 
and intellect , we tend to think of these elements 
as really separate and dis t inct . This is one of 
the liab il ities of abstract ion . The parts o f  the 
2Daniel Fogarty , Roots for a New Rhetoric (New York : Bureau o f  
Publ ications , Teachers College , 1 959 ) , p. 35 . 
cont ext are one , and the desiring of  the emot ions 
is never quite separable f rom the thinking of the 
intellect . As Richards put s it , "We canno t ,  in 
fact , wholly leave off wanting . No thinking can .. 
be mot iveless . 1 13 
3 .  An Approach to Metaphor 
1 4 6  
Ac cord ing t o  Richard s '  theory the b est explanation for language 
theory is metaphor . In metaphor , a quality is abs tracted from one refer-
ence and a qual ity f rom another put in its place for the purpo se of clar i-
ficat ion or vividness . In respect to this type of  metaphor , Richard s 
says , "in the simples t formation , when we use a metaphor we have two 
thoughts of  dif ferent things active together and supported by a s ingle 
word , or phrase ,  whose manner is a resultant of the interac t ion . 1 14 
Two t erms are adopted by Richards in his discuss ion of metaphor 
as a bas is for language . "Tenor" is the underlying idea or principle 
subj ect in the ins tance . The term "vehicle" is used to r efer to the 
selected characteris t ics used to make the tenor clearer or more vivid . 
The "ground " - refers  to the relat ionship between the two . With this back-
ground , Richards is ready to say that lang\lage is . metapporic � 
3 
4 
5 
Richard s '  mos t  emphatic contention about metaphor , 
thus explained , is that language is naturally meta­
phoric . S ince metaphor is j u s t  abs tract ion for the 
purpose of clearer and more vivid communication , 
s ince it seems to b e  the nature of  our thinking to 
b e  perpetually busy with sorting and class ifying 
references and compar ing contexts and their part s , 
and s ince our language symbolizes this thinking , it 
seems to Richards that  our language mus t  be highly , 
hab itually , and even naturally metaphoric . 5 
Fogarty , p .  3 6 . 
Richards , p .  9 3 . 
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Richards takes issue with Aristotle ' s content ion that the ar t o f  
metaphor cannot b e  taught to another but is a s ign of genius . H is 
counter-content ion is that metaphor-making ab il ity comes naturally to 
ordinary people and that we cannot get through "three s entences of ordin­
ary fluid discourse without it . 1 16 
4 .  Thought-Word-Thing Relat ionships 
In discussing Richards '  theories it is obvious that his emphas is 
is operational . Rather than concern for the nature of thoughts ,  word s . 
and things ,  Richard s is showing an interes t in "how words work . 1 1
7 
Terminology used by Richards in this explanat ion has "reference" 
standing for thought , "symbol " for word or langu�ge unit , and "referrent " 
for the ac tual event or obj ect . The reference will include not just the 
immed iate thought but all the concommitant elements and those from past 
experiences that go along with it . The "sign" is the one stimulus in the 
whole event that s erves to remind the subj ec t of the rest of the details . 
The "context " is the whole event with the psychological portion occurring 
within the ind ividual and the ext ernal ref erring to the actual event . The 
"engram" is the residual trace of some pas t  exc itat ion left in some psy­
chological part of  the organism . The relat ionships between the three pri­
mary terms , reference , symbol and referrent , are shown in the diagram below . 
symbol 
6Richards , p .  92 . 
7 Richards ,  p .  8 . 
As can be  seen in Richards ' diagram , there is a 
causal relationship between the ref erence and the 
symbol . In other words , the communicator us ing a 
certain word or express ion can cause his hearers 
to form a thought somewhat s imilar to his own . 
And , conversely , the thought or reference can 
caus e ,  at least in part , the use of a certain 
symbol to express it . 8 
1 4 8  
The second relat ionship , between the reference and the ref errent , 
is also causal and is so because the referrent has acted on the organism 
in such a manner as to cause it to have some reference about it . This 
causat ion can be from either the current s t imulus or it can be from past 
stimulat ions or the memory of such s t imulat ions . 
But the last relat ionship--and this is the important 
one for Richards--is not d irectly c ausal , rior is the 
relat ionship a real one in the sense of the other 
two . This " imputed "  relationship po ints to the key 
princ iple from which stems Richards ' theory o f  pro­
posit ional truth , his value norms , his theory of 
definit ion , and the val id ity of his cr iteria for 
accurate interpretat ion . It is the principJ e 
s tating that there is no referent ial relation 
between the symbol and the referrent , between 
the word and the thing . To phrase it d iffer� 
ently , the symbol , or word , does not r eally "refer 
to"  the thing or referrent except ind irectly through 
the thought or reference . The symbol merely " stands 
for " the thing referred to by the r eference . Whereas 
it sym�olizes the reference it does not symbolize the 
thing . 
To Richards it is this relationship that ac counts for much of the 
ambiguities and misunderstood messages in communicat ion . When people mis-
takenly assume that the symbol and the r eferrent are dir ectly r elated they 
lose sight of the fact that the mental reference for the symbol can vary 
from person to person and within a person at different t imes . It  is to 
8Fogarty , pp . 4 1-42 .  
9 
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this reference that the symbol refers and not to the referrent at all 
except by the indirect r elationship exist ing b etween the two . 
This key contention about the ind irectness o f  
the r elat ionship between the symbol and the 
referrent is of maj or importance to Richard s , 
because a failure to und ers tand and apply it 
is , for him , at the root of mos t  of the prob­
lems of conceptual meaning . The confu s ions of 
amb iguity and word shifts , multiple meaning , 
and out-o f-plac e  definit ions are ,  in his theory , 
at l east partly asc ribable to the making of 
direct relat ionships b etween symbols and 
referrents . 1 0  
To understand the symbol one must cons tantly check the reference . 
14 9 
Richards deplores "any absolute doctrine of proper meaning which assumes 
a direct , s table and real relation between word and thing . 1 1 1 1 From the 
s tandpoint of the public speaker , this can b e  a mos t  important concept . 
For one word or symbol there can be as many 
references or thoughts as there are persons 
to think them . The communicator faces as many 
interpretat ions o f  his symbols as he has hearers , 
and even each o f  these is momentarily changing . 
The hearer may be sure , when he hears a symbol , 
that it can mean something at leas t slightly 
d ifferent from �ny meaning it may have had at 
any other t ime in his hearing . 1 2  
Richards ' Theory o f  Definition 
Trad it ional definit ions of words lead to four d if ficul ties that 
should be  avoid ed by a pract ical theory o f  definit ion . There are confu-
s ions b etween real and verbal def initions or the d efining of words and 
things . Confus ion of the symbol and the referrent , forgetting the defini-
10 Richards ,  p .  2 .  
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tions are s ui te d  to  the o c casion in whi ch they are use d , and confus ing 
intens ive wi th extens ive de fini tions . 
Richards ' answe r to these four p roblems is  the 
p rinciple o f  indire ct  re l at ionship be tween the 
symbol and the re fe rrent . Wheneve r the re is a 
di f f i cul ty abo ut what a symbol me ans , when the re 
is a que s t ion o f  de f ini t ion , look fo r the re fe r­
rent . A re fe rren t conunon to all concerne d ,  in a 
dis cuss ion fo r ins t an ce , mus t be  fo und . 1 3  
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The range o f  de fini tion is f alsely limi t e d  because o f  the human pers is tent 
tendency to as s ume words have unal terab le me anings . Wo rds are act ually 
de f ine d according to the ir ul timate us e . A de fini t ion des i gned fo r use in 
a dis cuss ion may be q ui te di f feren t f rom one des i gned for ope rational pur-
p os es . These spe culat ive inqui ries re sul t  in Ri chards ' ins t ruments o f  
comp rehending . 
S ince Ri chards is conce rne d abo ut wo rds and thei r changing meanings , 
i t  is at all times wise to de fine the te rms he i s  exp laining Fhe way he 
intende d  them to  be interp re ted .  He re " comp rehending , "  "meaning , "  and 
" interp re t ing" are all o f  p rima ry importance to the unders t anding o f  
Richards ' theories .  
" Comp rehending , "  to Ri chards me ans , " an accurate and t rue unde r-
s t anding , but is de s cribed • • •  as the nexus or con text , or the ne twork o f  
con texts , that conne c t  a who le series o f  past  o c currences o f  part i ally 
s imilar ut terances in part ially s imilar s i t uat ions . This  comp rehension 
is the sei zing of meaning . 1 1 1 4 By me aning , Ri chards is t alking about the 
re fe rence wi th i ts con texts . Interp re tat ion includes  both the p ro cesses 
of seizing this �ne aning and having the comp rehens ion . 15 
1 3  45 . Fogarty , p .  
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Fogarty , p .  4 8 . 
1 5 4 8 . Fo garty , p .  
15 1 
Ri chards lists  s even speculative ins truments that he hope s will 
be the bas is for a new rhe tori c .  At vario us times he has cal led the se 
" tasks of rhe to ri c , "  " aims of dis course , "  " language function , "  and ·  "kinds 
of meaning . 1 1 16 
1 .  
2 .  
3 . 
4 .  
5 . 
6 . 
7 . 
Indi cating is pointing o ut the re fe rren t in 
the symbol s i t uation . 
Characteri zing s ays some thing abo ut the re fer­
rent , so rts i t  out from o thers . 
Realizing is the sense o f  unde rs tanding , having 
the re fe rence be fore the mind mo re fully o r  
vividly than i n  times o f  les s realiz ation . 
Valuing as sesses  the s aying from the s tandpoint 
of wor th or obl i gat ion . 
Influencing marks the s t at e  o f  wan ting to ch ange 
or p reserve un ch ange d  whateve r  the utte rance in 
que s tion conce rns . 
Controll ing the ins t rument is  making the de cis ions 
regarding the influence ment:i oned in the p re ceding 
paragraph . 
Purposing is the measurin7 o f  the inten tion o r  
mo t ive o f  the ut te rance . 1 
There is no ne cess ary s e t  o f  rel ationships among o r  b e tween these ins tru-
men ts . In Richards ' spe culat ion they may vary independent ly but they very 
s e l dom do so . The ins trumen ts actual ly have mut ual con t ro l  ove r  each o the r .  
These ins t rumen t s  are , o f  co urs e , us e d  b y  the heare r .  Howeve r ,  they can 
also be used by the speaker o r  o ri ginator o f  the mes s age to clari fy and 
obj e c t ivize his conununicat ion . 
16 
These ins trumen ts  as components o f  his sys tem o f  
comp rehens ion are the he art and the head o f  
Ri cha rds ' p roposed new rhe to ri c ,  the core o f  a 
di scip line that wil l  take the p l ace o f  the old  
rhe toric amon g the libe ral arts . A grasp o f  
such things and much p ract i ce and e xercis ing 
in them is Ri chards ' tentative answe r to the 
Fo garty , p .  4 8 . 
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rhe toric p roblem. As we s aw in the e arly p ages 
o f  thi s  analysis  of Ri chards ' theory , he is  dis­
s atis fied wi th the way current rhe tori c  con cen­
t rates upon the mere devi ces o f  p ersuas ive comp o­
s i t ion and spee ch .  He wants  a who le t reatment o f  
man ' s symbol- us ing p owe r i n  p rose , i ts philosophy 
as we ll as i t s  p ractical app li cat ion . He p ropos es 
tha t  this wholenes s  should b e  reflected in a new 
te aching rhe to ri c for clas s room use . 1 8 
1 5 2  
T o  Ri chards , rhe toric i s  the ar t o f  adap ting dis co urse to i ts end . His 
en tire philosophy is devoted to this p urp ose . Theo ries of e thos or 
character for the sp eaker , adap ting ones el f or dis cours e to the audience 
or lis tene rs in q ues tion , are all equated wi th the c lari fi cation of meaning 
and no thing more . Ce r tainly t ru th would seem , in this s cheme , whe re values 
and defini t ions are change ab le , an en t i ty that is  de f ined in terms of the 
purp oses and needs of the conununicants at the t ime in q ues t ion . 
His s chemati c  i de a  o f  me tho dology i s  to s t art 
with whateve r  s ti cks up as the mos t  ur gent and 
pertinent elemen t o f  a p rob lem , and then work 
in any di re ction at  all that has the s cen t o f  
t ruth . The importan t  thing , s eemingly to 
Ri chards , is to be ab le to s eek in any di re c­
tion , at any t ime . 1 9  
KENNETH BURKE 
To Burke "man p ours al l his ene rgies into es tab lish ing and main-
taining his personal world o f  hierarch i c  o rde r . " He further e laborates 
on thj s s ame tho ught : 
1 8 
His survival depends on i t . And rhe toric is  his  
speci fi c means of  seeking or keep ing that  o rde r . 
No t only in int rape rsonal relat ions , where man 
uses his rhetori c on h imsel f , where he holds 
inne r parliamen t as both speake r and heare r , 
Fogarty , pp . 54-5 5 . 
1 9Fogarty , p .  32 . 
L 
but , in all his in terpersonal , intergro up , and 
inte rclas s re lations , he is s triving for s t atus 
in an accep te d o rder , for survival by so cial 
2 0  balance wi th h i s  inne r s e l f  and wi th h i s  worl d .  
1 5 3 
For Burke , en tre aty , overture , poli t enes s  and dip lomacy are al l fo rms o f  
rhe toric co urt ship employed for the s ake o f  order . Rhe tori c leads men 
through the con flicts  and s c ramb le o f  everyday comp e t i tion for the neces-
s i t ies of l i fe . Burke sees the p os s ib i l ities for rhe tori c to als o  be the 
conveyance tha t wo uld me an new pe ace and order for a war-weary worl d . 
Richards app roache d rhe to ri c f rom the psychologi cal o rder , Burke ' s 
me tho d is  psychoso cial . The s cien t i f i c  me thod that in teres ted Ri chards 
is rep laced by the dramat i c  approach . o f  Burke . 2 1 
There are s ix aspects  to be exp lored in con side rat ion o f  Burke ' s 
concep t o f  rhe tori c .  
1 .  Burke ' s backgro und and. app roach t o  rhe tori c . 
2 .  The pentad format . 
3 .  The theory o f  abs t ract ion and the ne gat ive . 
4 .  The theo ry o f  iden t i fica tion and de fini t ion . 
5 . Hi s philosophy o f  li terary form .  2 2  
6 .  The ins t rumental app lications o f  the theo ry . 
The Pentad Fo rmat 
Burke was aware o f  a mul ti- dimens ional view o f  every human , symbol 
p ro ducing act . There are always thes e five points o f  view : 
S cenes , the envi ronmen tal point o f  view ; act , the 
thing i tsel f as rep resented in an idea ; agen t , the 
derivational or e f fi cien t cause aspec t o f  the thing ; 
20Kenne th Burke , A Rhe toric of Mo tives (New York : George 
Braz iller , In c . , 1 95 0 ) , p .  39 . 
2 1  
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agen cy , the "how" and "wi th what as s i s t ance" 
of  the thin� o r  act ; and purp ose , the agent ' s  
mo tiva t ion . 3 
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Wi th this me thod Burke hopes to  be  ab le to as cer tain the mul t iple 
aspects  o f  the me anings o f  symbols use d  to o rganize and p ro te c t  o ur posi-
t ion in the order o f  exis tence , Burke s tates th at  he o ften writes  in 
"pantalogue" to be cer tain to  cove r  all pos s ib le aspects  o f  a s i t uation . 
Theory o f  Ab s t rac tion and Negative 
Burke ' s  ideas o f  wo rd- though t- thing relat ionsh ips give a condi tion 
o f  real i ty to the exis t ence o f  ideas o r  though t as rep resenting the obj e ct 
concep tually • 
. • .  Burke can b e  conside re d  as having two things to  
s ay about abs t raction .  Firs t , it  is the character­
is t i cally human ab i li ty that makes a rat ional man 
speci fically rational . Not only is thi s ab s t racting 
powe r , whi ch Burke calls " generali zat ion , "  the spe ci­
fic  element o f  his essen ce as a man , but i t  l i f t s  his 
na ture , in kin d as well as in de gree , above tha t  o f  
o ther a.nimals . 2 4 
The ne gative comes int o  p l ay in the highes t kind o f  symb ol-us ing 
activi ty of wh i ch man is  cap able . This is symbo l- us ing about symbols them-
selves or  the cons cious use o f  wo rds to talk ab o ut o ther words . The theo ry 
o f  the negative comes into p lay he re as the di f fe rence between human and 
animal sorting . Wi th each i dea re ducib le to the mate rial the re is no need 
fo r the me t aphy s i cal reali ty o f  i deas . Burke isolated or iden t i f ied  the 
idea that canno t be reduced to an image and material i zed . 
2 3izenne th Burke , A _ Gra11!11a�Mo t_ives_ (Englewoo d  Cliffs , New 
Je rsey : P rent i ce-Hal l , Inc . , 1 945 ) int ro . , pp . xv-xvi i .  
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That i de a  was the idea o f  the "no" o r  " not , " 
or , in o ther wo rds , the negat ive . I t  i s  Burke ' s  
c ontention that "no t" can be conceived , in an 
ide a ,  and ye t one can have no image o f  i t . All 
the ima ges one h as in conne ct ion wi th it are not 
really i ts image but images o f  the re al things 
of wh i ch it is  the negat ion . 2 5  
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Thi s  gives the human being the unique cap ab i l i ty o f  b eing ab le to 
conceive an i dea fo r whi ch there is  not image . Earlier  in thi s  s tudy 
(p age 2 7 ) , the re is a re feren ce to a sophi s t i c  top i c  for disp utation "o lder 
than P ro tago ras himsel f , "  that s ays there can be no sp oken falsehood for 
the false has no exis tence . However , nothing can b e  con ceived or  spoken 
of that has no exis tence . I t  is  imposs ible to speak o f  the non-exi s tent . 
Here , 2 500 years late r ,  is the an ti thes i s . 
Though idea and image have be coine me rge d in the 
deve lopmen t of language , the negative p rovides 
the ins t rument fo r spli t t ing them apart . For 
the negative is  an i dea ; there can be no image 
of i t . But in image ry there is no ne gative . 2 6  
This le aves the negat ive a s  the sole examp le o f  an idea tha t canno t be 
reduced to materi al . 
Theo ry o f  De fin t i ion and Iden t i f i cation 
Burke ' s theory of de fini t ion is  emp i ri cal in the sens e that he 
looks realis t i cally at t he ac tual prac t i ce as use d  in rhe tori cal s i tua-
t ions . From observat ion he has isolated and i den t i fied fo ur types o f  
ambiguity that may arise i n  the p ro ce s s  o f  de f ini t ion . He then s t ates 
his p os i t ion of the use tha t is  made o f  these  in the creat ion of meaning 
in speech . 
25 Fogarty , p .  6 6 . 
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Kenne th Burke , " A  Dramat i c  View o f  the Origins o f  Language , "  
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The four types of  amo iguity are : 
1 .  Contextual definit ion d escrib es a c l as s  or 
group in t erms of  their environment without 
taking into ac count the charac teris t ics of 
memb ers of  the group . 
2 .  Derivat ional definition defines by sourc e .  
"Sourc es , however , are o f t en s o  highly 
abs trac t  in a definit ional s tatement that 
they allow many different meanings . Burke 
examines the terms ' general , ' ' gener ic , ' and 2 7  ' genit ive ' etymolo gically and f inds amb igu ity . " 
3 . Circumference shif t ing in the t endency to shi f t  the 
agreed on definit ion of a t erm to a new area as a 
discus s ion pro gres s es . 
4 . S cope-reduc t ion-deflection are us ed under var!�ng 
circumstances to change the scene of  the ac t .  
1 56 
Thes e amb iguities are the symbol-us er ' s  way of get t ing away f rom 
kinds of  meanings that do no t f i t  his mo t iva tion . They are o f t en us ed to 
reta.in ethos with the audience when get t ing a d es ired point ac cepted • 
• . • the fou r kinds of  def init ional amb iguity . • .  
(make) for uncl ear communicat ion and reception , 
but . • .  they are the symbol-us er ' s consc ious or 
uncons c ious ways o f  get t i ng away from the kind 
o f  meaning tha t does not fit  his mo t ivations . 
I t  is par t o f  the fortunate richness o f  lang·-
uage that makes it po s s ib l e  for people to adj us t 
thems elves to real ity . Per sonally and subj ec t ively , 
it allows them to b e  bl ind to real ity in one spot  
and no t ano ther .  The great po int about this kind 
o f  amb iguity , as abou t every kind o f  mo t ivat idnal 
manipulat ion of symbols ,  is that it mus t  b e  under� 
s tood thoroughly by tho s e  who wish to receive and 
communicate real meaning--mo t ivat ional meaning . 2 9 
To Burke , then , amb iguities are no t undes irabl e  in communication , but need 
to be studied with a view to clarifying the resourc es of amb iguity . For 
27  
Fogarty , p .  69 , 
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example , people in a d ialec t ical g ive and take have subj ective b l ind 
spots due to different mo t ivat ions . In the give and t ake of  discus s ion 
they may l ight up eachr : others b l ind s pot s , f il l  out contexts , round out 
and unify c ircums t ances , and generally come to some degree of mutual 
agreement in und erstanding and action . Burke l i s t s  mot ivat ional amb ig-
uities used by peopl e  not , necessar ily , to deceive , but often merely to 
fit the requirements of the moment . Pair t erms such as  love-du ty , piety-
impiety , the sacrif ice . and, the kil l , illus trate amb iguity of mot ivation 
and of t erms in a s imilar fashion . 
Of t en ,  too , the symbol-us er will build what Burke 
call s  eulogis tic and dys lo gis t ic labels for his 
acts , that enables him to indulge ,  whether con­
s cious ly or no t , for hims elf or for others , in 
limitless motivat ional window dres s ing .  Depending 
on one ' s known or unknown mo tive or s ituation , he 
can des cribe indus try either as "planned economy" 
or as "regimentation . "  Care with details can be 
labelled "fuss iness "  or "pains taking method . 1 130 
It is interes ting to note  here that neither al ternat ive is given 
preference over the other . The terms are used t o  adapt to the necess ities 
of the s ituat ion as they aris e .  
I am merely a t t emp t ing t o  suggest  that a termin­
ology o f  mo t ives is no t evas ive or s elf-decep t ive , 
but is moulded to f it our gener al orientat ion as 
to purposes , ins t rument alities . , the "good life , " 
etc . 3 1 
Identif icat ion 
The ident ification Kenneth Burke speaks o f  is in reality consub-
stant iat ion . Two people ,  different in other ways , may have one conunon 
factor in which they are subs tant ially the same . 
30 Fogarty , p .  74 . 
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A doctrine of consuostantiality , either explicit 
or implicit , may oe necessary to any way of  l ife . 
For substance , in the old philosophies , was an 
ac t ;  and a way of life is an acting together ; and 
in acting together , men have connnon sensations , 
concepts , image�� ideas ,  att itudes that make them consubstantial . 
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When us ing identif ication or consuhs tantiality to persuade  an aud ience , a 
speaker proceeds according to their way of thinking . When using emotion , 
the speaker feels the way the audience will b e  expec ted to f eel . On another 
occasion he will ident ify with some characteris t ic of the audience .  When 
talking to an aud ience of Boy Scouts ,  he m:ight descr ibe a scout troop he 
33 belonged to as a boy . 
It  is division, or part isanship , within any group of people that 
creates a need for identification . It  deals with one side of  a proposition 
as opposed to the o ther . Within a part isan group memb ers share an identi-
f icat ion and in this way it serves union and cooperation . 
Identif icat ion is aff irmed with earnes tness pre­
c isely b ecause there is d ivision . Identification 
is compensatory to d ivis ion . If men were not 
apart from one another , there would b e  no ne�� 
for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity . 
Fog�rty sums up Burke ' s  theory of  ident ification as "temporarily 
and topically assuming the rational , emot ional , and mo tivational level of 
one ' s  audience for the purpose of communicating mo t ivational meaning . 1 135 
3 2 Burke , "Rhetor ic of Mo t ives , "  p .  2 1 . 
33 Fogarty ,  p .  7 5 . 
34 
Burke , "Rhetoric of Motives , "  p .  2 2 . 
35 Fogarty , p .  7 6 .  
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The Philosophy o f  Literary Form 
The philosophy her e alluded to deal s with kinds o f  form ,  the 
l i terary symbol , ideology , eloquence , manner and s tyle . In the area o f 
form , Burke speaks of the innate ,  int ernal pat t erns o f expectancy within 
humans that are par t  o f  psycho logical and psychob iological pat t erns . The 
pat terns are the innat e  forms . 
They involve the bas ic  arrangement s  or pro ces s es 
l ike the succession o f  the s easons , s t ages o f  
growth , contrast o f  oppo s ites , and s o  on . Follow­
ing these innat e  expectancies is the pat t ern o f  
form in s tyle o f  wri t ing .  Burke calls the s e  forms 
of s tyle or t echnical forms " an arous ing and ful­
f illment o f  desires . That is , s tyle has form when 
it builds up for an expec tancy , with an innat e  form 
or pat t ern , and then answers that expectancy by 
sat isfying i t . 1 1 3 6 
An except ion tha t  Burke makes t o  this general rul e  for build ing 
and fulf illing of desires comes in the informa t ive conununicat ion . 
Anothe r  thing to b e  no ted is the ant ithesis between 
form and information in Burke ' s theory . When a 
literary product lacks form , it  is usually b e cause 
it is tha t  type o f  communicat ion which has as its  
purpose simply to relat e  facts  as they are . Even 
though this kind o f  obj ec t ive exposition is  hardly 
po s s ible in the s t r ic t es t  purity , pres ent-day sc ience 
aims a t  it as an ideal . Between this informat ional 
communicat ion and l i t erature of the r iches t form 
there c an ,  of cours e , b e  l i t erature with varying 
proport ions of the two . 3 7  
The l it erary symbol i s  s een by Burke a s  the "verbal paralle t o  a 
pat t ern o f  exper ienc e . 1 13 8 The ac tual experience being c it ed is no t part o f  
a pattern with which the l is t eners a r e  personal ly famil iar . However , some 
3 6Fogarty , p .  7 8 .  
3 7  
Fogarty , p .  7 9 .  
38 
Fogarty, pp . 7 9-80 .� 
part of the experience will r el at e to a s imilar one that is mo re fre-
quent and famil iar . Through the recall and associat ion , the audience 
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receives the meaning from the speaker . The experience to  which the aud i-
ence relates may be of small er magnitude than the one referred to by the 
speaker , but it allows the listener to under s t and what  he is hearing . 
Mark Antony used this sort o f  symbol when he showed the ingratitude o f  
Caesar ' s fr iends who had responded to his friendship w i t h  b etrayal and 
murder . 
Burke ' s und er s tand ing o f  ideology was that i t  was a general b el ief 
or j udgment that the ar t is t , orator , or writer can be sure the aud ience has . 
The more popular type o f  newspaper makes use o f  
such ideologies when its news ar t icles o n  j uvenile 
cr ime , let us say , imply that t eenagers ought to 
obey and respect their elders ; or its news art icles 
on s tr ikes imply two conf l ic t ing ideologies , the 
l iving wage and the need for publ ic order . A 
symbol with the appropria t e  exper ience pattern 
and based upon an ideology is charged with con� 
s id erable power . 3 9  
S tyle and manner will tell the speaker wha t  to  p u t  where and how much 
should go there . Elo quence ,  j o ined with the o ther two , s erves to give 
the d iscours e  the interest and appeal to gain accep tance f rom the aud ience . 
Some Instrumental Applications of Burke ' s Theory 
The pentad �s c it ed as the means of interpretat ion of communica-
t ion . In its broades t appl icat ion it  answers all quest ions that  might be 
asked about a problem . The categories are broad and within their conf ines 
will be found room for every possible quest ion that might ar is e . 4 0  
3 9 
Fogarty , p . 81 .  
40 
Fogarty , p.  82 . 
Ac t ,  S c ene , Agent , Agency , Purpose  b ecome the 
"pentad " f or pondering the problem of human 
mot iva t ion . Among these various t erms gram­
mat ical "rat io s" prevail which have rhetorical 
impl icat ions . One might illus trate by saying 
that a c ertain qual ity of s c ene cal l s  for an 
analogous quality of act . Hence , if a s itu­
ation is said to be of a certain nature , a 
correspond ing att itud e t oward it is implied . 4 1  
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The explanat ion given for this c ites the speaker who implored tha t  Pres i-
dent Roosevel t b e  given "unusual powers " b ecause the country was in an 
"unusual internat ional s itua t ion . 1 14 2  Th is focus on c ir cums tances as a 
determinant in the qual ity of the a c t ion is relat ed to Aristo t l e ' s treat-
ment of mo t iva t ion . 
S trongly all ied with the clas s icis t s  throughout 
ai! his works in both his ideas and his metho­
dology , Burke shows indeb tedness  to Aris totle for 
his treatment o f  mot ivat ion . Taking a c lue from 
Aris totle ' s considerat ion o f  the "c ircumstances " 
of  an action , Burke concludes that "In a rounded 
statement about motives , you mus t  have some word 
that means the act , • • •  and another that names the 
scene ; • • •  also , you must  indicate what person or 
kind o f  person performed the act , what means or 
instruments he used , and the purpo s e . 4 3  
The rat io b e tween the s cene and t h e  ac t may b e  used either to show that a 
c ertain pol icy had to b e  adopted , or that one should be adopted . 
The application of  the ident if ic at ion princ iples to rhetoric is 
two-fold . Ident if icat ion may b e  used in per suas ion and it may b e  used as 
an end in itsel f . 
4 1  
Marie Hochmuth Nichols , "Kenneth Burke and the New Rhetor ic , " 
Contemporary Theor ies o f  Rhetoric , ed . ,  Richard L .  Johannesen (New York : 
Harper and Row , 1 9 7 1 ) , p .  1 09 .  
42  
Nichols , p .  1 09 . 
43 
Nichols , p .  1 09 .  
As for the pr ecise r elat ionship between ident i­
f icat ion and persuas ion as ends of rhetor ic , Burke 
concludes , "we might well keep in mind that a speaker 
persuades an audience by the use of s tylistic ident i­
f icat ions ; his act of persuas ion may be for the pur­
pose of caus ing the aud ience to identify itself with 
the speaker ' s  interes ts ; and the speaker draws on 
ident if icat ion of  interests to es tabl ish rapport 
between himself and his aud ience . So , there is no 
chance o f  our keep ing apart the meanings o f  per­
suas ion , ident ification ( consubs tant ial ity) and 
communicat ion ( the nature o f  rhetor ic as ' addres sed ' ) . 
But , in given instanc es , one or another of these 
elements may serve bes t  for ext ending a l ine o f  
analys is in some part icular d irect ion . 44 
The other purpo s e  of  ident if ication in rhetor ic , as an end in 
itself , is : 
Ident if icat ion , at it s s imples t  level , may be  a 
del ib erat e  device , o r  a means , as when a speaker 
id ent if ies his .· interests with those  of his aud i­
ence . But ident if ication can also be an "end , "  
as when people earnestly yearn to id ent ify them­
s elves with some group or other . "  They are thus 
no t necessarily acted upon by a conscious ext ernal 
agent , bµt may act upon themselves to this end . 
Ident if icat ion " includ es the realm of  transcend­
ance . 1 145  
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In Burke ' s  concept of  rhetor ic , the s ense o f  "moral s "  or "ethics" 
is introduced on the intrapersonal level when the proces s o f  persuas ion is 
turned inward in the process .  of justif ication for one ' s  stand on some issue . 
44 
45 
By consid ering the ind iv idual s elf as "aud ience" 
Burke br ings morals and ethic s into the realm of 
rhetoric . He notes that a "modern ' po s t-Christ ian ' 
rhetoric mus t  also concern itself with the thought 
that , under the head ing of appeal to aud iences , 
would also be  included any ideas or images privately 
address ed to the individual self for moralis t ic or 
incantatory purposes . For you b ecome your own aud i­
ence • • •  when you become invo lved in stylis t ic sub­
terfuges for presenting your own cas e to yourself 
in sympathet ic t erms • • • •  Therefore ,  the "ind iv idual 
Nichols ,  p .  1 0 1 . 
Nichols , pp . 1 0 1 - 1 02 . 
person , striving to form himsel f in accordanc e  with 
the connnunicative norms that match the cooperat ive 
ways of his society , is by the same token concerned 
with the rhetor ic o f  ident ification . 1 14 6  
Etho s , a s  the character o f  the speaker , the total o f  habits , 
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cus toms , is thus very closely all ied to  Burke ' s theory of identif icat ion . 
Whenever the speaker is us ing ident i f ication , interpersonally to an aud i-
ence or intraper sonally to self , he is identifying and estab lishing ethos . 
RICHARD WEAVER 
There are two or ientations that  are cons idered es sential  to any 
study o f  the wr it ings o f  Richard Weaver . The first o f  thes e is his poli-
t ical conservat ism and the second , his Platonic ideal ism • 
• • •  Weaver championed the Agrarian ideal o f  ind ividual 
ownership of privat e  property and disdain of s cience 
as inadequate to deal with values . He d es ir ed in 
society law ,  order and cohesive d ivers ity . The just 
and ideal society , he b el ieved , mus t  r ef lect real 
hiearchy and essential d is t inct ions . An orderly 
soc iety following the vis ion o f  a Good Purpose ,  
with men harmoniously funct ioning in the ir proper 
47 stations in the structur e , const ituted Weaver ' s goal . 
The Platonic idealist in Weaver s tr enuously rej ected the theor ies of  the 
general semant icis t and progress ive educator . 
4 6  
Secondly , Weaver was a d evot ed Platonic ideal is t . 
Bel ie f  in the r eal ity o f  t ransc endentals , the 
pr imacy o f  ideas , and the view that  forin is prior 
to substance cons t itut ed his philo sophical founda­
t ion . While not a Platonist in all matter s , he yet 
Nichols , pp . 1 05-1 06 . 
4 7 Richard L .  Johannesen , Rennard S t r ic kland and Ralph Eubanks , 
eds . , "Richard M .  Weaver on the Nature o f  Rhetor ic : An Int erpretat ion , " 
Language is Sermonic (Baton Rouge :  Louis iana State Univers ity Pres s , 
1 9 7 0) '  p .  1 1 . 
looked for soc ietal and personal salvat ion to · ideals , ess ences , and principles rather than 
to the trans itory , the changing , and the 
expedient . 48 
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This s tudy of  the writ ings of Richard Weaver will cons ider first , 
Weaver ' s  concept ion of the nature o f  knowledge . Nes t , the nature o f  man 
in regard to the scient istic interpretat ion opposed to the human qualities 
that defy scient if ic analysis will be looked at from Weaver ' s perspective . 
Here also will come a d is cuss ion o f  Weaver · s ob servat ion that "as a man 
speaks so he is . "  Four sour ces of  authority are the bas is for this "classi­
f icat ion" of men by argument sources . 4 9 The discuss ion of  Weaver will con..,. 
elude with statements of Weaver ' s  conc ept s  of rhetor ic and the func t ions of  
the teacher . 
The Nature of  Knowledge 
Central to understanding other theor ies developed by Richard Weaver 
is his concept of the nature of knowledge . His concept was complex but 
did note three orders of  knowledge . 
He partially agreed with Mort imer Adler that there 
are three "orders" of  knowledge . First  is the level 
of  particulars amd individual facts , the s imple data 
o f  science . S econd is the level of  theories , pro­
pos it ions• .:and generalizations about these fac t s . 
Third is the level of  philosophic evaluat ions and 
value judgements about such theor ies . At this third 
level , ideas , universals , and f irst  pr inciples func­
t ion as j udgement standard s . Knowledge based on 
part iculars alone and on raw physical sensations 
is suspec t s ince it is incomplete knowledge . T38e 
knowledge is o f  universal and f irst  principles . 
4 8  Johannesen , p .  1 1 . 
49  
Johannesen , pp . 2 1 -25 . 
50 Johannesen ,  p .  1 2 . 
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This knowledge o f  universals was t o  be arrived a t  in three ways : through 
dialec t ic , the abil ity to d ifferent iat e  existents into categories , and 
through "intuition , the ab ility to grasp ' essent ial correapondences . 1 1 15 1  
Certainly Weaver ' s concepts o f  the "good " were part o f  his unders tand ing 
of the nature o f  knowledge . 
The ultimate "goods "  in society were of  central 
concern to Weaver . Real ity for him was a hier­
archy in which the ultimate Idea of the Good con­
st ituted the value standard by which all o ther 
existent s could be appraised for degree o f  good­
ness and truth . Truth to him was the degree to 
which things and ideas in the mat er ial world cop- _ 
form to their ideals , archetypes , and ·es.sences .  � 2 ·· 
Nature of  Man 
Dur ing the Nineteenth Century a b elief in the all-power ful and 
revealing scient if ic method entered our way of  thinking . The Indus trial 
Revolution had already developed a method for use in s tudy of  the physical 
world and the resultant material advantages confounded the minds of the 
Nineteenth Century philo sopher . Certainly it seemed desirable to apply 
t he same methods to the humanit ies that had done so much for the physical 
s ide of our existenc e . The pro cess began . Experimentation moved from the 
phys ics and chemis try laboratories into the psychology and rhetoric class-
rooms . Men were to be analyzed in the same manner as chemicals and physi-
cal forces . To do this men had to be reduced to chemicals and physical 
forces . The result , Weaver po ints out , has been to downgrade the study of  
53  rhetoric and to demean the "human" or "emotional " qual it ies of  men . 
5 1  Johannesen , p .  1 2 .  
52  Johannesen ,  p .  1 2 . 
53 Richard Weaver , "Language is 
R .  L .  Johannesen ,  et al . (Baton Rouge : 
1 9 7 0 ) , pp . 20 1 -204 .  
Sermonic , "  Language is Sermonic , ed . , 
Louis iana S tate Univers ity Press , 
In this case we have to deal with the most  potent 
o f  cultural causes , an alterat ion o f  man ' s  image 
of man . Something has happened in the rec ent pas t  
t o  our conc ept o f  what man is ; a decis ion was made 
to look upon him in a new l ight , and from this deci­
s ion new b ases of  evaluat ion have proceeded , which 
aff ec t  the pub l ic reputation of rhetor ic . This 
changed conc ept o f  man is b es t  described by the 
word "scient is t ic , "  a term which denotes the appli­
cation o f  s c ient ific as sumpt ions to subj ec t s  which 
54 are not wholly compr ised o f  naturalis t ic phenomena . 
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Weaver goes on to expla in that this led to man ' s  ef forts  to deny the emo-
t ional s ide of his being . 
From this datum it was an easy inference that men 
ought increas ingly to b ecome sc ientists , and again , 
it was a s imple derivative f rom this notfon that man 
at his best is a logic machine , or  at  any rate an 
aus terely unemot ional thinker . Furthermore , carr ied 
in the train of this conception was the thought , not 
often expres sed , o r  course ,  that things would be 
better if men did not g i�� in so  far to being human in the humanist ic sense . 
What was includ ed in this "humanis t ic sense" were the capac it ies to feel 
and suffer , to know pleasure , emo t ional ity , the capacity for aesthet ic 
sat is f ac t ion . It  was generally f el t  any such experiences were to be mis-
trusted and such incl inat ions in the ind ividual wer e better suppressed . 
Rhetor ic had always recognized this "human" s ide of  human beings and was 
therefore thrown into greater disrepute . 
54 
Under the force o f  this narrow reasoning , it was 
natural that rhetor ic should pas s  from a s tatus in 
which it was regarded as o f  questionable worth to a 
s t ill lower one in which it was positively condemned . 
For the mos t  obvious truth about rhetoric is that its 
obj ect is the whole man . 56 
Weaver , p .  203 . 
55  Weaver , 204 .  p .  
56 205 . Weaver , p .  
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Weaver recognized that man ' s  fund amental humanness res ides in 
four areas : 
He held that man ' s  fundamental humaness is founded 
in four facult ies , capacit ies , or modes of  appre­
hension . Man possesses a rat ionai or cognitive 
capac ity which gives him knowledge ; an emot ional 
or aes thet ic capacity which allows him to experi­
ence pleasure , pain , and beauty ; and ethical capa­
c ity which determines orders of goods and j udges 
between right and wrong ; and a rel igious capac ity 
which provides yearning for something inf inite and 
gives �9 a glimpse o f  his destiny and ultimate 
nature . 
Plato ' s influence on Weaver may in part account for his tri-part ite 
division of man ' s nature . Though the d ivis ions are not the same , both did 
adhere to the same type perception of  the nature of  man . 
Weaver used a tr ipar t ite division of body , mind , and 
soul to further explain man ' s essent ial nature . The 
body , man ' s phys ical being , houses the mind and soul 
dur ing life but extracts its due through a constant 
downward pull toward ind iscriminate and exces s ive 
satisfact ion of sensory pleasure • • • •  Man ' s mind or 
intellect provides him with the potential to appre­
hend the s t ructure of  reality , define concepts , and 
rationally order ideas • • • •  Man ' s soul or spir it--depend­
ing upon whether it has b een trained well or ill-­
guides the mind and body toward love of the good or 
toward love o f  physical pleasures • • . 58 
It  has been ment ioned that central to Weaver ' s  rhetorical theor ies 
was his pol itical cons ervatism .  This is reflected in his thinking abou t 
the nature of man as ind icated from the s tylis t ic charac teris tics and modes 
of argument he uses in his speech . Weaver po int ed out that a frequent use 
of  the word "but" ind icated a balanc ed po int of view toward world affairs . 
5 7Johannes en ,  pp . 1 3- 1 4 . 
58 Johannes en ,  p .  14 . 
The modes of  ar gument were even more spec ific ind ic ators of  a person ' s 
philosophical or ientation . 
"A man ' s  method of argument is a truer index of 
his belief s than his explicit profes s ion of pr in­
c iples , "  Weaver held as a bas ic axiom . "A much 
sur er index to a man ' s polit ical philosophy , " he 
f elt , "is his characterist ic way of  thinking , 
inevitably expressed in the type of argument he 
prefers . "  Nowher e does a man ' s  rhetor ic catch up 
with him more complet ely than in "the topics he 
chooses to win other men ' s  assent . 1 1 59  
Weaver looked to the Ar istotelian topo i for  the arguments that would 
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det ermine the philosophy of  the speaker . These topics , used as the bas is 
for argument in persuasive speeches , Weaver ranked f rom most  ethically 
des irab l e  to the l east . The basis for his j udgement was the philosophic 
conception of reality and knowl edge . The mos t  ethically des irable topic 
was that that rel ied on genus or on def inition . 
A speaker would make the highest order of appeal 
by basing his argument on genus or def inition . 
Argument from genus involves arguing from the 
nature or essence of things . It as sumes that 
there are fixed classes and that what is true 
of a given class may be imputed to every memb er 
of that class • • •  Def initions should b e  rationally 
rather than empirically sus tained . Good def ini­
tions should be st ipulat ive , emphas izing what­
ought-to-be , rather than operat ive , emphas iz ing 
what-is • • •  Weaver also included argument f rom 
fundamental principles and arguments from 
example� • •  He believed that argument from genus 
or d ef inition ascribe "to the highest real ity 
qual it ies of stas is , immutab il ity , external 
perdurance . 1 1 60 
Argument from s imilitude or analogy was placed second in Weaver ' s 
order of the topics . He noted that some o f  our d eepest intuitions about 
59Johannesen ,  p .  20 . 
60Johannesen , p .  22 . 
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the world around us are expressed in the form of  comparisons . Al though 
no t able to portray the ac tual ess ence o f  the thing at the moment , the 
use o f  the comparison indicates an awareness of  it . 
In this mode o f  argument are embraced analogy , 
metaphor , f igurat ion , comparison , and contra s t  . 
• • •  The user o f  an anlogy hints at an essence he 
cannot at the moment produce . Weaver asserted 
that "behind every analogy lurks the possib ility 
of  a general term . 1 16 1 
Third in the hierarchy of topics is caus e and ef fect . In this 
category Weaver includes argument from cons equences . 
This method of argument and its subvar ieties , he 
felt , charac ter ized the radical and the pragmatist . 
Causal argument operates in the realm o f  "becoming" 
and thus in the realm of flux . Argument from con­
s equences attempts to forecas t results  of some 
cour se o f  ac tion , either very des irable or very 
undes irable . The results are a determining fac tor 
for one in deciding whether or no t t.o adopt a pro­
posed ac t ion . Arguments f rom cons equences , Weaver 
observed , usually ar e completely "de6� id of refer­ence to principle or def ined ideas . "  
The fourth and least desired o f  the topics is argument from c ircum-
stance . This is the mark of the true liberal in Burke ' s  eyes . Here is one 
who is eas ily impressed by exis ting tangibles--with the s tatus quo . 
The arguer s f rom c ir cums tance , conc erned no t with 
"concept ions of verit ies but qual it ies of percep­
t ions , "  lack moral vis ion and possess only the 
illusion of reality • • • • "Actually , " he explains �  
"this argument amounts to a surrender of  reason . 
Maybe it expres ses an ins tinctive feel ing that in 
this s ituation reason is powerless . Either you 
change fas t or you get crushed . But surely it 
would be a couns el of desperation to try only 
this argument in a world suf fering f rom aimless­
ness and threatened with destruction . 1 163 
61 Johannesen , p .  2 3 . 
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Weaver has been criticized for his narrow view o f  critic ism for 
as certaining the relative cons ervativeness or lib eralness  o f  a speaker . 
He has over emphasized the "agency" o f  Burke ' s  pentad at the expens e o f  
the agent , act , scene and purpose . Never theless , the sys tem was meant 
to show a bas ic qual ity of reason deeply rooted in the mind . Those  who 
naturally turn to a princ iple and def inition for their argument s have the 
cas t  of mind that is less l ikely to be swayed by changing circumstances . 
On the o ther hand , one who cons is tently chooses c ircumstance or expediency 
as the premis e for argument is fully tuned to a society in flux and is 
ready to �uit his arguments to the needs  of the moment . 
Weaver ' s  Concept of Rhetoric 
Richard Weaver saw rhetor ic as neces sarily concerning itself with 
the right and wrong of policies and ac t ions . By its very nature , rhetoric 
has to funct ion in an advisory capac ity and tho s e  who prac t ice it are 
advisors .  
Rhetoric is advisory ; it has the o f f ice o f  advis ing 
men with referenc e to an independent order of goods 
and with refer ence to their particular situat ion as 
it relates to thes e .  The honest rhetoric ian , there­
fore , has two things in mind : a vis ion o f  how mat t er s  
should g o  ideally and ethically , and a cons ideration 
of  the special cons id erations of his aud itors . Toward 
both o f these he has a responsibil ity . 64 
Weaver , always the conservative , was deeply inf luenced by clas s ic rhetoric 
in his concept ions of  the nature o f  the art . He , at one point , widened 
the s cope o f  rhetor ic beyond the purely linguis t ic . 
64 Johannesen , p .  1 7 . 
As his writings on rhetoric show , he was familiar 
with the ancient theories o f  Plato , Aris totle , 
Cicero and Quintilian . And Plato ' s  views on the 
subj ect held a special attrac t ion for him .  The 
influence of Kenneth Burke is al so cl early reflec ted 
in Weaver ' s writings on rhetoric . At one point 
Weaver views rhetoric as a process of  making id ent i­
f icat ions and he wid ens the scope o f  rhetoric beyond 
linguis t ic forms to include a "rhetoric o f  matter or 
scene , " as in the ins tance of a bank ' s erect ing an 
imposing o f f ice building to s trengthen its image . 65  
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The Platonic id ealist in Weaver perceived rhetoric a s  cons tantly 
showing men "better versions .of  themselves , l inks in that chain extending 
up toward the id eal which only the intellec t can apprehend and only the 
soul have affection for . 1 166  
The Aristotelian influence manif es t ed itself  in his  r ecognit ion of  
the relationship between d ialec t ic and rhetoric . 
Like Ar is to tle , Weaver per ceived a close relat ionship 
between d ial ec t ic and rhetoric . Dialec t ic , he main­
tained , is a "method o f  inves tigat ion whos e  obj ect is 
the es tablishment of truth about doub tful propos it ions • 
• • •  Dialec tic involves analysis and synthes is of  funda­
men�al terms in controvers ial quest ions . Both dia-
lec t ic and rhetoric operate in the realm of probab ility . "67 
Inherent in the practice o f  rhetoric is the use of  words . Weaver ' s 
concept o f  the place o f  words in the meaning of  things was d irectly con-
trary to that of Richards . To Weaver , the meaning is in the word . To b e  
sure at some time a n  obj ect receives a name . That essence for which the 
symbol s tand s b ecomes so as sociated with the word that to change the mean­
ing would b e  to shake the foundat ions o f  civilizat ion itself . 68 Weaver 
65  Johannesen , p .  1 6 . 
6 6  Johannesen ,  p .  1 7 .  
67Johannes en ,  p .  1 9 .  
68 
Richard Weaver , "Relat ivism and the Use o f  Language , " Language 
is Sermonic , ed . ,  Johannes en et al . ,  pp . 1 1 5- 1 3 5 . 
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also recognizes words d o  change from t ime t o  t ime in the ir meaning . 
However , this is only done with the assent o f  the people belonging to 
the culture that uses the word . 
Closely as soc iated with this is the definition of that which is 
unique .  
I t  must surely be granted that whatever is unique 
defies def inition . Def inition mus t  then depend on 
some kind of  analogical relat ionship of a thing with 
o ther things , and this can mean only that definition 
is ult imately c ircular . • • •  Such conclusions lead to 
the threshold of  a s ignif icant commitment : utlimate 
def inition is as  Aris totle af f irmed , a matter o f  
intuition . Primord ial c0ncept ion i s  somehow in us ; 
from this we proceed as already no ted , by analogy , 
or the process of  f ind ing resemblance to one thing 
in ano ther . 69 
Weaver equates this loss of true def inition of words with the 
decline of a culture in "Relat ivism and the Use of Language . "  He points 
to terms such as " freedom , " "democracy , "  and others that no longer can be 
precisely def ined for every occasion and draws some parallels with these 
confusions and those exist ing in sophis t ic Athens . 
Certainly one of the mos t  important reJ..ev:at:ions 
about a per iod comes in its thoery o f  language , 
for that informs us whether language is viewed as 
a bridge to the 111onmnental or as a body of f ic t ions 
convenient for grappling with transitory ehenomena . 7 0  
Wha t  can be done to restore the purity of the language? Weaver 
looks to the educator for the answer . 
69weaver , "The Power o f  the Word , "  ed . ,  Johannesen , pp . 4 1 -43 .  
7 0weaver , "The Power o f  Word s , "  p .  35 . 
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Weaver ' s Views on Educat ion 
Firs t , in a general nature , Weaver sees poetry as the vehicle to 
bring the s cope of  meaning again into the unders tand ing o f  men . It takes 
minds with imaginat ion and genius to give meanings to word s . This is the 
realm of the poet . 
In brief , the d iscipline o f  poetry may be expected 
f irst to teach the evocative power o f  words , to 
introduce the student ,  if we may so put it , to the 
mighty power of symbolism ,  and then to show him 
that there are ways of feeling about things that 
are not provincial either in space or time . po$try 
of fers the f airest hope o f  restoring our los t unity 
o f  mind . 7 1  
With the instruc tion in poetry would come foreign languages . Here 
the s tudent would be brought face to face with the conc ept of unchangeable 
meanings . He part icularly favored the introduct ion of  Greek into the cur-
7 2 riculum . Another aid in reestablishment o f  the concept o f  stable word 
definitions would be  the s tudy o f  Socratic d ialect ic . 
The s tudent will get a training in def inition which 
will compel him to see limitation and contrad iction ,  
the two things about which the philosophy o f  pro­
gress leaves him most confused . In ef fect , he will 
get training in thinking , whereas the b es t  that he 
gets now is a vague admonition to think �or himself . 7 3 
Progress ive educat ion with "s tudent centered " ins tead of  "teacher 
centered " learning is not conduc ive to teaching the true meanings of things 
in Weaver ' s view .  The teacher i s  plac ed in charge of  his clas s a s  a "def iner" 
and the s tudents should be able to look to him (or her) to f ill this role . 
7 1weaver , "Word � "  p .  53 . 
7 2  ' 'Word , "  53 . Weaver , p .  
7 3weaver ,  "Word , "  p .  55 . 
The teacher is , accord ing to Weaver , a "definer , "  
a "namer , "  and an "orderer , "  of  the universe o f  
meanings .  Af ter all , h e  argues , the "world has 
to be named for the benefit of each oncoming 
generation . "  Those who give the names have a 74  unique role in order ing and controlling soc iety . 
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Accord ing t o  Weaver i t  was in the Fourteenth Century that a cho ice 
was made between teaching vere locqui ( to speak the truth) and rec te loqui 
( to speak correctly) . The choice was made for recte loqui b ecause if the 
"new" theories being d isclosed by Franc is Bacon . In Advancement of  Learn-
ing he s tated " the essential forms or true differences of things cannot by 
any human d iligence be found out . 1 17 5  
Empir ic ism was gathering s trength , and the decis ion 
was to teach rec t i  loqu i ,  as one can d iscover in the 
manuals o f  rhetoric o f  the Renaissanc e .  Once the 
ontological referrent s were given up , however , this 
proved but an intermediate . . s tage , and the course 
cont inued unt il tod ay we can d is cover on all s ides 
a third aim, which I shall take the liberty of 
phras ing in a parallel way , utiliter loqu i . 7 6  
This util iter loqui  i s  describ ed as the hand maiden o f  succes s . 
This is us ing language for betterment of  pos ition in the world . It is 
using "language as a tool which will enabl e  you to get what you want if 
you use it well--and well does not mean scrupuously . 1 1 7 7  
Those who teach Engl ish o n  this level are the modern 
sophists , as the homely realism of the world s eems to 
recognize . They are doing what the orators were once 
accused of do ing , making speech the harlot o f  the art s . 
74weaver , "To Wr ite the Truth, " intro . ,  Johannesen , p .  1 86 . 
7 5  Weaver , 
7 6  Weaver , 
7 7weaver , 
"Truth , "  
"Truth " .. ' 
"Truth , "  
p .  1 88 . 
p .  1 8 8 . 
p .  1 89 . 
More specif ically , they are us ing the universal ity 
of language for purposes which ac tually set men 
against one another . They are teaching their 
s tudent s  to prevail with what is , f inally , verbal 
deception . 78  
The t eaching of  rec te loqui  s eems more respec table b ecause it  
teaches a sort of  eti.quette . •  , Becaus e it seems the bet ter o f  the two , 
there. is danger in its promot ion • 
• • •  recte loqui requires the language o f  social 
"proper ty . "  B ecause it reflects mor e  than any­
thing els e  a worldliness or satisfaction with 
exis t ing institut ions , it is the speech of 
pragmatic acquiesc ence . Whoso s tops here con­
fesses that educat ion is only ins truct ion in 
mores . Is it any wonder that pro fessors have 
b een contemptuously grouped with danc ing masters , 
sleight-of-hand ar tis t s , and vendors of  pat ent 
medicine? 7 9 
1 75 
The only alternative lef t is to teach people to speak the truth 
and this can only be done when the teacher recogni zes the existence of the 
. truth and the fac t  that the truth can be ascertained and transmitted to 
others . 
This means teaching people to speak the truth , 
which can b e  done only by . g iving them the right 
names o f  things . We approach here a critical 
point in the argument , which will determine the 
poss ib ility of  def ining what is correc t in expres­
s ion . 80  
Weaver was not unaware o f  the arguments that would be brought to 
bear against this proposal . The idea o f  def ining and clearly stating what 
is right and what is wrong has departed from the classroom . In the spirit 
7 8weaver , "Truth , "  p .  1 89 . 
7 9  "Truth , "  1 9 1 . Weaver , p .  
80 "Truth , "  1 9 1 .  Weaver , p .  
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of  "let t ing the child learn t o  think f o r  hims el f , " and the belief that 
there are many pos s ible answers for any ques t ions , the teacher has b een 
impressed with his own inadequacy in making an accurate assessment o f  the 
truth of any s ituation . In light o f  this , he f eels very inadequate when 
called on to make positive s tatements of  definition of concepts that have 
become loosely def ined . 
I am no t unaware o f  the ques t ions which will come 
crowdiµg in at this point . It will be asked : By 
what ac t  of  arrogance do we imagine that we know 
what things really are? The answer to this is : 
By what act o f  arrogance do we s et ours elves up 
as teachers ?  There are two pos tulates bas ic to 
our pro fes s ion : the f ir s t  is that one man can 
know more than another , and the second is that 
such knowledge can b e  impar ted . Whoever canno t 
accept both should ret ire from the profes s ion 
and renounce the intention of teaching anyone 
anything . B l 
Much more could b e  wr itten in explanation nf these views of our 
modern-day Platonic philosopher . I t  is to ; be  hoped that these sunnnary 
statements of Weaver ' s views of rhetoric will s erve our ends for compar i-
son with other rhetor ic ians with s imilar and differ ing points of view .  
Conclus ions 
This discuss ion of modern concep ts of ethos has concerned itself 
with three contras t ing and influent ial philosophical approaches to the 
f ield of rhetoric . It  is relevant to the topic in the broad sense of 
ethos seen as the total character o f  the speaker . This would include his 
bas ic acquis ition of knowledge and skills , his concepts of relat ivism or 
8 1weaver , "Truth , "  p .  1 94 • 
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permenance o f  value s tructure, , and his id eas o f  the true purposes and 
goals of rhetor ic . It must  also involve the aud ience members ' expec ta­
t ions and reactions to the speaker , bo th as ind ividual s and members of 
a group . These are the id eas this chapter has dealt with . 
The moderns have gone much further . Answers to modern concepts  
o f  ethos quest ions are  not complete as  presented her e . 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
I t  has been the purpose o f  thi s s tudy to dis cove r the s imilari ties 
and di f ferences that exi s t  be tween clas s i cal and mode rn concep ts of e thos 
and to dis cover relationships o f  the concep ts to philosophical value sys­
tems . The his tori cal approach was used involving a search o f  lite rat ure 
to dis cove r the philosophi cal o rientations o f  the p eriods in quest ion and 
o f  the rhe toricians wri ting during that p eriod . Wri tings of se lected 
rhe to ricians were searched for speci fic concepts of ethos . The s tudy 
was focused by asking seven ques tions that were to be answered during the 
course o f  the inves tigation : 
1 .  What philosophi cal value sys tems p rovide the b ases fo r the 
concep ts o f  e thos set  forth by clas s i cal rhe to ricians ? 
2 .  What concep ts o f  e thos are se t forth by clas s i cal rhe tori cians i 
3 .  What s imilarit ies and di f ferences exist b e tween the concep ts 
of  ethos set forth by clas s i cal rhe toricians ? 
4 .  What value sys tems provide the bases for the concepts o f  
ethos se t forth b y  mode rn rhe tori cians ? 
5 .  What concep ts o f  e thos are set  fo rth by mode rn rhetoricians ? 
6 .  What similari ties and di f fe rences exi s t  be tween the concep ts 
of  e thos set forth by modern rhe to ricians ? 
7 .  What similarities and differences exis t be tween concep ts of  
ethos s et  forth by class ical and modern rhe toricians ? 
1 78 
1 79 
This paper has deve loped value systems o f  the ancients in some 
de tail . As mentioned before , this is  of  p rimary concern in the s tudy of  
e thics . A rhe torician who accep ts the concep t that each man has the 
ability to grasp the right and wrong thro ugh ins tinc tive inborn knowledge 
mus t have a dif ferently s t ructured view of  the re lationship o f  the o rator .. 
to his audience . He re there can be no comp romise with the t ruth that 
remains cons t ant for all men at all t imes and unde r all condit ions . On 
the o ther hand , a rhe torician whose value sys tem is colored by a view-
point that "man is the measure o f  all things , "  will see nothing incons ist-
ent wi th a speaker free ly adap ting his mes s age , his audience appeals , evi-
dence and his own character to the o ccasion at hand . When no man has the 
percep tion to dis tinguish right from wrong be cause he cannot verify the 
t ruth of his s ens ory percep t ions , who can demand that the rhetorician dis-
p lay absolute reverence for a value sys tem that has no o ther qualifi cat ion 
than someone else ' s possibly false impress ion o f  ri ght and wrong? 
If  e ach rhe to ri cian fell neatly into his s lo t  for one camp or the 
o ther , this port ion o f  the paper  would be s imp licity itself . The origin-
ators of  the concep ts de fined them clearly ,  and that is why they are 
inc luded in dis cussion of the opposing s t ances . Rhetoricians are more 
practi cal than this , p erhaps , and it is no t unusual to find them us ing 
concep ts from all camps as needed . Because o f  thi s comp lexi ty and poss-
ible confusion these concepts have been p laced in chart fo rm wi th page 
re ferences . 
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S imi lari t ie s  and Di f fe rences in 
Classi cal Philosophical P re cep ts Use d in 
Bases for E thos in Rhe tori c 
Al l impress ions are gained 
thro ugh sensory experience . 
Re fe rence in mind may /may not 
be s ame as fact , as ano ther ' s 
re ference . Canno t communicate 
references . 
Repeated sense p erceptions 
res ult in as signment o f  
degrees of  p robability 
to some cons tructs . 
Asso ciation o f  ideas 
from sense pe rceptions 
to fo rm de grees o f  
probability 
Pro tago ras , 20 , 2 1  
Gorgias , 2 2 , 2 5 , 2 6  
Arcesi laus , 7 9  
Carneade s , 7 9 , 80 
Co rax , 1 7 ,  1 8  
Gorgias , 2 4 ,  2 5  
Carneades , 79 , 80 
Cicero , 88 , 89 , 90 
Carneades , 7 9 , 80 
Cicero, 88 , 89 ,  90 
----- - -- .--------------- ·------ --
Inductive reasoning from 
repeate d  s ensory expe riences 
results in absolute 
de fini t ions . 
Ins tinctive re action 
to experlence of the 
truth 
Me taphysical , ins tinct ive 
trans cendental knowledge 
gives men ri ght and 
wrong concep ts 
Socrates, 33 , 34 , 35 
Cullus Gillius , 7 7 , 78 
Meado r , 7 7  
S toics , 7 7 
Plato , 4 0  
Isocrates , 66 
Ari stotle , 5 3 ,  54 
--- · ··------ - ·�-------- -
1 8 1 
Similarit ies and Di fferences in 
Ethics in Clas s i cal Rhetori c 
Truth , vir tue . nobility 
o f  characte r are obj e cts 
of education 
Ptah-Ho tep ,. 1 4  
Protago ras , 22 
Plato , 4 1  
Ari s tot le , 4 8 , 4 9 , 5 0 
Isocrates , 6 3 ,  66 , 6 7 
Ad He rrenium ,  8 2  
Quintilian , 9 7 , 98  
Cicero , 90 , 9 1 , 93  
·-------- ---------------------- ----
Obj e ct ive o f  education 
is ma terial success 
Pro tago ras , 2 2 , 32 , 6 3  Corax , 1 7 
Go rgi as , 2 7 ,  32 , 6 3  Isocrates , 6 3 , 66 , 6 7 
----- --- -------·--·- · 
Education , convi ct ion , 
come firs t , then 
spee ch .  
So crates , 38 , 39  
Plato , 4 1 , 4 2 , 4 3 ,  44 
Aris to t le , 56 
Ad_ Herrenium , 82 
Ci ce ro , 9 1 , 92 
Quintilian , 99 ,  100 
------- - -·--- --- - - -·--- ----
Virtue can be taught . 
Virtue canno t be 
taugh t .  
Nature o f  man 
to do goo d  
Nature o f  man i s  deprave d 
Protagoras , 2 2  
So crates , 34 
Gorgias , 2 7 
Plato , 4 1  
Isocrates , 30 ,  6 3 ,  6 4 , 65 
So crates , 3 7 , 39  
P lato , 4 1  
Aristo tle , 5 4  
Iso crates ,  7 1 ,  72 
--------- --- -- ---- - · -- --- - - - - · ----------
S tudy and us e o f  nob le 
themes results in noble 
nature for orator 
Good man is involved in 
affairs of man , the 
s tate 
Good man removed from 
society , lives in 
world o f  Ideas 
Isocrates , 70 
Quintilian , 9 8 , 9 9  
Isocrates , 6 1 ,  62 , 6 4 , 65 , 6 6 , 6 8 , 69 , 70 
Cicero , 92 
Quintilian , 95 , 96 
Plato� 46 , 6 9  
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Similarities and Di fferences in 
Ethics in Clas s i cal Rhetoric and Education 
None but honorable 
means to at tain 
hono rable ends 
L"i e when needed 
to attain hono rable 
ends 
Adap t any way nee ded 
to attain any des ired 
end 
Broad l iberal arts 
education prepares 
speaker 
Orato r sho uld be 
t rained from infancy 
I f  goo d  for society , 
goo d  for individual 
Men are vi r tuous 
for material gain 
Orator mus t be a good man 
Men are virtuous be cause 
through education they 
realize this is true 
happ iness 
Rhetoric  neut ral , no 
built in value sys tem 
Doctrine of  the mean 
Aris totle , 52 , 5 3 , 5 4  
Quintilian , 1 0 1 , 102 , 1 0 3  
A d  Herrenium ,  84 , 95 , 86 
Isocrates , 66 , 6 9 , 70 , 7 1  
Ci cero , 9 1 , 92 
Quintilian , 95 , 96 , 9 8 , 99  
Piato , 4 1 ,  42 , 43  
Quintilian , 95 , 98  
Aris totle , 5 1  
Isocrates , 6 7 
Plato , 4 4  
Isocrates , 6 7  
Quintilian ,  95 , 96 
Plato , 42 
Isocrates , 36 , 6 7  
Aris to tle , 5 1  
---- --- -- - - -- - ---
Gorgias , 2 7  
Corax , 1 7 , 1 8 
Aris to tle , 52 
So urces of etho s  
are sagacity , high 
character and 
good wi ll 
E thos gained 
during speech , 
not p rior 
op inion 
S imilari t ies and Dif ferences in 
Concep ts of E thos as P resented in 
Clas s ical Rhetoric 
Ari s to t le , 5 5 , 5 6 , 5 7  
Iso crates , 6 6 , 6 7 , 7 0 
Ad He rreniuro ,  82 
Ci ce ro , 90 , 9 1 , 9 3  
Quintilian ,  9 9 , 1 00 
Aris to t le , 54 , 5 5 ,  56E thos 
Cicero , 9 3  whole 
l i fe , 
from 
o f  
hab i t s  
--------- - --· 
In yo uth , 
modes ty aids 
e tho s 
Be a friend to 
the audien ce , 
i den t i fy interes ts 
wi th theirs , 
p raise them 
Exordium used 
to gain goo d 
will o f  the 
audience 
Adap t to the 
audience , forge t  
o r  change rules 
as needed 
Rules for 
conciliat ion 
o f  the Judge 
How to handle 
the opposition 
to gain favor 
o f  audience 
Aris to tle , 5 8 , 5 9  
Cicero , 9 3  
Quintilian , 9 7  
Aris t o t le , 5 9  
Corax , 1 7  
P lato , 4 5  
Ad Herrenium ,  84 , 
85 ,  8 7 
Nat uralnes s  
aids e thos 
Tell s t o ries 
to  win favor 
of the 
audience 
Corax , 1 8  Ins inuat io 
Ad Herreniu� , 84 , 85  Exo rdium 
Quintilian , 1 0 1 
Isocrates , 7 3 ,  9 6  
Cicero , 9 3  
Quin t i l ian , 96 , 9 7  
Ad Herrenium , 84 , 
85 86 
Adap t to 
audience , 
rules allow 
for this 
_!\d Herrenium ,  8 3 ,  85 
Cicero , 9 3 
Quinti lian , 100 
Ptah-Ho tep ,  15 
Ad Herrenium , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 
Cicero , 9 3 
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Ar i s totle , 5 2 
Ad Her reniuro ,  82 
I socra tes , 6 3 , 64 , 66  
Cicero , 9 1 , 9 3  
Quintilian , 9 9 ' 100 
P t ah-Hotep , 1 4 '  1 5 ' 
Ad Herrenium ,  8 7  
Quintilian , 9 7 , 98  
Isocrates , 7 3 
Ad Herrenium , 86 , 87 
Ad Her renium , 85 , 86  
Quintilian , 1 00 
Ptah-Ho tep , 1 5  
1 6  
Plato , 44 , 45 
Ari s to tle , 5 7 , 5 8 , 5 9 
Ad Herrenium , 85 , 86 
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Similarit ies and Differences in 
Modern Philosophical P re cep ts Used as 
Bases for Concep ts of Ethos 
in Rhe toric 
---·--·--- --- ---- ------
All impress ions are gained 
thro ugh sensory experience . 
Re ference in mind may /may no t 
be equal to fact , equal to  
any o ther re ference held by 
someone els e . Re ferences 
canno t be connnunicate d .  
Repeated sense per cep t ions 
result in degrees of  
probability , re8ult in 
adop t ion o f  language 
symbols 
As sociat ion o f  ideas from 
sense percept ions form mo re 
abstract asso ciations for 
p robabilities and language 
us age . 
Induct ive re asoning from 
repeated sensory experiences 
results in first truths , 
de finitions . 
Instinct ive reaction to 
the experience of the 
truth . 
Me taphys ical , ins t inctive , 
trans cendental knowledge 
gives men knowledge o f  
truth , right and wrong 
p recept s . 
---- - -·
John Locke , 1 09 
John Locke , 1 0 9 , 1 10 
David Hume , 1 1 4 ,  1 1 5 
Geo rge Campbell , 1 2 9 , 1 30 , 1 33 
I .  A .  Richards , 144 
Kenne th Burke , 1 60 
David Hume , 1 1 4 ,  1 1 5 ,  1 16 
George Campbell , 1 2 9 , 1 30 , 1 33 , 1 34 
I .  A .  Richards , 1 44 , 145 , 1 4 7 , 14 8  
Kenne th Burke , 1 60 
Richard Wha tely , 1 40 
Geo rge Campbel l , 1 2 9 , 1 3 1 ,  1 32 
Richard Weaver , (against , 1 6 8 )  
Ri chard Whately , 1 40 
Hugh Blair ( good tas te ) , 1 2 1 , 122  
Thomas Reid , 1 05 
George Campbell , 1 2 9 , 1 3 1  
Thomas Re id , 1 04 
George Campbell , 1 2 9 , 1 3 1 
Hugh Blair , 1 2 1 , 1 22 
Richard Weaver , 1 63 ,  164  
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Similarit ies and D i f feren ces in 
Ethics in Mo dern Con cep ts o f  
Education and Rh etoric 
Discourse is outward 
and inward thought . 
------· ----
Teache rs should give 
rules for circums tantial 
de�ini tions . 
Teachers should teach 
abso lute de fini tions . 
Universals are creat ions 
of man from exp er iences .  
Universals are part  o f  
" real" world out s ide 
man ' s experience . 
No image for the negat ive , 
man alone can conceive this . 
Opposed to s cientistic  
s tudy o f  humanities . 
Pre fer s cient istic  approach 
to the humanities to the 
syllogis ti c .  
Ambiguous defini tions 
serve men ' s purposes . 
Ambiguo us de finitions are 
sign of deteriorating cul t ure . 
Ri chard Whate ly, 1 40 
Kenn eth Burke , 1 5 2 , 1 5 3 , 1 62 
Kenne th Burke , 1 5 7  
I .  A.  Richards , 1 4 9 , 1 5 0 , 1 5 1  
Richard Weaver , 1 7 3 ,  1 74 
David Hume , 1 1 4 ,  1 1 5 
John Lo cke , 1 09 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 3 
George Campbell,  1 3 3  
Hugh Blair (tas te ) ,  1 2 1 , 1 2 2  
Ri cha rd Weaver , 164 , 1 6 5  
Kenne th Burke , 1 5 9  ( form) 
Kenne th Burke , 1 5 4 , 1 5 5  
Richard Weaver , 1 6 4 , 1 65 , 1 66  
John Lo cke , 10 9 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 3  
David Hume , 1 1 4 ,  1 15 
George Campbell , 1 32 ,  1 33 
I .  A.  Ri chards , 1 44 
Kenne th Burke , 1 60 
Kenneth Burke , 1 55 , 1 5 6 , 1 5 7 
· ---- · - -- ------- ----
Ri ch ard Weaver , 1 7 2 
·---- - - -- -- -- --- --··- "----·- --- - - ·-·- --- ---- -
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S imilari ties and Differences in 
Ethics in Modern Concep ts of  
Educat ion and Rhe toric 
Men are good , virtuous , 
when shown this is 
Chris t ian , true happ iness .  
Men express virtuous 
sent iments when needed . 
Experience , t rue knowledge , 
eduaation , before speaking . 
Believe in what you say .  
Truth , right def ini tions 
are the obj ect  of educat ion . 
Truth will p revail ,  
all else being equal . 
Broad education in 
literature , liberal arts . 
Rhe toric  is neutral , 
no built- in value 
sys tem.  
Antithe tical dialectic-­
al ternatives o f  different 
degrees of  p robability .  
Change de finit ions to 
suit purposes . 
Hugh Blair , 1 1 9 ,  1 2 0  
Kenne th Burke , 1 5 2 , 1 55 
John Locke , 1 09 , l lO ,  l l  l 
Hugh Blair , 1 2 2  
Ri chard Whately , 1 4 0  
Richard We aver , 1 7 1  
Richard Weaver , 1 7  5 ,  1 7 6 
Richard Whately , 1 4 1  
Ri chard Weaver , 1 7 3  
Richard Whately , 1 39 
Kenne th Burke , 1 5 5 , 56 , 1 5 7  
I .  A .  Ri chards , 1 44 
George Campbell , 1 33 
----- ·------- ---- -------
Kenne th Burke ,  1 55 , 15 6 , 1 5 7  
---- ---- ---
1 8 7  
Simi lari ties and Dif ferences in 
Modern Concep ts of  Ethos in Rhe toric 
Modes ty o f  expres sion 
promotes ethos , in 
youth espe cially . 
Acconunodat e to a 
skep tic audience . 
Tes timony an unrel iable 
form of proo f . 
Tes t imony a p re ferred 
form of  proof . 
Rules for use o f  tes t imony . 
Argument from definit ion 
most  ethi cal . 
S ty le o f  sp eaking dif fers 
for dif ferent types o f  
speaking t o  gain credi t 
with the audience . 
Use ins inuatio exordiurn 
when needed . 
Too intense s tyle lessens 
persuas ibility--etho s . 
I f  appropriate , intensity is 
mos t effective for etho s .  
Hugh Blair , 1 2 5 , 1 2 7  
Hugh Blair , 1 2 7  
Kenne th Burke , 1 56 , 1 5 7  
David Hume , 1 1 7 ,  1 1 8  
Ri cha rd Weaver , 1 6 8  
Hugh Blair , 1 2 1 
Geo rge Campbell , 1 2 1 
Ri chard Whately , 1 40 , 1 4 1  
Richard Whately , 1 4 0 , 1 4 1  
Richard Weaver , 1 6 8 , 1 6 9  
Hugh Blair , 1 2 3 , 1 2 4 , 1 2 5  
George Campbell , 1 3 7 , 1 38 
Hugh Blair , 1 2 7 , 1 2 8  
Hugh Blair , 1 2 4 , 1 2 5 , 1 2 6  
Hugh Blair , 1 2 4 , 1 2 5 , 1 2 6 , . 
1 2 8 
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Classical and Mo dern Philosophical Pre cep ts 
Used as Bases for Concep ts of Ethos 
All impress ions are gaine d 
through sensory experience . 
Re ference in mind may /may no t 
be equal to fact , equal to any 
o ther reference he ld by some­
one e ls e .  Re ferences cannot 
be connnunicated 
Repeated sense percep tions 
result in degrees of  prob� 
abili ty , resul t in adop t ion 
o f  language symbo ls . 
As sociation o f  ideas from 
sense percept ions form mo re 
abs tract asso ciat ions for 
probab i li t ies and language 
usage . 
Inductive reasoning from 
repeated sensory experiences 
results in firs t t ruths , 
de f ini t ions . 
Ins t inct ive re act ion to  
the experience o f  truth . 
Me taphysi cal , ins t inct ive , 
trans cendental knowledge 
gives men right and wrong 
concep ts . 
in Rhetori c 
P rotagoras ,  2 0 , 2 1  
Gorgias , 2 3 ,  25 , 2 6  
Arces i laus , 7 9  
Carneades , 7 9 , 80 
Co rax , 1 7 ,  1 8  
Gorgias , 24 , 2 5  
Carneades , 7 9 , 80 
Cicero , 88 , 89 , 90 
Carneades , 7 9 ,  80 
Cicero , 88 , 89 , 90  
Socrates , 33 , 34 , 35 
John Lo cke , 109 , 1 1 0 
David Hume , 1 1 4 
John Lo cke , 109 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 3 
David Hume , 1 1 4 , 1 1 5  
George Capmbell , 1 2 9 , 1 30 , 1 3 3  
I .  A.  Ri chards , 1 4 4  
Kenne th Burke , 1 60 
David Hume , 1 1 4 , 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 
George Campb ell , 1 2 9 , 1 30 , 1 3 3 
I .  A .  Richards , 14 4 , 145 , 1 4 7  
Kenne th Burke , 1 60 
Richard Whate ly ,  1 40 
George Campbell , 1 2 9 , 1 3 1 , 1 32 
Ri chard Weaver , (agains t , 1 68)  
Richard Whately ,  1 40 
Cullus Gill ius , 7 7 , 7 8 Hugh Blair ( t as te ) l 2 1 , 1 22 
Meador , 7 7  
S toics , 7 7  Thomas Reid , 105 
P lato , 40  
Is corates , 66  
Aris tot le , 5 3 , 5 4  
Geo rge Campbe ll , 1 2 9 , 1 3 1  
Thomas Reid , 1 04 , 1 05 
George Campbe ll , 1 2 9 , 1 3 1 , 
Hugh Blair , 1 2 9 , 1 31 
Richard Weaver , 1 6 3 , 1 64 
1 8 9  
E thics i n  Class ical and Mode rn Concep ts o f  
Educat ion and Rhe tori c 
- -- - - - - - -··· - · - ·· - · - --�---- --- · - - --·-------··------
Men are vi rtuo us 
be cause , through 
educat ion , they 
re alize this is  
t rue happiness . 
Men are virtuous fo r 
own material gain . 
Prefer s cientis ti c 
app roach to reaching 
conclus ions in the 
humani t ies over use 
o f  sy llogism. 
Amb i guous de fini tions 
are si gn of de teriorating 
cul ture . 
Ambi guous def ini tions 
aid in reaching ends . 
No image for · the 
negative , man alone 
can achieve this . 
No image for the false 
or ne gative , there fore 
man canno t conceive i t . 
Rhe toric is advisory ,  
shows men be tter 
ve rs ions o f  themselves . 
Plato , 4 1  
Iso crates , 36 , 6 7  
Ari s totle , 5 1  
Iso crates , 6 7  
Hugh Blair , 1 1 9 , 1 2 0  
Kenne th Burke , 1 52 , 1 5 5  
So crates , 34 Kenne th Burke , 1 5 7  
John Lo cke , 1 09 ,  1 1 0 Isocrates , 6 1 , 6 2  
David Hume , 1 1 4 
George Campbell , 1 2 9 , 1 30 , 1 33 
I.  A.  Ri chards , 1 44 
Plato , 44 
Isocrates , 2 9  
Richard Weaver , 1 7 2 
Go rgias , 2 6 , 2 7 
Kenne th Burke , 1 5 6 , 1 5 7  
Kenne th Burke , 1 5 4 , 1 5 5  
Sophists , 2 7  
Pro tago ras , 22 Hugh Blai r , 1 1 9 , 120  
Plato , 4 5  Ri chard Weave r , 1 7 0 
Aris to t le , 52 , 5 3 , 54 , 55 
Quintilian ,  
Isocrates , 70 
1 9 0  
E thics i n  Clas s i cal and Modern Concep ts of  
Educat ion in Rhetori c 
Experience , true knowledge , 
education , convi ct ion , 
be fore speaking . Believe 
in what you say .  
Truth , virtue , the 
obj e cts o f  education . 
Nature o f  man to do 
good , truth will p revail . 
Study and use o f  nob le 
themes , s tudy li terature , 
poetry , foundation for 
bro ad and noble meanings 
used in rhetori c .  
Rhe toric i s  neut ral , no 
built-in value sys tem. 
Antithe ti cal diale ctic , 
al ternative solut ions o f  
different degrees o f  p rob­
ability . 
Nature of  man to be 
skep tic , dep raved , mus t 
adap t for this kind o f  
audience . 
Adap ting meanings and me thods 
to attain any end . 
/ 
Cicero , 9 1 
Socrates , 38 ,  39 
P lato , 4 1 , 42 , 4 3 , 44 
Aris to tle , 56  
Ad He rrenium, 82 
Isocrates , 70 
P tah-Ho tep ,  14 
Protagoras , 22  
Plato , 4 1  
Aris to tle , 48 �49 , 50 
Socrates , 3 7 ,  39  
P lato , 4 1  
Aris to t le , 54  
Isocrates , 70  
Cicero , 9 1 ,  92 
Quintilian , 98 ,  99  
Go rgias , 27  
Co rax, 1 7 , 18  
Gorgi as , 25 
Geo rge Campbe ll, 1 33 
Isocrates , 72 
John Lo cke ,109 , 1 10 , 1 1 1  
Hugh Blair , 122  
Ri chard Wha tely ,  140  
Richard We aver , 1 7 1  
Isocrates , 6 3 , 66 , 6 7 , 7 0 , 7 1 , 72 
Ad Herrenium,  82 
Cicero , 9 1 , 9 3  
Quintilian , 93 , 97 
Ri chard We aver , 1 74 , 1 75 
(Truth will p revail)  
Ri chard Whately , 1 4 1  
Richard Weave r, 1 73 
Richard Whately , 1 39 
I .  A .  Richards , 144 
Kenne th Burke , 1 55 , 156 , 1 5 7  
Hugh Blair , 1 1 9 ,  1 2 0 , 12 1 
Ad He rremium ,83 , 84 , 85 Kenne th Burke , 155 , 
Quintili�,m , 1 0 1  1 5 6 , 1 5 7  
1 9 1 
Concep ts o f  Ethos in Clas s i cal and Mode rn 
Rheto ri c 
Sources o f  e thos 
are s agaci ty , high 
character , an d 
good wi ll . 
Etho s gained during 
spee ch , no t p rior  op inion . 
E thos from whole 
o f l i fe , hab i ts . 
Ethos can be s t ronges t 
form of  persuas ion . 
In youth , modes ty 
aids e thos . 
Naturalness aids 
e thos . 
Be a friend to audience , 
identi fy interes ts and 
charac ter t rai ts  wi th 
them. 
Exordium used to gain 
good will of the 
audience . 
Ins_inuatio Exordium. 
Argument from de fini tion 
is mos t ethical . 
Ari s totle  55 , 5 6 , 5 7 
' 
Iso crates , 66 , 6 7 , 7 0 
Ad Herreni um ,  82 
Ci cero , 90 , 9 1  
Aris totle , 54 , 55 , 5 6  
Cice ro , 9 3  
W_eaver , 1 64 , 1 68 
Ad He rreni um ,  82 
Isocrates , 6 3 , 64 , 66 
Cicero , 9 1  
Quintilian , 95 
Ar is totle , 52  
Quin tilian , 9 3 , 95 
Hugh B lai r ,1 2 2 , l 2 3 
Geo rge Campbell ,1 36 , 1 39  
Ri chard Whately ,  1 42 
P tah-Ho tep , 1 5 , 1 6 
Hugh Blair , 1 2 1 , 1 2 2 , 1 2 3 
George Campbe ll , 1 36 
Richard Whately , 142  
Richard Weaver , 1 64 
Ari s totle (e thos during spee ch) , 55 , 56 
Ri chard Whately ( rep utation , p rior 
e thos ) , 1 42 
Aris tot l e , 5 8 , 5 9 
Cicero , 9 3 
Ad He �reni um , 87  
Quintilian ,  9 1 , 9 4 
Qui tni l i an , 75 
Hugh Blair ,  1 2 5 , 1 2 7  
Hugh Blai r , 1 2 3  
Ri chard Whate ly , 1 4 3 
----- - ------
------
------------
Ari s totle , 59  
Co rax , 1 7 
Plato , 4 5 
Ad He rre�ium , 80 
Kenne th Burke , 1 5 7 , 1 5 8 , 1 6 1 
Ri ch ard Weave r ,  1 7 1 
Corax ,  1 8  Hugh Blair , 1 2 3 , 1 2 6 
Ad He rreni um ,  83 , 84 , 85George Campbell , 
Quintilian , 10 1 (no in homi­
le t i cs )  1 39 
Ad Herrenium , 85 ,  86 Hugh Blair , 1 2 7 , 1 2 8  
Quintilian , 1 00 
P lato , 45  
Aris tot le , (Maxims and firs t  t ruths )5 6 , 5 7 , 58  
Ri chard We aver , 1 64 
--------------- - - - --- ------
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CONCEPTS HELD IN COMMON BY CLAS S I CAL AND MODERN RHETORI CIANS 
!fan ' s Onl�u r ce o f Knowledge is Senso.!'Y._ Exper ienc� 
Protagoras : 
Gorgias : 
Carneades : 
John Lo cke : 
Geo rge Campbe l l : 
I .  A. Ri chards : 
Kenne th Burke : 
Ri chard Weaver :  
Each person knows only his  own image o f  an obj ect . 
Truth is  individual p er cep t ion . 2 0 ,  2 1  
No man can conceive or  t ransmi t images o f  ideas . 
There can be no communicat ion o f  the abs tract . 
2 2 ' 25 ' 2 6  
There is n o  dis ce rnible dif ference between t rue and 
f alse percep t ion , there fore , no way to  know i f  expe ri­
ence is  t rue o t  l i fe or no t .  7 9 , 80 
Al l we know is gained through sens o ry experience . 
Only this experience can be t ransmi t te d  t o  ano ther 
who has had the s ame expe rience . 109  
Re cognized thought-word- thing relat ionship s .  
1 2 9 , 1 30 ,  1 33 
Re co gni zed the indire c t  relationship b e tween obj ect  
and ment al image . The symb o l , o r  wo rd , is tied 
dire c t ly to  the obj ec t  on the one hand and the mental 
image on the o the r .  Guides are given to  communi can ts 
to  ident i fy refe ren ces for symbols . 1 4 7 ,  1 48 ,  1 4 9 
Di f ferent p eop le will have varying de fini tions for 
words as circums tances change . 1 5 4 
Los s  o f  p recise  wo rd de fini t ions is  a s i gn of a 
de teriorating culture . 1 72 
Repeated Experienc;es Res ul t  in Re cogni tion of " De grees of  P_rob ab i l i ty " for 
Cons truct s  
Corax : 
Gorgias : 
- So crates : 
Aris to t le : 
Re commended reas oning f rom p robab i l i ty in co ur t . 
1 7 ' 1 8  
An t i thet i cal diale c t i c  arrives  a t  co unter p ropo­
s i t ions o f  vary ing degrees of p robab i l i ty . 2 5  
Rep eated expe rien ce o r  obs e rvation res ults  in 
absolute de fini tions . 33 , 34 , 35 
Us e the experiences of the audience to es tab lish 
common gro und in persuas ion . 59 
I so crat es : 
Cameades : 
Cicero : 
----
David Hume : 
George Campbell : 
I .  A .  Ri chards : 
Kenne th Burke : 
Richard Weaver :  
Experience and observation p roves the value of 
virtue . 36 , 67  
1 9 3  
Es t ablished degrees of  p robab i l i ty f o r  knowledge 
expe rientially gained . 7 9 , 80 
Argument based on degree of p rob abi l i ty . 88 , 89 , 9 0  
Repeated expe riences result i n  increas ing p rob­
ab ility for the t ruth of a phenomenon . 1 1 4 , 1 1 5 
"Deduct ive evidence" o f  repeated experiences and 
"moral evidence" lead to p ropos i t ions o f  varying 
degrees o f  p rob ab i l i ty .  1 2 9 , 1 30 ,  1 3 3  
As so ciat ions o f  ideas along preconceived guideline s 
can aid in the det ermination of  word meanings . 
1 4 8 , 1 4 9  
Di f ferent cir cums tances wi ll result i n  different 
interp re t at ions of the s ame term.  P robability o f  
de fini t ion de termined b y  co-exis ting condit ions . 
1 60 
De fini t ions or argument taken from circums t ance o r  
shi f t ing o f  conditions-- f rom as sociations-- called 
the leas t e thi cal . If t aken from hi s tori cal , or 
cause to e f fe ct , s ince it happened this  way b e fore 
it sho uld again , then this use of p robab i l i ty is 
se cond only to the leas t e thi cal . 1 6 8 , 1 6 9  
There i s  a Trans cendental Area o f  True Knowledge o f  Pure I deas , Removed 
from Sens ory Percep tion , Whi ch all Men Hold in Common But do not Always 
Use and May Not be Aware o f  
Plato : 
Aris to tle : 
Thomas Reid :  
Hugh Blair : 
This universal realm of  I deas held holds truths for 
all men for al l t ime that are "above"  everyday sen­
sory experience . Man should s t rive to  live and 
theorize in this " I deal Repub li c . " 40 
Re cognized an ideal s tate o f  virtue , truth and happ i­
ness , unrelated to material gain or earthly power . 
These truths are the true goals men seek and the 
ones that ul t imately triumph . 5 3 , 54 
Common sense of man is an innate t rait . 104 
"Good tas te" is a common inborn t rait o f men .  
1 2 1 , 1 2 2  
1 9 4  
George Campbe l l : Firs t truths are known intui t ive ly to man ( they are 
int ui t ive ly recognized when expe rience d ) . 1 2 9 , 1 3 1  
Richard Whate ly : Firs t t ruths and vi rtue are no t the concern of  
rhe tori c . 1 4 0  
Richa rd Weaver : True knowle dge is a f un c t ion o f  the mind , the reason , 
and is  ideally colore d by as few " experiences" as 
poss ible . Sho ul d  be concerne d wi th the trans cend­
en tal realm of I deas , no t t ran s i tory exp e rience .  1 7 2 
Wo rd Meanings are in Peop le ,  Not Words Meanings are in Words 
P ro tagoras , 2 0 ,  2 1  
Gorgias , 2 2 , 25 , 2 6  
John Lo cke , 109 , 1 1 0 
George Campbell ,  1 2 9 , 1 30 ,  1 3 3  
I .  A .  Richards , 1 4 8 , 1 4 9  
Kenneth Burke , 1 5 6 ,  1 5 7  
Plato,  4 0  
Ari s t o t le , 5 3 , 5 4  
(Thomas Re i d )  
(Richard Whately ) 
Ri chard Weaver, 1 7 0 ,  
1 7 1 , 1 7 5 
Rhetoric is  Advisory , Should Show Men 
Be t ter  Versions of  Themselves 
Rhetoric is Amoral 
P l ato , 4 1  
Aris to t le ,  4 8 ,  4 9 , 50 
Iso crates , 6 3 , 6 6 , 6 7 , 7 0 ,  7 1 , 7 2  
Quinti lian , 9 7 , 9 8  
Hugh Blai r,  1 1 9 ,  1 2 0  
Geo rge Campbell , 1 36 
Kenne th Burke ( for peace and order) 1 5 2 
Ri chard Weaver, 1 7 0 ,  1 7 1  
The Obj ect  of  Educat ion i s  to Teach 
Truth , Right and Wrong , Ethics 
P ro tagoras , 2 1  
Plato , 4 1  
Aris totle,  4 8 ,  4 9 , 50 
Isocrates , 6 3 , 6 6 , 6 7  
Cicero , 90 , 9 1 ,  9 3  
Quintilian, 9 7 , 9 8  
Hugh Blair (religious spe ,3king)  1 1 9 , 1 2 0  
George Campbell ( religious spe aking) 1 2 9 , 1 3 1  
Ri chard Weaver , 1 73 , 1 74 
Gorgias (omits ) 
Ad He rreni um, 84 , 85 
John Locke 
(Only exp er iences ) 1 1 2 , 1 1 3  
Ri chard Whate ly, 1 40 
I .  A .  Ri chards,  1 5 2  
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Conclus ions 
This s tudy exp lored the hyp o the s i s  that s imi larit ies and d i f f er­
ences exis t be tween clas s i cal and modern concep ts of ethos and that the 
concep ts  can generally be iden t i f ied with philsophi cal value systems . 
I t  was focus e d  by the following seven ques t ions : 
( 1 ) Wha t  philsophical value sys tems p rovided the b ases for the concep ts  
o f  e thos set  forth by clas s i ca l  rhe toricians ? 
( 2 )  Wha t concep ts of  e thos are s e t  for th by clas s i cal rhe tori cians ? 
( 3 )  What s imilar i t ie s  and dif feren ces exi s t  be tween the concep t s  o f  ethos 
set forth by clas s i ca l  rhe toricians ? 
( 4 )  Wha t value sys tems p rovided the bas e s  for the concep ts  o f  e tho s set  
for th by mo dern rhe toricians ? 
( 5 ) What concep ts o f  e thos are s e t  fo rth by modern rhe t or i c ians ? 
( 6 )  What s imilari t ies and dif ferences exis t b e tween the concep ts  o f  e thos 
set forth by modern rhe toricians ? 
( 7 ) What s imi larit ies and dif ferences exi s t  b e tween con cep t s  o f  e thos s e t  
forth b y  clas s i cal and mo dern rhe toric ians ? 
In answe ring thes e  ques tions the following conclus ions were reached : 
( 1 )  Clas s ical value sys tems that could serve as b as e s  for concep ts o f  e thos 
were idealis t i c , nat uralis tic , and p ragmat ic . 
( 2 ) Ethics in clas s i cal p e r io ds large ly s aw educat ion as p roduct ive o f  
righteous life  s tyles and rhe tori c as  advi sory . 
( 3 )  S imilari t ies in c las s ical concep t s  o f  e thos are found in agreement on 
the importance o f  audie: 1 ce analys i s , speake r wis dom ,  and speaker honesty 
or s agacity . Di fferences are seen in emphas is given to  audience adap t a­
t ion and speech con ten t .  
( 4 )  Mode rn value sy s tems that have rela ted to the con cep ts  o f  e thos in 
rhe toric  have been predominan t ly nat uralis t i c  and p ragmat i c .  
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(S ) Educat ion and rhetoric  are more gene ral ly cons idered amoral , unre lated 
to value s t ructures , by mo dern theo ris t s . 
( 6 ) Modern theories o f  e thos emphas ize the imp o r t an ce o f  the sp eaker ' s  
repu tat ion and language us age . They differ  on the importance o f  con­
tent , purpo se , an d forms o f  p roof needed to  gain credib i l i ty . 
Re commendat ions for Fur ther S t udy 
( 1 )  In- dep th s tudies o f  individua l  rhe t o ricians o f  the c las s i cal , 
Renaissance and mode rn periods should be done . 
(2 ) Ext ens ive s tudies should b e  made o f  curren t research in the 
area of e thos in rhe t o ri c .  
( 3 )  Co rrelat ive s t udies o f  the inte rre lat i onship s  be tween his torical , 
poli t i cal , philosophical and rhe tori cal events should be made . 
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